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for a march to Paris. With all that you have gained, you surely will not say that the prospect is brighter now than it was then. What have you gained but the re covery of a part of what you before lost? One campaign is successful to you-another to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, and rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious, even, than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever; as, with such black incentives, I see no end to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, all this because you may gain a better peace a year or two hence! So that we are called upon to go on merely as a speculation-We must keep Buonaparté for some time longer at war, as a state of probation. Gracious God, Sir, is war a state of probation? Is peace a rash system? Is it dangerous for nations to live in amity with each other? Is your vigilance, your policy, your common powers of observation, to be extinguished by putting an end to the horrors of war? Cannot this state of probation be as well undergone without adding to the catalogue of human sufferings?" But we must pause!" What! must the bowels of Great Britain be torn out-her best blood be spilt her treasure wasted-that you may make an experiment? Put yourselves-oh! that you would put yourselves in the field of battle, and learn to judge of the sort of horrors that you excite. In former wars a man might at least, have some feeling, some interest, that served to balance in his mind the impressions which a scene of carnage and of death must inflict. If a man had been present at the battle of Blenheim, for instance, and had inquired the motive of the battle, there was not a soldier engaged who could not have satisfied his curiosity, and even, perhaps, allayed his feelings they were fighting to repress the uncontrolled ambition of the grand monarque. But, if a man were present now at a field of slaughter, and were to inquire for what they were fighting-" Fighting!" would be the answer; "they are not fighting, they are pausing." "Why is that man expiring? Why is that other writhing with agony? What means this implacable fury?" The answer must be, "You are quite wrong, Sir, you deceive your selfThey are not fighting-Do not dis turb them-they are merely pausing !this man is not expiring with agony

that man is not dead he is only pausing! Lord help you, Sir! they are not angry with one another; they have now no cause of quarrel-but their country thinks that there should be a pause. All that you see, Sir, is nothing like fightingthere is no harm, nor cruelty, nor blood. shed in it whatever-it is nothing more than a political pause!—it is merely to try an experiment to see whether Buona. parté will not behave himself better than heretofore; and in the mean time we have agreed to a pause, in pure friendship!" And is this the way, Sir, that you are to show yourselves the advocates of order? You take up a system calculated to uncivilize the world, to destroy order, to trample on religion, to stifle in the heart, not merely the generosity of noble sentiment, bu the affections of social nature; and in the prosecution of this system, you spread terror and devastation all around you..

Sir, I have done. I have told you my opinion. I think you ought to have given a civil, clear, and explicit answer to the overture which was fairly and handsomely made you. If you were desirous that the negotiation should have included all your allies, as the means of bringing about a general peace, you should have told Buonaparté so; but I believe you were afraid of his agreeing to the proposal. You took that method before, "Aye, but, you say, "the people were anxious for peace in 1797." I say they are friends to peace now; and I am confident that you will one day own it. Believe me, they are friends to peace; although, by the laws which you have made, restraining the expression of the sense of the people, public opinion cannot now be heard as loudly and unequivocally as heretofore. But I will not go into the internal state of this country. It is too afflicting to the heart to see the strides which have been made, by means of, and under the miserable pretext of this war, against liberty of every kind, both of speech and of writing; and to observe in another kingdom the rapid approaches to that military despotism which we affect to make an argument against peace. I know, Sir, that public opinion, if it could be collected, would be for peace, as much now as in 1797, and I know that it is only by public opinionnot by a sense of their duty-not by the inclination of their minds that ministers will be brought, if ever, to give us peace. I conclude, Sir, with repeating what

I said before; I ask for no gentleman's vote who would have reprobated the compliance of ministers with the proposition of the French govenment; I ask for no gentleman's support to-night who would have voted against ministers, if they had come down and proposed to enter into a negotiation with the French; but I have a right to ask-I know, that in honour, in consistency, in conscience, I have a right to expeet, the vote of every gentleman who would have voted with ministers in an address to his majesty, diametrically opposite to the motion of this night. The House divided:

