hope that certain ships in sight contained these waggons; but afterwards were told the waggons were in some ships, and the wheels in others. The want of means of conveying the bleeding troops from the field of battle obliged them to have recourse to Dutch schuyts. Was it true, that such ignorance prevailed of the roads of Holland, that the waggons which were afterwards employed proved useless? No consideration ought to shield from inquiry the persons to whom these, and similar inconveniences were owing. Between the first landing at the Helder, and the arrival of the reinforcements under the duke of York, an opportunity had been given to ascertain the determination of the Batavian army to resist our attempt, French troops were pouring into Holland. Was it not known that the nature of the country afforded means of defence almost insuperable? Were not all the circumstances which pointed out the certain conclusion, that the expedition could not be successful, known previous to the sailing of the duke of York? If there was not a secret motive for persevering in the expedition, which no common understand ing can suspect, why did not ministers profit by their experience to avoid farther disaster? If they did not know all these circumstances, they must stand convicted of a negligence no less criminal than the presumption of persisting after so many warnings to desiat. On the 10th of September, the French and Batavians, anxious to make an impression on our troops before the arrival of the reinforcements, attacked sir Ralph, but were repulsed by the gallantry of our troops, and the strength of their position, On the 13th, the duke of York arrived, and on the 19th, an attack was made upon the enemy, which was successful in that part where the British troops were engaged, and unsuccessful on the part of the Russians. Of the behaviour of the latter I shall say but little. If the accounts of their conduct in the villages where they came be true, it would form the ground of an address to his majesty. The result of this action was, that the British and Russian forces retreated to their former position. What was at this time passing at home? On the 24th, ministers had in telligence of this disastrous engagement; yet, with all the facts in their possession, they made his majesty come down to parliament, and express his sanguine hopes of the ultimate success of the ex pedition! A more flagrant deception of parliament never was practised. After the action of the 2nd October, the army moved forward. This was represented as a great victory; there is every reason to believe, however, that it was a drawn battle. Alkmaer was stated to have opened its gates, as if this had been the act of the inhabitants, and a proof of their friendly disposition. The fact, how ever, was, that a lieutenant and some troops having accidentally advanced near the place, found it without means of defence, of which he immediately gave information, and the town was occupied by our men. In his dispatches after the action, his royal highness states that it had given him the command of an extent of country, and that the inhabitants would have an opportunity of declaring themselves. What was the consequence? The army attempted to advance; an engagement took place on the 6th, in which we claimed the victory: but so little advantageous was the success, that on the evening of the 7th, the retreat was or dered; the army returned to its old position at Shagen Brug; and this retreat was conducted so precipitately, that 400 women and children were left behind. These the French treated with great pro priety; nay, these cruel and perfidious enemies actually clothed the children, and sent them back with the women to the British head-quarters. Thus, instead of the deliverance of the Dutch, the army was compelled to enter into a capitulation for its escape! What a mortifying termination of a plan in which so much exertion had been employed, and so much of our hope had been embarked! I do not censure those by whom it was concluded: I believe, on the contrary, that it was inevitable in the situation in which the army was placed. Yet how painful a reflection! to find that the inducement held out to the enemy to agree to the convention, was a threat to destroy for ever the means of commerce of that very people whom we had gone to save! I am sure that had circumstances made it necessary to proceed to so cruel an alternative, it would have been employed with reluctance. It was a humiliating thing, after such proud expectations, to fail in our design, and to fail too amidst such an accumulation of disgrace. Our army left Holland with sentiments of indignation against the Batavians, by whom they con ceived themselves injured and deceivede with detestation of their allies, to whose misconduct they imputed the disastrous termination of the campaign; and with increased esteem for the enemy whom they had been taught to abhor. Such is the transaction which the House is called upon to investigate. Never was there a case which prima facie presented stronger grounds for inquiry. There are moments when it becomes this House to exercise a peculiar jealousy of its reputation. An opinion has gone abroad, that this House has reposed too blind a confidence in ministers. The rewards which have followed this confidence have thrown more than a suspicion on the purity of the motive. It is necessary, on an occasion like this, to watch their conduct with more than ordinary attention. The suspicion that the minister has nothing to fear from the controlling vigilance of parliament, must either be strongly confirmed, or honourably removed. It is not a consequence which any member need fear from the result of inquiry, that ministers will be obliged to quit their places. It would be no advantage, doubtless, to show that the administration of this country is in the hands of convicted incapacity; but still it would be a far greater evil to prove that ministers are too powerful for control; that error is exempted from inquiry, and misconduct secure from censure. The present case should afford a salutary caution to the House how they gave their confidence to ministers to pursue against France that system of exploded impolicy which has produced such fatal mischief and indelible disgrace. We are at war for the restoration of Bourbons, and for nothing else. All the qualifications with which this proposition is limited are mere quibbles. This is the sine quâ non to immediate peace. But if no enlarged view of policy, no dictate of constitutional jealousy, can move a British House of Commons to institute the proposed inquiry, they owe it to the reputation of the army, whose honour has been cruelly attacked abroad, to investigate the transaction to the bottom, and lay the blame where it ought to fall. Read the report which has been published in the Petersburgh Gazette of the different * Petersburgh, Oct. 22. (From the Court Gazette).