besides, so abridged me of the use of par- perhaps, unqualified to judge. When we ticles, that though I am not particularly see such arts employed, I think it pretty attached to the sound of an if or a but, I strong proof that Jacobinism is not exwould be much obliged to him if he would tinct. I am no enemy to peace: but I give me some others to supply their think that the danger of patching up a places. Is this, however, a light matter, peace without any probable ground of that it should be treated in so light a its permanency, is greater than that of manner? The restoration of the French carrying on a war. With respect to the monarchy, I consider as a most desirable negotiation at Lisle, I believed at the moobject, because I think that it would ment, that the prosecution of the war was afford the best security to this country fraught with more danger to the country and to Europe. But this object may not be than the establishment of peace, if peace attainable; and if it be not attainable we could have been concluded on such terms must be satisfied with the best security we as were then proposed to the enemy. It can find independent of it. Peace is most was the result of a comparison between desirable to this country; but negotiation the farther prosecution of the war, and may be attended with greater evils than the then existing state of the country; a could be counterbalanced by any benefits state different from that in which, I am which would result from it. And if this be happy to say, it finds itself at this mofound to be the case; if it afford no pros- ment. I am free to say, that the preva pect of security; if it threaten all the lence of Jacobinical principles in France evils which we have been struggling to does not at present allow me to hope for avert; if the prosecution of the war a secure peace. As I declared upon a afford the prospect of attaining complete former occasion, without that attempt to security: and if it may be prosecuted with obtain peace, we could not have made increasing commerce, with increasing those subsequent exertions which have weans, and with increasing prosperity, proved so successful. But because of our except what may result from the visita- present increased means for carrying on tions of the seasons; then, I say, that it the war, I ask the hon. gentleman, is it is prudent in us not to negotiate at the fair to argue that I was insincere in lapresent moment. These are my buts and bouring for peace at a time, when the cirmy ifs. This is my plea, and on no other cumstances of the country dictated the do I wish to be tried, by God and my expedience of attempting it?-We are country. The hon. gentleman says, that told, however, that our policy ought to we reduce our own means in the same be changed, as the Russians are no longer proportion that we exhaust those of the to co-operate with Austria. But may not enemy. Is this, indeed, the conclusion the Russians be employed with advantage which we must draw from a survey of the in the common cause, though they no longer respective situations of France and Eng- act immediately in conjunction with the land, since the negotiation at Paris, and Austrians? If, however, the Russians particularly those at Lisle? Does the are not to assist the cause by their efforts hon. gentleman really think, that the upon the continental frontier of France, means of this country have been ex- does it not become the policy of England hausted in the same proportion with those to employ every means to supply the loss of the enemy? Does he think that the which their departure will occasion? expense of a new campaign will produce The measure in question aims at that obthat effect? On these grounds of com- ject? It is for the House, then, to deparison the question is to be decided, and cide whether, in supporting this meanot upon those topics which are adduced sure, we have judged on good grounds. to create a prejudice against the war, and If any man thinks he sees the means those insidious representations employed of bringing the contest to an earlier to render it unpopular. It is, indeed, to termination than by vigorous efforts and become the allies of Jacobinism, to con- military operations, he is justified in opnect, as some affect to do, the present posing the measures which are necessary scarcity with the subject of the war. It to carry it on with energy. Those who is, indeed, to resort to its most destructive consider the war to be expedient, cannot, weapons, thus to appeal to the feelings of with consistency, refuse theirassent to meathe multitude and call upon them to de-sures calculated to bring it to a successful cide, on such a ground, upon a question, issue. Even those who may disapprove of of which, in their coolest state, they are, the contest, which they cannot prevent by their votes, cannot honestly pursue that conduct which tends only to render its termination favourable to the enemy. God forbid I should question the freedom of thought, or the liberty of speech, but I cannot see how gentlemen can justify a language and a conduct which can have no tendency but to disarm our exertions, and to defeat our hopes in the prosecution of the contest. They ought to limit themselves to those arguments which could influence the House against the war altogether; not dwell upon topics which can tend only to weaken our efforts and betray our cause. Above all, nothing can be more unfair in reasoning, than to ally the present scarcity with the war, or to insinuate that its prosecution will interfere with those supplies which we may require. Mr. Wilberforce said, he would confine himself to the main question, which was, being at war, whether we should conduct it with vigour, or not? and whether that vigorous resistance could not be more effectually made by foreign troops, subsidized by this country, than by British troops? He was surprised how any gentleman who had voted for the war should take