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necessary to prove that it ought to be adopted. I profess, Sir, that in bringing this subject before the House, I do not consider it as a party question. It is one that can admit of no party feeling. It is a question that in the highest degree interests every feeling for the glory of the country, every sentiment of humanity for the loss our troops have sustained, for the honour which they have to support. We are called upon by the sacred duty we owe to our constituents, to investigate a transaction, which on the face of it, presents so much argument for inquiry; and which, in its consequences, has been attended with such a waste of blood, and expense of treasure. In treating of this question, I shall not proceed upon private information, but upon the recorded accounts of ministers themselves in their own gazettes. I shall not consider the advantages of having obtained possession of the Dutch fleet. That acquisition I view, perhaps, as less important than others do. I cannot suppose, that it will be contended that there has been no failure. I cannot conceive, that the corrupt and clandestine surrender of the Dutch fleet will be viewed as the attainment of all our wishes. Yet I see, that the lord lieutenant tells the Irish parliament, that the expedition to Holland will prevent the invasion of Ireland. He speaks as if the main object of our policy was not the deliverance of the Dutch from the yoke of France; not the restoration of the house of Orange to their rights; not the protection of religion, or the defence of social order; but the capture of a few Dutch ships of war! -as if for such an acquisition we have subsidized the mercenary magnanimity of Russia, for this called into action our military strength, and strained our financial What other advantage than this have we obtained from this famed secret expedition? Secret, indeed, it was called, till the term became absolutely ridiculous. Never was an undertaking conducted with such ostentatious mystery --never did the object of a secret expedition obtain such universal notoriety. The only thing secret in the expedition was the favourable disposition of the Dutch people to our cause; a secret so well kept, that to this hour it has never been discovered.

resources.

But the gentlemen opposite are of opinion that the Dutch fleet is not the only thing we have gained. It may be so, to be sure, in a certain way. It was an ex

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pedition of discovery, and not altogether
unsuccessful in that view. We have, in
the first place, discovered, that there is
no reliance to be placed in the chancellor
of the exchequer's knowledge of human na-
ture;-2ndly, that Holland is a country in-
tersected by dykes, ditches, and canals; and
3rdly, that the weather there is not so good
in October as it is in June! Information,
however, may be purchased too dear. If
we consider the number of lives which
have been lost; and reflect, that the
tenth of every man's income has been
squandered, and all by the misconduct of
ministers, we shall have little reason to
boast of our discoveries. We took pos-
session of the Dutch ships in the name of
the stadtholder. Are they to be manned
with the mutinous crews who surrendered
them, and employed in the name of the
stadtholder? If so, they are no addition
to our navy. When I reflect upon the
mode in which this acquisition was gained,
I consider it as of the most perilous ex-
ample. I tremble to see a deliberating
navy in the face of the naval force of
England; a navy deciding upon the cause
of their country, instead of fighting its
battles. I do not like to see mutiny re-
commended to our sailors by any example
or any approbation. I hope there is no-
thing in the temper of our navy to catch
the infection. I wish to see the spirit of
Blake prevail, who told his sailors, that
it was their duty to fight for their country,
in whatever hands the government might
be. If ministers promoted a spirit of mu-
tiny amongst the Dutch sailors they ill
understood the interests of their own coun-
try. They departed from a great principle
to serve a particular purpose. To gain a
partial advantage, they introduced a most
dangerous precedent. Suppose admiral
Story had resisted the spirit of mutiny and
disobedience; suppose he had done what
De Ruyter would have done in his situa-
tion-endeavoured to maintain his autho-
rity and perished in the attempt-would
you have permitted your seamen to wel-
come the Dutch sailors besmeared with
the blood of their admiral and officers?
Would you have sanctioned such a deed?
Would you have applauded the doers?
Would you have allowed your seamen to
become their allies and associates? Yet
was it only the want of vigour in the
officers that prevented this catastrophe;
the example is the same; and we all
know how dangerous such a violation is
to the principle of discipline. Enter-

taining these sentiments, I can as little approve the mode in which the Dutch fleet was gained, as I can enter into the views of those who represent the acquisition as of so much importance. Take into consideration the whole of the case; weigh what you have lost and what you have gained, and you will find that there is a fearful balance against you. The result of the late expedition has thrown discredit on your councils, and dishonour on your operations. You cannot again attempt to restore the house of Orange; you have left the pretensions of that fa. mily more desperate than ever. The confidence of their enemies is confirmed; the hopes of their partizans are overthrown. After this review, I confess I cannot conceive how any man can contend, that the result of the expedition has in any degree repaid our sacrifices, or realized our expectations.