-Major-general Hessen, from his head quarters at Zypser Schleusen: "I humbly acquaint your imperial majesty, that, on the 4th of September, I arrived from Yarmouth with the first division of troops before actions in Holland, and say whether you are not called upon to vindicate the cha racter of the British army? You owe it to the character of the British nation, to the spirit of your troops-you owe it to the honour of the living, to the memory of the dead-to go into an inquiry. I move "That it be referred to a com mittee of the whole House to consider of the Texel. We disembarked immediately in row-boats, and landed all our troops on the 6th at the Helder, though in a violent gale of wind. General Hermann was arrived before me, and was at the distance of 35 werstes orders I joined him on the 7th; and on the from the Helder, towards Alkmaer. By his 8th in the morning, at four o'clock, we proceeded in three columns, and attacked the enemy with a bravery only characteristic to your majesty's subjects. We drove him from three strong entrenchments, took all the batteries with the bayonet, and entered three strong villages, with the town of Bergen. We had already taken fourteen pieces of cannon, 2,000 of the enemy. However, all our amabout 1,000 prisoners, and killed upwards of munition being exhausted, we could no longer carry on offensive operations against a numerous enemy, who employed all his forces against us, who forced the right wing of our allies, who intended to attack at the same time, but who, from causes unknown to me, were two hours too late, which considerably injured the victory which we had already gained. Lieut.-general Hermann was made prisoner. I cannot conceal from you, most gracious sovereign, that the troops of your majesty are in want of the most necessary articles. I will not, however, pretend to say that this is owing to the want of care of our allies, but rather to their late arrangements, all the troops, their own as well as ours, in a when, contrary to the first plan, they landed crowd, so that it was impossible the small track of ground which we occupied could furnish us with provisions, and we are under the necessity to wait for supplies from England. We were in want of sufficient artillery and horses, and the troops were not yet recovered from a violent sea sickness. Our ammunition being exhausted, we had no means of attack and defence but the bayonet; but through began in confusion. The commander in chief the extreme fatigue of our troops, their retreat being a prisoner, lieutenant-general Scherebzow killed, and major-general Suthof wounded, the chief command devolved on me. I strove to collect our troops, and retired to our first advantageous position in such a manner that. the enemy found it impossible to follow. Our whole loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounts to about 3,000 men; but the enemy has lost many more; the prisoners taken by the English and ourselves amounting to above 3,000 men," &c. the Causes of the Failure of the late Expedirion to Holland." Mr. Secretary Dundas rose, and, after a few introductory observations, said:-Sir; the object of the expedition was threefold: first, to rescue the United Provinces from the tyranny of the French; secondly, to add to the efficient force of this country, and diminish that of the enemy, by getting possession of the Dutch fleet, so as to render it of no use to the French, by whom it was kept with a view of aiding that enemy in a descent on some part of his majesty's dominions; thirdly, to divert the enemy from its projected pursuits in general, by hostile operations in Holland on our part, thereby to defeat the plans of the enemy in the course of the campaign, whether they chose to remain in Holland or not. These objects were in contemplation when the expedition was agreed on; and there was a great probability, at that time, that all the three objects would be successful; two of them did succeed, and only one of them failed, and for which I shall shortly assign a sufficient reason. With regard to the first general object, namely, that of rescuing the United Provinces from the galling yoke of the French. I should have thought it was hardly necessary to argue, in this House, on the wisdom and policy of such a measure. This, indeed, was admitted by the hon. gentleman himself, who, by the way, accompanied it with a little affectation of candour: for he was pleased to bestow some praise on what he called the wisdom and policy of his majesty's ministers, for rescuing Holland from the tyranny of the French. I thought, that as he set out with this as a matter of praise to his majesty's government, he intended to follow a course different from that which he did follow; but I was a little surprised to find him directly wheel about, and then make an eloquent address, the obvious purpose of which was to tell Holland this story: "Be you aware of the English. They endeavoured to destroy you in the American war. They take your possessions, but they will never restore them to you. If ever they should remove the French yoke from off your necks, be on your guard against them. This is my advice to you as