Address be presented to his Majesty, to return his Majesty the Thanks of this House, for his Majesty's most gracious Message; to assure his Majesty, that we feel it our indispensable duty to support his Majesty to the utmost, in making every exertion for improving the signal advantages of the present campaign, and for completing, under the blessing of God, by continued perseverance and vigour, the general deliverance of Europe, from the insupportable tyranny of the French republic; and that we will therefore cheerfully concur in enabling his Majesty to make good his engagements with the Emperor of Russia, to give assistance to the Swiss Cantons for the recovery of their ancient liberty and independence: and to continue his assistance to his ally the queen of Portugal and to make every effort which may best contribute to the permanent security of his Majesty's dominions, so deeply interested in the issue of this contest."

Earl Fitzwilliam observed, that in almost every point adverted to by the noble secretary of state, as well as in the tenor of the address, he most cordially agreed; but he thought that neither went far enough, and under this impression he felt himself called upon to propose in the way of amendment to the address, a slight alteration: not such a one as would in the least do away the vigour and energy of its sentiments, but, on the contrary, give them additional weight and strength, by rendering the whole more clear and explicit in explaining, and manfully declaring the real object of the present momentous contest. The object of the war should be, and to that declaration his proposed amendment would go not only to deliver Europe from the tyranny of the French republic, but from the French republic itself. He had no doubt but such a declaration, made in a manly and explicit manner, would be productive of immediate good consequences, not only with regard to the allies and to Europe at large, but in France itself. When he said in France, he alluded to the disgraceful and tyrannous yoke borne by the people, under their present odious form of government: such a decided declaration would unite every honourable and feeling spirit in that country against the directorial tyrants. He was aware that it might be objected to him, that one independent nation should not interfere in the internal government of another; but surely it

must be allowed, that if ever this maxim was inapplicable, it was in the case of France-a country which, without the least regard to justice, even in appearance had interfered with and subverted the governments of all those nations where her influence or arms preponderated. France was so circumstanced, as to be, ever since the revolution, in a state of perpetual war, not only with all the governments of Europe, but those of every civilised country in the world. These considerations were abundantly sufficient to make up his mind with respect to the political principle he had alluded to; and deeming so of France, he had no hesitation in pressing an interference with respect to the government of that country. When he considered such an immense track of territory in the heart of Europe, with such an immense population as France presented, and lying under the absolute yoke and direction of a set of unprincipled tyrants, owing their political existence to such a government as now existed in France, he could not think Europe could be safe for one moment: but in advancing those bold and decided propositions, he would wish to have it understood that he meant only the government of Frances not France as a nation, nor the French as a people, who, he was confident, at least a great majority of them, viewed their present tyrannical form of government with horror and detestation, and would gladly embrace every opportunity to cast off their rulers; and in the room of the present system he thought it would be most eligible and expedient to restore the ancient monarchical government of the country, under which its inhabitants had enjoyed for ages a great degree of political happiness and security, and Europe at large a degree of tranquillity which there was not the smallest probability of its possessing while the French republic existed. His lordship then proposed as an amendment to leave out these words in the address," the insupportable tyranny of," which omission would cause that particular sentence to run thus, “to deliver Europe from the French republic."

The Earl of Liverpool observed, that such an avowal, under the present circumstances, would be highly indiscreet; besides, it was such a one as could not with propriety be included in such a parlia mentary declaration as that now in question. It was impolitic, as tending to fetter the exertions of the executive

power; and it involved a question of particular terms of pacification, which it was obvious must depend upon contingencies and events, which no man could with any degree of certainty foretell. He considered it as impolitic in the extreme, thus prematurely to declare, that in no case war shall terminate, until a specific form of government is established in France.

Lord Holland could not agree to the amendment, as it would be pledging the House and the country to carry on a war of extermination against the French republic. There was no doubt but that the ambition of France had shown itself on some recent occasions in a manner which could not but excite alarm; but much as he might wish to see its power reduced, it was quite another proposition to wage war definitively for the purpose of imposing a monarchy on that people. Nothing could be more idle than to imagine that France would accept from any foreign power a government not of its own choice. The people might be divided in opinion, and the government oppressive, but a foe at the gates would unite the people, and give means of defence and triumph to the government. With regard to the granting a subsidy, if such policy could at any time be wise, it was probably so at present; but before he could cordially vote for the address, he must first know what was really meant by ministers when they spoke of the deliverance of Europe. To have the benefit of general and hearty co-operation among the people, government ought to declare the specific object of the war, Had they changed their sentiments since the period of the two negotiations at Paris and Lisle? If that was so, the public had a right to be informed of it. At those periods two different declarations were published of the sentiments of his majesty concerning the issue of the negotiations themselves, and stating his readiness to treat for peace whenever the enemy should show a disposition to meet him on just and equitable terms. Now, it was his intention to propose an amendment to the address, embracing in substance these declarations of his majesty. He was persuaded the people of this country, every sober thinking people in Europe, and France herself, would regard such sentiments at least with complacency; but what would not be the consternation and dismay, when, upon the authority of a vote of that House, Europe would be told that

