Let us now examine the proofs, the recorded evidences of which we are in possession, and which will enable us to form a correct opinion of the personal good faith of the first consul. We shall not be destitute of sufficient grounds for judging what degree of reliance is to be placed on his present promises and professions, from considering his past actions, if we trace general Buonaparté from the period when, in the third year of the republic, he imposed upon the French people, by the mouth of the cannon, that very constitution which he has now destroyed by the point of the bayonet. In this consideration I am spared a great deal of detail by the previous statements which I have given to your lordships of the acts of the French general himself, or of those immediately executed under his command. For if a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Buonaparté-if peace was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Buonaparté-if armistices were ratified and annulled with Modena, and the other petty states of Italy, they were ratified and annulled by Buonaparté-if Venice was first drawn into the war, and afterwards forced to conclude a treaty of peace, that antient republic was drawn into it, and compelled to conclude peace by Buonaparté, that he might with more ease overthrow her constitution, and annihilate the political system by which she had been enabled to exist with glory and security for ages-if the government of Rome was terrified into terms of negotiation, and forced to conclude the treaty of Tolentino, that government was also subverted by Buonaparté-if Genoa was reduced to the same humiliating situation, her wealth and her independence were sacrificed to the will of Buonaparté-if Switzerland was induced to surrender up her rights and liberties by the delusive offers of peace and alliance, she was deprived of them by Buonaparté ; for his perfidious designs were carried into execution in that country by general Brune, the same commander whom the first consul has selected to head the army dispatched to reduce the inhabitants of La Vendée. Even the affiliated republics were equally the victims of his destructive perfidy. The constitution of the Cisalpine republic, which was the work of Buonaparté, was overthrown by the hands of his general, Berthier. But this is not all. Let us pass from the continent of Europe,

and try if the subsequent conduct of the first consul can furnish a more favourable opinion of his sincerity. When he arrived at Malta, he held the same specious promises of good faith, by which he had so frequently succeeded in betraying states and governments; but he treated that island as a conquered country, and despoiled it of every thing that was valuable. I now come to his proceedings in Egypt. It would be very unnecessary for ine to detain your lordships by details with which you are already too well acquainted; but I cannot avoid calling your attention to that part of his conduct which is diplomatic. I shall, of course, pass over his deceitful professions, his rapacities, and the cruel massacres which were perpetrated by his troops, and by his immediate orders. He solemnly declared to the Porte, that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt; he declared to his own generals, that his object was to take possession of that country; and he assured the people of Egypt that he had taken possession of it with the consent of the Porte. What can we think of his blasphemies, his hypocrisies, his repeated acts of perfidy, his multiplied violations of all religious and moral ties? Did he not declare, in the most unqualified terms, that the French were true Mussulmen? Is it in that country that he has laid the foundation for us to rest with security upon the good faith and sincerity which he now professes? Having, therefore, such bases for us to form a correct opinion of his policy, can it be thought inconsistent to believe that he has no intention of fulfilling his engagements? Can we so soon forget his delicate apprehensions with respect to the lives of his remaining soldiers after his flight, and his directions to general Kleber to propose preliminaries of peace to the Porte; to enter into a treaty of peace, and to defer the execution of the articles? "You may," says he, in his official letter, "sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt; but do not execute the articles, as you may observe with great plausibility, that it must be sent home, in order to be submitted to the inspection and ratification of the Directory." Thus, my lords, we are in complete possession of his system of politics, a system as fraudulent, perfidious, and destructive, as ever was practised, to the disgrace and misery of human nature. Thus are we provided with unquestionable pledges of his future integrity. In the

correspondence which appears upon your table, his motives are open and undisguised; and there is not the least necessity for having recourse to conjecture to ascertain that he has a double object in his communication. The one is to amuse Great Britain, and the other to induce her to give offence to her allies. I hope I shall not be accused of entertaining any unfounded jealousy of a man, who, having done nothing to redeem his good faith, so often violated, but the overturning the government of his country by the terror of military despotism, now comes forward with proposals of pacification. When we are fully satisfied with the share which he has had in previous aggressions and depredations, can we be too slow in giving him credit for professions of sincerity? Will any security be found in his personal assurances? If his interest be deeply concerned, I grant, indeed, that he may be sincere but let us for a moment examine this question. I have heard it reported as a matter of opinion, that it is the peculiar interest of the first consul to make peace, and that we consequently are bound to turn that consideration to our own advantage, and meet the overture which has been made to us. It is hardly necessary for me to remark, that in this important business there are three distinct steps to which our attention should naturally be directed: first, the opening of negotiation; secondly, the concluding a treaty of peace; and, thirdly, the observing of the conditions of peace. We should be clearly convinced that negotiation will lead to peace. I am undoubtedly convinced, that it may be the interest of general Buonaparté to consolidate his power; but it cannot be forgotten, that whenever any acts of atrocity were to be accomplished by the French, they have been usually effected by a suspension of arms. The proposed negotiation would relieve France from the present pressure of numerous and alarming difficulties, and could not relieve England from any. The ports of France, which are now blockaded by our fleets and cruizers, would be thrown open for the purpose of introducing naval stores, and a variety of useful and necessary articles, of which the country is in want: fleets, too, would be sent to bring back the troops which are now deprived of all intercourse with the republic, and which might then be employed in augmenting the numbers of the French armies. To us a suspension of arms could not be productive [VOL. XXXIV.]