As to the object of the expedition, in so far as it aimed at the rescue of Holland from the dominion of France, and the restoration of the house of Orange, I most readily agree, that it was a legitimate British object. In proportion, however, as the object was wise and good, must be the criminality of those to whose misconduct its failure is to be attributed. If, by their gross negligence, their ignorance, and their presumption, we have failed in an undertaking so dear to every British heart, the value of the prize for which we contended only augments the mortification of our disappointment. That the house of Orange has strong claims upon the gratitude, nay, upon the justice of Great Britain, I do not deny. They well deserved that hospitable asylum which they enjoy in this country. Their expulsion from their hereditary authority in Holland, is in a great measure to be ascribed to their deference to British councils, perhaps their devotion to the views of British ministers. The restoration of that family was, therefore, in itself an honourable motive for our interference. At the same time I cannot agree in the opinion, that we had any particular claim to the attachment of the Dutch. It is long since any cordiality prevailed between the two countries. The French faction had been increasing, and possessed a very powerful interest in the United Provinces. In this situation, grounds of dispute have arisen at no very remote period. In the American war, the Dutch complained bitterly of our aggressions,

In answer to their complaints, we represented them in speeches and proclamations as a dull and stupid people. A noble lord, then in administration, used the extraordinary expression, that the Dutch must be "stunned into their senses." By such treatment the influence of France was increased in Holland. Perhaps too, the Dutch, in the mere view of promoting their own interests, might conceive a connexion with France more beneficial to them than one with England. At the breaking out of the present war, the Dutch, against their own wishes, were compelled to abandon their neutrality, and to take a share in the war. They were engaged in the contest by our influence, but we were not able to protect them in the moment of difficulty. From being our allies they became our enemies. But, previous to this change, what were the symptoms of cordiality and good understanding when we were endeavouring to defend Holland? Did not our troops leave that country complaining of the people, and irritated by their reproaches? After the success of the French invasion, was our conduct calculated to increase the number of our friends? Was it right, after the stadtholder had taken refuge in this country to consider him sovereign of Holland (which he never was), and to require his consent to the seizure of so much Dutch property? Were such measures conciliatory? Did they tend to promote the interest of the stadtholder? In the negotiation at Lisle, what was the conduct of ministers? The negotiation was broken off, because the French refused to allow us to retain the conquests we had made at the expense of the Dutch who had been involved in the quarrel by our obstinacy and violence. Must not the Dutch have considered us as gross hypocrites, when we lately affected such a zeal for their interests, which, in the instances alluded to, we had rendered completely subservient to our own? These are circumstances which could not fail to produce a powerful impression upon the cool and calculating Dutchman. But on entering upon the expedition for the deliverance of Holland, what means did we employ to efface the prejudice that must have existed against our disinterestedness? Look at the proclamations which were issued on our landing in Holland. Read that distributed by sir Ralph Abercromby: it holds out to the Dutch, to be sure, delightful visions of future happiness

under their ancient government; but it says not a word of the Cape of Good Hope, of Ceylon, of Trincomalee. We address the Dutch, a people cold, considerate, phlegmatic, as if they were a nation of religious fanatics or chivalrous warriors. Religion is dragged in upon all occasions; but why it is so I cannot understand. The French did not interfere with the religion of the Dutch. They do not seem, indeed, to have prevented religious worship in any country where their arms have prevailed; but least of all, had they any temptation to interfere with the poverty and simplicity of the religious institutions of the Dutch. What influence, then, could such topics produce in Holland? Every thing that could have no effect was urged-every thing that might engage them in our favour was omitted. We tell the Dutch to " forget and forgive the past." But, how will they understand this advice? Will they not consider it as a recommendation to forget that they ever had colonies, and to forgive us for taking them? The minister seems to have understood very little of Dutch human nature, if he expected such proclamations could have any success among them. If, instead of all the fine reflections upon religion, social order, and their former government, he had said, We will give you back all your colonies, the argument would have been understood, and the effect might have been favourable. Instead of this, what did we tell them, in other terms?-Be a nation without trade; take back your old government; be a province dependent upon England through the stadtholder. These are the blessings which we promise you, and which you must co-operate with us to obtain.