exception to this mode. Did his right hon. friend at any time deny that the pressure of the war would be severe? Certainly not. It was a misrepresentation to state that the war was carried on for the restoration of the Bourbons. The war was carried on for just and weighty considerations. The government of France was such as no man could calculate on with any degree of certainty. The most ambitious monarch that ever filled a throne afforded infinitely more grounds for security than its present usurper. Buonaparté was connected with the Jacobins, who hitherto distracted France; they influenced of course its councils, and rendered all intercourse extremely dangerous. The old system of Jacobinism prevailed; and who could tell but, at the very time of negotiation, a powerful force might be brought against this country? This was a solid objection to entering on a premature negotiation. We ought not, then, to be told, that the object of the war was to place the Bourbons on the throne. The opposition made to the vote of this night, was an opposition made to the principle of the war, on purpose to impede the powers of administration, and force them into a disadvantageous negotiation. When there was any appearance of security in the councils of France, then, and not till then, should he be ready to treat for peace. Mr. Sheridan said:-The right hon. the chancellor of the exchequer has spoken with great eloquence, I may say irrita. tion; but never was eloquence so misapplied. He has shown his dexterity in driving the subject from its basis; he guides, urges, and inflames the passions of his hearers on Jacobinical principles; but he does not show how they bear on the present question. He has not dared to say that, so far as respects the restoration of the Bourbons, we have suffered by the defection of Russia. What that power may still do with regard to La Vendée, or reconciling the people of Ireland to the union, I do not inquire; but with regard to the great object, the restoration of monarchy in France, we are minus the emperor of Russia; that power may be considered as extinct. Is it then to be endured, that the minister shall ask for a subsidy under such circumstances? If Germany possessed these wonderful forces before, why were they not called into action; and if not, why are we to subsidize the posse comitatus, the rabble of Germany? But who is the person that applies for this subsidy? It is the emperor of Germany. Is there any thing in his conduct or character to incline us to listen to him? I think not; and for two reasons: first, he applied once on a false pretence; and, secondly, he failed in performing his stipulated engagement. Now, if to this we add "experience and the evidence of facts," when he dared, though bound to this country, to break faith with her, and make a separate peace, does it not furnish a rational cause for declining to grant a subsidy to such a power?-The minister is offended at our connecting the present scarcity with the question of war. Now, I see no more objection to state the pressure in this particular from the continuance of the war, than there would be to advance the increase of the public debt, the situation of the finances, or any other of those reasons so often assigned, without its having been ever objected that they were of an improper kind. What has my hon. friend said? We see an opulent commercial prosperity; but look over the country, and we behold barracks and broth-houses, the cause and its effect, the poverty and distress of the country. That the war is unnecessary, as being useless, is self-evident. But, say they, we do not object to peace, but we have a jealousy | man, arguing from experience of human of concluding one, except with the House nature, tells us, that Jacobin principles of Bourbon: in a peace concluded with are such, that the mind that is once init we should have confidence, but we have fected with them, no quarantine can none in the present government of France. cleanse. Now, if this be the case, and I say, were that event arrived, and the that there are, according to Mr. Burke's House of Bourbon seated on the throne, statement, 80,000 incorrigible Jacobins the minister ought to be impeached who in England, we are in a melancholy situawould disband a single soldier; and that tion; the right hon. gentleman must conit would be equally criminal to make peace tinue the war while the present generaunder a new king as under a republican tion remains, and consequently we cannot government, unless her heart and mind for that period expect those rights to be were friendly to it. France, as a repub- restored to us, to the suspension and relic, may be a bad neighbour; but than strictions of which the right hon. gentlemonarchical France a more foul and man attributes the suppression of these treacherous neighbour never was. Is it, principles. A pretty consolation this, then, sufficient to say, let monarchy be truly! Now I contend that they do not restored, and let peace be given to all Eu- exist in France to the same extent rope? What security have we, that a as before, or nearly. If this, then, be change of principles will take place in the the case, what darger can we appre restored monarch? But if this security is hend? But if this then be true, and effected by maiming France, would the that Buonaparté, the child and champeople of France submit to it? With re- pion of Jacobin principles, as he is called, gard to the practicability of the course to be resolved to uphold them, upon what be pursued, the right hon. gentleman says, ground does the right hon. gentleman prehe is looking forward to a time when there sume to hope for the restoration of the shall be no dread of Jacobin principles. house of Bourbon? So far I have argued I ask whether he does not think, from the on the probability of the object; but the fraud, oppression, tyranny, and cruelty, right hon. gentleman goes on, and says, with which the conduct