of any benefit whatever. Are our ports blocked up? Is our commerce interrupted? And it will also be considered, that there would, in that case, be no more security for the maintenance of such a suspension than other powers have formerly experienced in similar instances. There is not a merchant in the country that would send a ship to sea without convoy, on such an account. So far I have no objection to agree, that it would be the interest of Buonaparté to enter into a negotiation; for he would derive from it considerable advantages to the commerce, trade, and manufactures of the republic, whilst this country would be left merely in its present situation with respect to any benefit. He would also enjoy the satisfaction and triumph of lowering the tone and the character of a people who have hitherto proved the great and effectual barrier against the encroachments of republican policy, and infuse into our allies and the other powers, a distrust of our resolution and integrity. He would, I entertain no doubt, be inclined to open such a negotiation as that which he directed general Kleber to open with the Ottoman Porte; but the conclusion of peace would be suitable to the views by which the overtures have been dictated. An important consideration occurs to me, and it will, I am confident, have the weight to which it is entitled in your lordships minds. Is Buonaparté now prepared to sign a general peace? Is his power sufficiently established, and the stability of his government so fixed, as to enable him to carry through a treaty of that nature? If he be not prepared, it follows that he cannot be sincere in his offers. On what ground does his power rest in France? He indeed announces, "that he is called by the wishes of the French people to fill the first magistracy of the republic;" and this information he thinks proper to com. municate, before it was thought possible to learn whether the French people were so servile, so degraded, as to accept as a gift the constitution which he was forcing on them at the point of the bayonet. He has, it is true, succeeded in establishing a military despotism, and every act of his government is supported by an armed force. For can there exist a difference of opinion with respect to the character of his power, when we learn that an army of 60,000 men is necessary to preserve tranquillity in the interior of France? You cannot, my lords, forget, that in turbulent [ 41 ]

republics it has ever been an axiom to preserve tranquillity by constant action; and that axiom has uniformly been the standard by which the system of the political rulers of France has been regulated. Such is the impulse that actuates the present government of France; such was the grand and leading motive by which Brissot was influenced; and such was the cause of the military operations pursued in the time of Robespierre. That the same system prevails at this moment in France, there cannot exist a doubt; for if Jacobin principles are adopted at home-if Jacobin doctrines are still maintained at home -the principle of engaging the nation in a state of continual warfare must also be strictly adhered to.

I have now, my lords, but little more to trouble you with. If Buonaparté had really shown a particular desire for a general peace, the offer would be less an object of suspicion. He says, that he has given many proofs of his eagerness to put an end to the war, and of his disposition to maintain the rigid observance of all treaties concluded: and he also observes, that this is the second proof of his desire to effectuate a general pacification. For my part, I am at a loss to find any proof of his having entertained such a desire. Does he allude to the treaty of Campo Formio? If he does, we certainly are not in possession of a single fact to corroborate his assertion. We, on the contrary, learn, that his sentiments were then in direct opposition to a general peace, and were particularly hostile to this country. When official intelligence of that transaction was sent by him to the Directory, Monge, speaking in his name, declared, that the French republic and England could not exist together. So that if he even were allowed to have an evident in terest in promoting peace, would you not be perfectly justified in pausing and reflecting on what degree of faith should be given to the interest and power of such an individual? You were lately told by the present government of France, that there existed no security, no guarantee, for the preservation of peace in the republic, from 1793 to November 1799; a just remark, and one which utterly confounds all the assertions, all the arguments, all the observations made here, that no change of men in power could effect the execution and permanence of a treaty. Yet such was the language used in support of the negotiation which was #

carried on at Lisle. Your lordships must perceive how much you hazard, by hazarding all on the faith, on the power, and on the life of Buonaparté. If the last security fail you, what remains behind? Will you place your reliance upon the unanimity of the French people in accepting the new constitution? Will you rest your dependence on the hopes of its permanence. But you are also destitute of every hope from the change which has recently taken place in the persons employed in the different departments of the public service. Men of the blackest characters have been appointed to situations of the greatest trust; persons infamous by the profession of the most licentious principles of anarchy have been raised to places of confidence and power and those who were judges in the sanguinary tribunals of Robespierre are now exalted to a distinguished rank in the republic. I am only desirous to call your attention to two principles; whether you are of opinion, that while the system of government in France (which you have reprobated) still prevailed, there were any hopes but in the prosecution of hostilities? and whether any event has happened since November, to induce your lordships to alter that opinion? I have now merely to notice what has been advanced here, and repeated, that ministers are determined to restore monarchy in France, and to engage in eternal war sooner than relinquish that object. I have stated this assertion, which has been often made, though it has been as often publicly and solemnly disclaimed. It has been disclaimed after the capture of Toulon, in a variety of instances, down to the present moment, and the slightest alteration has not taken place in the language of government. I do not pretend to deny, that we considered the re-establishment of monarchy as the best, the surest, and the speediest means of restoring peace; but it has never been maintained, that it was the only means of effecting that desirable end. We merely wished for a government that was capable of preserving the customary relations of peace and amity; nor would his majesty hesitate to treat with a republic, a monarchy, or any nondescript form of government; consequently the restoration of monarchy was never made the sine qua non of negotiation. If I am asked, what circumstances I may be induced to think proper security for the observance of articles of treaty to be obtained in France, I can only answer