we persevere in the war without any known object but to destroy the princi ples of the revolutionists of France? Was the war carried on for the purpose expressly of reducing the power of that nation? If it was, it should have his support. Was it carried on againt opinion? That was madness. Was it a war that ministers were determined to carry on until they had chastised the Directory of France for its ambition? In fine, was it to punish ambition? Perhaps some noble lords thought the latter a good ground of war; but if it was, what would be the si tuation of the members of the coalition ?. If Russia should go to Poland to recruit its armies for the deliverance of Europe, might not the people of that sacked, divided, and plundered country, say, “ Deliver us." The same of the emperor of Germany in Venice and other parts; so that this war to chastise France for her. ambition might end with inflicting stripes: on the allies. Again, to consider the; war as a war of policy and prudence, how stood the question? Was the House quite sure that Russia sincerely wished only to check France and reduce her power?. Had Russia no views of aggrandizement. -no comprehensive scheme of exclusive dominion? He would suppose that Russia was in earnest, and not at all actuated by, that kind of motives. But who could for one moment suppose Austria free from ambitious projects, and sentiments of exclusive advantage? From the past it was quite fair to argue, that the cabinet of Vienna would turn aside from the contest the moment the measure of its ambition was filled. If, on the other hand, Russia should be found to have entered into the war also from motives of aggran, dizement, how manifold the dangers to this country and to Europe from a lengthened war! It was fair to assume that all this was possible, and would the House lightly regard such serious matters? Under the interpretation of the language of the address, it was obvious that we were henceforward to pursue, not a war of ordinary character-not a common war-but a crusade against the nation and people of France. The amendment he had to propose would go to counteract what was dangerous or impolitic in the Address, by inserting, after the word Republic, "by prosecuting a vigorous war, till the republic of France shall be disposed to enter on the work of general pacification, in a spirit of conci

vernment. Much had been said of a crusade against France, and of a war waged for the extermination of opinion. Such declamation very little deserved to be seriously commented upon. If used reproachfully, then he would say that the word "crusade" was improperly introduced; for the truth was, it was a coalition of powers gloriously in arms to defend all just and legal governments, and the rights of every people, against the tyranny and the injustice of the French Directory.

liation and equity, agreeable to his majesty's solemn declarations of Dec. 27, 1796, and the 28th of October, 1797." Lord Grenville observed, that no man would deny that the existence of the present government of France was incompatible with the security of the other governments of Europe. It was against this government, acting on its present principles, that he would wage war. Yet if ever the government changed in such a manner as to make it safe to treat with it, he would enter upon the work of peace without any regard to the name of its government. The censure so freely dealt out on the conduct of the court of St. Petersburgh and of Vienna, it had, perhaps, been full as decent to have spared. But as it seemed to be the principal object of the noble baron to hear what ministers would say of the conduct of those powers in the case of Poland, no consideration of policy would prevent him from declaring, that for the partition of Poland those powers were very blameable, and sooner than sign the deed of partition he would have cut off his hand. There was, however, one remark which it might not be improper to add on this subject. The partition of Poland, a theme trite and old in itself, was that evening brought forward as an accusation against the emperor of Russia. Now surely it would have been more consistent with justice and truth, had the noble lord recollected that that transaction was among the events of another reign and who would say that it would have been politic-that it would have added to the happiness of his old subjects or his new-had the emperor Paul restored his portion of Poland, at his accession to its former masters and to its government? If the noble lord must undertake to be the general censor of the kings of Europe, he ought to recollect that probably many, indeed all of them, hold possessions by very doubtful titles. Even the right of the crown of Great Britain to Jamaica might be disputed. Those who considered the subsidy necessary for the general purpose of checking France, and taming the spirit of its government, must see the necessity of not coming to any specific declaration. For one, he would avow his object. He wanted security; not a security to which the present government of France would be a party, but a security resting on the tried good faith and justice of a well tempered go