These considerations I have adduced, to show that ministers had not truly calculated the temper and views of the people of Holland; that they had no reason to flatter themselves with the support of that country; and that they did not pursue the course by which it was to be obtained. It was, to the last degree, arrogant and presumptuous to involve this nation in the expense of such an armament as was employed in the late expedition, upon vain speculations. The right hon. gentleman should not have put his theories of human nature to such a costly experiment. He ought to have acted, in matters of such high moment, upon authentic information and upon practical grounds,

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tion that it was embraced and pursued upon any uniform views of policy. The powers of the hereditary prince of Orange, given in his proclamation to the Dutch, are dated in December 1798, from which a presumption arises that the expedition was in agitation at the time of the first treaty with Russia. The declaration of the emperor Paul points at this attempt for the deliverance of Holland. If it was then planned and agreed that Russian troops should be employed, what was the policy of ministers? Though they had themselves admitted that the scheme must be a coup-de-main, the landing in Holland was not effected till the 27th of August 1799. It appears that expectations had been formed of inducing Prussia to enter into the common cause against France. In June 1799, however, all hopes of drawing Prussia from her neutrality were abandoned. A treaty is concluded, in which 17,000 Russians are to be employed in the expedition against Holland. The emperor Paul, too, agrees to employ some of his own ships to transport the forces to England, upon condition of his being allowed ample indemnification for fitting out the vessels in question for another expedition. The landing at Helder was at length effected. No blame whatever attaches to the royal commander in chief, or to those who served along with him. The expedition was planned upon such sanguine calculations of co-operation from the inhabitants, that the military efforts were made dependent upon the

There is another very material point which I cannot pass unnoticed. If the plan proposed had been attended with success, was it the intention of ministers to establish the old government of Holland? I confess I have doubts on this subject. A noble and vigorous statesman in another place, in arguing upon the Irish union, represented the old government of Holland as feeble, inefficient, incompetent to its own defence and to any useful exertion, from the want of unity in its executive authority. Was it, then, for the re-establishment of this piece of imbecility, that our blood and treasure were to be applied? or was it intended to strengthen the government, to give it the vigour of despotism for the purposes of self-defence and useful alliance? If this was their intention, they meant an usurpation; and I trust that the stadtholder would have been an unwilling usurper. Can we conceive that ministers concealed this design, if it was really entertained; if they did not communicate the intention to the partisans of the house of Orange, they were guilty of a shameful fraud in inviting them to contribute to the restoration of the ancient government, while they were, in fact, to risk their lives and fortunes for a new constitution. If they did communicate their design to improve the former government by an infusion of additional strength, were they sure that the Dutch would agree to changes which violated those principles and those forms to which they were obstinately attached? After the differences, then, which sub-political views of its authors. The army sisted between this country and Holland was sent to Holland as to a friendly during the American war; after the ex- country. A summons was sent by general perience of the campaigns on the conti- Abercromby to the Batavian commander, nent in which we were engaged along with in a style of haughty menace, which clearly them against France; after the known proved that it was not the production of views of domestic parties in Holland; after that gallant officer. The answer of the we had forced Holland into the war, and Batavian officer was spirited. Did sir showed, after all, a desire to indemnify Ralph find the Batavian troops disposed, ourselves for the continental conquests, like the sailors, to surrender without a by the possession of her colonies; had we blow? Did he not meet with the most any reason to infer a welcome reception? vigorous resistance, even before any Ministers had no right to calculate upon Frenchmen appeared in action? Our very the dispositions of the Dutch. They are first success was purchased by the loss of guilty, therefore, of having squandered a great number of our brave countrymen. the blood and resources of this country Why, after the landing was effected, was upon a plan, undertaken without a proper no attempt made to follow up the first attention to the circumstances on which advantage? Was our general prevented its success necessarily depended. Con by his orders, or by the want of necessasidering the scheme of this expedition, ries? The fact was, that the army was from its first conception to the period of destitute of the means of moving forward. its execution, we find in it such variation The army was left without baggage-wagand uncertainty as preclude the supposi-gons? they were first cheared with the

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