of France has there is no wish to restore monarchy withmarked them, that they are not now nearly out the consent of the people. Now, if dead, extinct, and detested? But who are this be the case, is it not better to leave the Jacobins? Is there a man in this coun- the people to themselves; for if armies are try who has at any time opposed minis- to interfere, how can we ascertain that it ters, who has resisted the waste of public is a legitimate government established money and the prostitution of honours, with the pure consent of the people? As that has not been branded with the name? to Buonaparté, whose character has been The Whig club are Jacobins. Of this represented as marked with fraud and inthere can be no doubt, for a right hon. sincerity, has he not made treaties with gentleman (Mr. Windham) on that ac- the Emperor, and observed them? Is it count struck his name off the list. The not his interest to make peace with us? Friends of the People are Jacobins. I am And can you suppose, that if peace were one of the Friends of the People, and con- made, he has not power to make it be obsequently am a Jacobin. The right hon. served by the people of France? And are gentleman pledged himself never to treat not the people of France aware that an with Jacobin France. "Toto certatum infraction of that peace would bring with est corpore regni." Now, he did treat it a new order of things, and a renewal of with France at Lisle and at Paris; but those calamities from which they have perhaps there were not Jacobins in France escaped? But, Sir, on the character of at either of these times. You then, the Buonaparté I have better evidence than Friends of the People, are the Jacobins. the intercepted letters. I appeal to CarI do think Jacobin principles never ex- not, whether the instructions given with isted much in this country; and even ad- respect to the conduct to be observed to mitting they had, they have been found so the emperor, were not moderate, open, hostile to true liberty, that in proportion and magnanimous ?-[Here Mr. Sheridan as we love it, we must detest these prin- read an extract from Carnot's pamphlet, ciples. But more; I do not think they in support of his assertion].-With regard even exist in France: they have stung to the late note, in answer to his proposal themselves to death, and died by their to negotiate, it is foolish, insulting and own poison. But the right hon. gentle- undignified. It is evidence to me, that the hon. gentlemen themselves do not be- | lieve his character to be such as they describe it; for, if they did, they must know their language would irritate such a mind; the passions will mix themselves with reason in the conduct of men, and they cannot say that they will not yet be obliged to treat with Buonaparté. I am warranted in saying this; for I do believe in my heart, that since the defection of Russia, ministers have been repenting of their answer. I say so, because I do not consider them so obstinate and headstrong as to persevere with as much ardour for the restoration of monarchy as when they were pledged with Russia. There was not a nation in Europe which ministers have not endeavoured to draw into the war. On what was such conduct founded, but on Jacobinical principles? Indeed, ministers, by negotiating at one time with a Jacobinical government in France, plainly proved they were not so hostile to its principles as they wish to appear. Prussia and Austria, as well as this country, have acted also on Jacobinical principles. The conduct of this country towards Ireland has been perfectly Jacobinical. How, then, can we define these principles, when persons who would disavow them fall by some fatality into an unavoidable acknowledgment of them? The objections that have been raised to peace have been entirely Jacobinical. If we seek for peace, it must be done in the spirit of peace. We are not to make it a question, who was the first aggressor, throw the blame that may attach to us on our enemy. France, in the beginning of the revolution, had conceived many romantic notions; she was to put an end to war, and produce, by a pure form of government, a perfectibility of mind which before had never been realized. The monarchs of Europe, seeing the prevalence of these new principles, trembled for their thrones. France, also, perceiving their hostility to her projects, supposed she could not be a republic without the overthrow of thrones. Such has been the regular progress of cause and effect; but who was the first aggressor, with whom the jealousy first arose, need not now be a matter of discussion. Both the republic, and the monarchs who opposed her, acted on the same principles: the latter said they must exterminate Jacobins, and the former that they must destroy monarchs. From this source have all the calamities of Europe flowed; and it is now a waste of time and argument to Has enquire farther into the subject.-Now, Sir, let us come to matter of fact. not France renounced and reprobated those Jacobin principles, which created her so many enemies? Are not all her violent invectives against regular governments come into disesteem? Has not the Abbé Sieyes, who wrote in favour of monarchy-has not Buonaparté-condemned the Jacobinical excesses of the Revolu tion,-the very men who have had so large a share in the formation of the present government? But I maintain that Buonaparte himself is also a friend to peace. There is in his correspondence with the ministers of this country a total renunciation of Jacobinical principles. In the dread, therefore, of these, I can see no argument for the continuance of war. A man who is surprised at the revolution of sentiment in individuals or nations shows but little experience. Such instances occur every day. Neither would a wise man always attach to principles the most serious consequences. Left to themselves, the absurd and dangerous would soon disappear; and wisdom establish herself only