a British senator." But the hon. gentleman ought to have recollected, that all these grievances, of which he so kindly reminds Holland, were committed before the year 1787; and yet, during that year, this [VOL. XXXIV.] country was successful in bringing about a revolution in Holland, which the hon. gentleman recommended highly. Why did the Dutch submit to that Revolution? Why did we interfere to accomplish it? To rescue Holland from the yoke of the house of Bourbon. Was it more criminal in us to attempt to rescue the same provinces from the yoke of the French republic? In the one case, Prussia did that in concert with Great Britain which the hon. gentleman applauds. In the other, Great Britain attempts the same thing alone, which the hon. gentleman condemns. Where am I to look for the hon. gentleman's real sentiments? I say, I wish to rescue Holland from the tyranny of France; whether monarchical France, or republican, is to me no object. I say it is the policy of this country to rescue Holland from the gripe of France; and this is no new policy. To prove this, I will read what has been laid down as the creed of this country with regard to its connexion with Holland; and it is as far back as the year 1585, when a state paper was published. It relates to the relative interests of Holland and this country, and was penned by Cecil, minister to queen Elizabeth: the substance of which is, that Elizabeth thought it the policy of England to give assistance to the Dutch, and to prevent their being overpowered by the Spaniards, king William followed the same policy, and it has been uniformly observed since the reign of the house of Brunswick. There are, indeed, exceptions to this policy, in the reign of king James; but no good politician has ever doubted of the imprudence of that counsel; nor need I say any more to prove that, if there was any prospect of success, the object of rescuing the Dutch from the French yoke, was an object worth pursuit. The next point I have to notice, is that of our taking possession of the Dutch fleet, in order to diminish the power of France; I did not expect, even from the hon. gentleman any thing like a doubt of the value of such an acquisition. To what has the Dutch fleet been destined for the greater part of this war? To invade our dominions! We have heard it frequently said, that if any hostile fleet appeared on our northern coast in Ireland, it could only come from the Texel. Is it therefore nothing to extinguish all hope of the enemy upon this subject? Besides, we took between 6 and 7,000 seamen of the [4 X] Dutch, all of whom were liable to be employed in the service of the French fleet. We took also 40,000 tons of shipping belonging to the enemy, which might have annoyed our commerce. We have transferred the Dutch fleet from their own to the English coast; so far, therefore, I say, that the expedition has been completely successful. The next question is, whether we could have had any chance of rescuing Holland from the tyranny of France, in case the French had followed the plan of the campaign formerly adopted by them in the different parts of Europe? Now, upon that subject, I do say, that the French could not have prevented our recovering Holland, if they had not made such prodigious reinforcements in Holland; and it was a matter of great doubt what policy the French would adopt at the moment our expedition was undertaken : whether they would reinforce the A third object of the expedition was, that this country should co-operate in the general plan against the enemy. I believe it was a question with France, for a while, whether it was better for her to use much of her strength to prevent us from recover-power in Holland, or employ all their ing Holland, or to use all her power to reinforce her armies in different parts of Europe? She at last determined to reinforce her power in Holland. Does the hon. gentleman mean to say, that her withdrawing from the general plan of the campaign 40,000 of her men, was not withdrawing, in the first place, in conjunction with the Dutch fleet, all chance of an attack upon our own coast? Was it not making a great diversion of their force, and so far disappointing their scheme? I say, that this expedition kept them in a state of suspense with regard to the distribution of the force of which we felt the beneficial effects in the course of the campaign, in various parts of Europe. What was the case at the battle of Novi? It was the most bloody, as well as the most doubtful, between the Austrians and the French, in the whole campaign, and it was the cause of the recovery of all Italy from the grasp of the French republic: it decided the fate of Tortona, and Coni. If this be so, I would ask, whether this success could have taken place, on the part of the allies, if the expedition to Holland had not taken place? Nor is this all; the effect was felt at Suabia; after which the Archduke was enabled to proceed with vigour against the French. Or, if you take notice of Massena in Switzerland, you will see the advantage the allies have gained: and this, I say again, is an illustration of the advantages you have gained by this expedition to Holland; for I say they are to be ascribed to the necessity to which the French were driven to employ 40,000 of their men to reinforce their power in Holland. It has given decision to the imperial arms almost all over Europe; at Novi, at Suabia, at Tortona, at Copi, and at Philipsburgh. Two of the objects, therefore, have been completely successful. means of reinforcement in other parts of the continent, for the purposes of the campaign. They adopted that of reinforcing their power in Holland; the result of which was, that we were not able to rescue the United Provinces from the French yoke: but that was only one part of the result; another part of it was, that the French lost every other point which they contested in the whole campaign all over Europe. Now, as to the good which would arise from the inquiry proposed, I am satisfied, that any inquiry into this matter must