The Marquis of Lansdown observed, that with respect to the present war, from its commencement to that hour he had never entertained any opinion but one that it was a war of kings, entered into by a confederacy of kings, and carried on with a view of supporting their power. He had also constantly maintained, that the British cabinet wanted to destroy the republic of France, and restore the ancient monarchy; and that they had never been sincere in their desire of concluding a peace. It was perfectly relevant for the noble lord near him to make the observations he had done on some of the monarchs who were engaged in the coalition. For his own part, he could never speak otherwise than respectfully of persons in that high situation. He knew the veneration he felt for his own king. Next to the religion of any country, he considered them as things the most sacred, and consequently most entitled to respect. But it was impossible for any man not to express his indignation at the conduct that had been pursued by some of the crowned heads who were engaged in the present war. Would any noble lord suppose that a sincere wish to guard the regular governments of Europe against an ambitious republic, was the motive that actuated those powers to join the confederacy against France, when those very powers availed themselves of that coalition to seize on Poland? They knew that that was the time to do an act which destroyed the balance of power in Europe, because England, on account of the war in which she was engaged in common with them, could not prevent it. In his opinion, there was no solid ground for the expectations held out by ministers of the general deliverance of Europe, and it was highly impolitic in them to declare an opinion with respect to the species of government they wished to have established in France. It was car

of accumulated experience), this matter cannot admit of any doubt; for most unquestionably it has been the invariable policy of the law of England, from before the conquest down to the present century, that forfeiture should be the penalty of treason. In the earliest times, every estate in fee-simple was liable to forfei ture; and by the statutes and adjudications of subsequent ages, the forfeiture has been gradually extended to hereditary dignities and offices, to trust estates and entailed estates, to freehold leases, to copyholds, and even to dower.

tion. Every wise government will, for its own preservation, employ of course, the strongest means; and one of the most powerful checks for the repression of this specific crime is to be found in the infliction of forfeiture; for treason being in its formation slow, progressive, and deliberate, the individual, who is brooding upon his plans of guilt, when he looks round upon those who are connected with him by the nearest ties of existence and affection, must (according to the probable influence of every principle implanted in human nature) feel his ambition damped and his resolution unnerved, if not by the dread of his own hazard, at least by the prospect of involving those in his own ruin whom by his very machinations he is seeking to aggrandize.

I know that it is sometimes objected to this policy, that it overlooks the considerations of compassion which are due to the heirs of the offenders. To this, how. ever, there are many answers. In the first place, that the same event which has happened to them by the guilt of their ancestor might equally have happened, if he had dissipated the same inheritance by his folly; and that, in either case, it is not an injury, but a misfortune. But a more conclusive refutation of such an erroneous reasoning is to be found by pointing out, that such a view of this subject is partial and false; and false, because it is partial; and that upon the same ground, if a more extended view be taken of the same sub. ject, the just commiseration will appear to be due to the numberless individuals who would become the sufferers in those scenes of blood and confusion, if they were not protected by the terror of these punishments. And it is always to be kept in mind, that in every wise and well framed government the very power of resumption is placed in the hands of the sovereign, who may either remit the forfeiture wholly, or may apply it for the indemnification of others, at least equally innocent, who may have suffered more, or may hold the forfeiture as a pledge to be redeemed by the future loyalty of those very persons whose expectations have been frustrated by the disloyalty and guilt of their ancestors. That these general principles, upon which the question rests are satis factory, I think most men will agree; but to us who have the happiness to enjoy the blessings of the British constitution (not the production of any abstract theory or untried speculation, but the practicalresult

Upon this subject, it is extremely remarkable, that although the law of treason, both in its definitions and its mode and circumstances of trial, has been alternately extended and contracted by the struggles of contending parties, yet the principles of forfeiture have been universally recognised, and its penalties maintained throughout. It is remarkable, that when the treasons, which were created in such abundance during the wars between the houses of York and Lancaster, were reduced by the act passed on the acces, sion of queen Mary to the standard of the 25th of Edward 3rd, yet the forfeitures were nevertheless kept in force. cumulative treasons of the last century have been since most justly reprobated; and at no time has the liberty of the sub, ject stood so securely upon this question as it stands since the act of the last parliament relative to treason, because that law has given a legislative interpretation upon many points which formerly rested upon judicial construction, and has fixed the definitions of the offence in terms more distinct and explicit than we find them in any former period.

The

Nor does the matter rest here. We have also to remark, that the circumstances of trial for treason have also varied, but without any variation in the law of forfei ture. The act of king William, which gave to the prisoner the benefit of a full defence by counsel, and provided him with a compulsory process for his witnesses, was, in my judgment, a great and necessary improvement; but it must be recollected, that the very same act recognises the penalties of forfeiture, and in no degree curtails them. A farther alteration, indeed, was introduced in the reign of queen Anne, which required lists of the jurors and of the witnesses for the crown to be delivered to the prisoner ten days before his trial. But this, Sir, was a