the more secure on their ruins. I am a friend to peace at this time, because I think Buonaparté would be as good a friend and neighbour to this country as ever were any of the Bourbons. I think also that there can be no time when we can hope to have better terms. If the king of Prussia should join France, such an alliance would greatly change the state of things; and from her long and honourable neutrality (in spite of the entreaties of this country), an event of that kind is by no means unlikely to happen. It must be considered also, that the first consul must feel no little portion of resentment towards this country, arising from the indignity with which his overtures of negotiation have been treated; it is not improbable that, to satisfy his revenge, he would make large sacrifices to the House of Austria, that he might contend more successfully against this country. Such are my fears and opinions; but I am unhappily in the habit of being numbered with the minority, and therefore their consequences are considerably diminished. But there have been occasions when the sentiments of the minority of this House have been those of the people at large: one, for instance, when a war was prevented with Russia concerning Oczakow. The minority told the minister, that the sentiments of the country were contrary to those of the majority: the fact justified them in the assertion, and the dispute was abandoned. In 1797, the opinions of the minority on peace were those of the people, and I believe the same coincidence exists now upon the same subject. Mr. Windham said:-Sir; in rising to deliver my sentiments on the question before us, I cannot avoid remarking, that the opinions of the House, and those opinions of the gentlemen opposite, have long been in direct opposition. The House wishes that an end may be put to the calamities which have afflicted Europe, arising from revolutionary principles. Gentlemen opposite seem to wish that those principles, which are called the rights of man, may be invigorated and flourish. The House wishes either the restoration of monarchy to France, or some government not tinctured with revolutionary principles. Gentlemen on the other side wish for a republic, such as we now see exist. The House wishes for a government in France that may be a pledge to this country of a safe and honourable peace. Gentlemen, in conformity to their principles, wish the present coalition of powers may be broken, or that their united endeavours may not succeed. They have pleaded the necessity for a negotiation, without considering that it affords very little prospect of leading to peace; while at the same time we know that it would have the certain effect of countenancing and consolidating the power of Buonaparté: it would also produce jealousy among the coalesced powers, and might ultimately tend to break the existing confederacy. Seeing, then, all those immediate dangers to which the coalition is exposed by a nego tiation, it requires but little sagacity to conclude for what reason it was at first set on foot; it was an instrument to answer the political purposes of Buonaparté. If a man were to ask what would open an oyster? he would answer a knife of a certain thickness and dimensions: so, if a man were to ask what would break up a coalition? he would answer a negotiation; it is the apple of discord, meant to disunite only, and not to produce pacification. But the object of this country should be to counteract the schemes of our enemy, and this can only be done by guarding, with the most scrupulous care, against every thing which may weaken the great military confede racy now happily renewed against France. Two years and a half ago, when Buonaparté was at the gates of Vienna, what was the conduct of gentlemen opposite? When France appeared to be in her exultation, did they wish to depress her? Their conduct was quite the reversethey opposed the giving of supplies, and were willing to leave France to turn all her force against Austria. The language of gentlemen is, if you continue the war, we will try to cripple you in all your efforts, and to render them ineffectual. I gentlemen acted impartially and fairly, they would examine whether there was not some important end to be answered worth all the trouble and expense which ministers would wish to bestow on its attainment. If such an end existed, it would then be the height of absurdity to refuse the means of accomplishing it. But on this subject we have heard very little said. As for the reasons alleged for not granting the supply required, I am glad to observe that they seem to make very little impression on the House. If gentlemen can show that the money is not likely to produce an effect adequate to the expenditure, or that it can be laid out in some other way more to the advantage of this country, ministers will be much oliged to them. But gentlemen opposite do not appear to be decided in their plans;-sometimes they would put an entire stop to the war-and sometimes they would only obstruct it. Some would go great lengths to carry on the war, but object to the extensive lengths to which others are led, and therefore endeavour to paralyse the efforts which they want the spirit to approve. Another contradiction is seen also. They are attached to the republic of France while a republic exists, and to individual despotism when fresh circumstances have created that change. Can feelings of the rights of man approve of such revolutions? That the House in general should differ from them, can be a matter of no surprise.Gentlemen accuse ministers of having no determinate object in the war. Sometimes they say it is the restoration of monarchy: sometimes the surrender of Belgium has been a sine qua non of peace; but the explanation of the grounds of the war, and its continuance, have been so often repeated, that it is folly to dwell any longer upon them; it must be intelligible to all mankind. If we cannot gain |