be defective for any useful purpose of information, without exposing every thing with regard to Holland. It is impossible for us to vindicate ourselves in the shape of an inquiry, because it is absolutely impossible for us to produce the grounds of intelligence on which the expedition was founded. The publication of the whole of that intelligence would be highly injurious to the interests of Europe; and to disclose the intelligence partially would be worse than doing nothing. The hon. gentleman says, that the people of Holland were not favourable to us in the object of our expedition. If I were at liberty to give up all confidential communication on this matter, I could convince this House that the disposition of the Dutch was not unfavourable to us. They have been pretty well squeezed by the French. A Dutchman's last shilling has been sweated down to a sixpence. Am I then to suppose that the feeling of a Dutchman is different from the feeling of the rest of mankind; or that he has less attachment to his property than any other man ? Now, as to the making known the instructions given to commanders; I am of opinion that no such instructions can, with propriety, come before this House. I will tell the hon. gentleman why. I am not sure it will never be the policy of this country again to attempt the recovery of Holland. Another reason is this, that from the very nature of the thing, the instructions must contain much conditional matter. Would it then be wise to expose the plan of our future operations; for that, to a given extent, would be the result of giving up these instructions? I shall now proceed to show you that this expedition was wisely undertaken. Sir Ralph Abercromby sailed for the Helder on the 13th of August. A more prosperous commencement was never known. On the 14th came on the most extraordinary hurricane that ever blew from the heavens. It was impossible to land a single sailor on any part of the coast of Holland, and this continued, with the exception of one day, until the 27th. What was the effect of all this? It enabled the enemy to know where we must land, and their troops came in shoals to oppose us: 7,000 men were collected to oppose us; so that sir Ralph could not land his men to advantage: the ardour of the men, the zeal and gallantry of the commander, which were never excelled on any occasion were put to the severest trial. Without any thing but their muskets and bayonets, they made their landing good; and by it the Dutch fleet was secured. I state these things chiefly to show how easy it is to censure both soldiers and their generals unjustly, upon an event depending on the temper of the elements. The hon. gentleman says, the troops had no horses to draw their wag. gons. They had no waggons; and could not possibly land them under such circumstances, if they had intended it. But he will recollect, that instantly on their landing they did not want them; for all they had immediately to do was to secure a landing place, and a port of communication. Till the 1st of September, sir Ralph had to consider what position he should take, when reinforcements were to arrive. There is no complaint against sir Ralph for the disposition of his army; he judged wisely. The delay arose from causes which no human wisdom could foresee. Had he been able to land when he expected, he would not only have struck the brilliant stroke he did; but, in all probability, have commanded complete success to all the objects of the expedition. The same wind which prevented our landing on the coast of Holland, prevented the Russian troops from arriving to reinforce ours. They did not land till the 18th. The duke of York, on the 19th, offered the Russian general d'Hermann to delay the attack, if he thought his troops were not sufficiently recovered from the fatigues of their voyage; but the general earnestly requested the attack might be made, and did it with a promptitude which reflected the highest honour upon him. This ardour led that general to the field full two hours sooner than the time appointed. The army was, however, completely successful till a late hour in the day. General d'Hermann and his troops were in possession of the village of Bergen, and crowned with victory, till his ardour led him beyond a given point, and turned the fate of the day. When the attack was made, the French army amounted to 7,000 and the Dutch to 12,000 men; yet, notwithstanding this superiority, our troops fought and beat them with a bravery that did them the highest honour. But French reinforcements continually arriving, the duke of York was advised by general Abercromby, and all the other officers, to accede to an armistice. The officers volunteered their advice (but not till after the 2nd of October), to fall back to the first strong position. The duke yielded to this advice; and in so doing, consulted the dictates of reason and humanity. And here, once for all, allow me to advert to those various parts of the hon. gentleman's speech, in which he bestowed encomiums on the character of the commander in chief. Upon those parts of his speech, I need say nothing more, than that every thing he has said, is richly deserved by the object of his praise. I am sure I say so with equal sincerity; and certainly with more means of judging than the hon. gentleman possesses. Sir, the hon. gentleman has said a great deal of the disgrace which attached to the end of the expedition; but, for my part, I can see nothing disgraceful in it. Where, I ask, is the disgrace? I will venture to say, that no nation was ever more struck with the gallantry of our troops, than the French soldiers themselves who fought against them. Our army returned home with as much honour, as they first entered Holland. I think the duke of York was perfectly right in signing the convention; nor could he be wrong in giving up 8,000 lumber of French troops, from our overloaded prisons. He did not recede from any one article in which national honour was concerned. He resisted with firmness and indignation every proposition for |