insensibly to influence and bias their sentiments and arguments on the greatest and most important discussions. This concealed poison is now more to be dreaded than any open attempt to support such principles by argument, or to enforce them by arms. No society, whatever be its particular form, can long subsist, if this principle is once admitted. In every government there must reside somewhere a supreme, absolute, and unlimited authority. This is equally true of every lawful monarchy-of every aristocracyof every pure democracy (if indeed such a form of government ever has existed, or ever can exist)-and of those mixed constitutions, formed and compounded from the others, which we are justly inclined to prefer to any of them. In all these go. vernments, indeed alike, that power may by possibility be abused; but whether the abuse is such as to justify and call for the interference of the people collectively, or, more properly speaking, of any portion of it, must always be an extreme case, and a question of the greatest and most perilous responsibility, not in law only, but in conscience and in duty, to all those who either act upon it themselves, or persuade others to do so. But no provision for such a case ever has been or can be made beforehand; it forms no chapter in any known code of laws; it can find no

in its laws, its constitution, and its esta- | blished religion? What must be said by those who have at any time been friends to any plan of parliamentary reform, and particularly such as have been most recently brought forward, either in Great Britain or Ireland? Whatever may have been thought of the propriety of the measure, I never heard any doubt of the competency of parliament to consider and discuss it. Yet I defy any man to maintain the principle of those plans, without contending that, as a member of parliament, he possesses a right to concur in disfranchising those who sent him to parliament, and to select others, by whom he was not elected, in their stead. I am sure that no sufficient distinction, in point of principle, can be successfully maintained for a single moment; nor should I deem it necessary to dwell on this point, in the manner I do, were I not convinced that it is connected in part with all those false and dangerous notions on the subject of government which have lately become too prevalent in the world. It may, in fact, be traced to that gross perversion of the principles of all political society, which rests on the supposition that there exists continually, in every government, a sovereignty in abeyance (as it were) on the part of the people, ready to be called forth on every occasion, or rather, on every pretence, when it may suit the pur-place in any system of human jurispruposes of the party or faction who are the advocates of this doctrine to suppose an occasion for its exertion. It is in these false principles that are contained the seeds of all the misery, desolation, and ruin, which, in the present day, have spread themselves over so large a proportion of the habitable globe.

dence. But, above all, if such a principle can make no part of any established constitution, not even of those where the government is so framed as to be most liable to the abuse of its powers, it will be preposterous indeed to suppose that it can be admitted in one where those powers are so distributed and balanced as to furThese principles, Sir, are at length so nish the best security against the probawell known and understood in their prac- bility of such an abuse. Shall that printical effects, that they can no longer hope ciple be sanctioned as a necessary part of for one enlightened or intelligent advo- the best government, which cannot be adcate, when they appear in their true co-mitted to exist as an established check lours. Yet, with all the horror we all feel, in common with the rest of the world, at the effect of them, with all the confirmed and increasing love and veneration which we feel towards the constitution of our country, founded as it is, both in theory and experience, on principles directly the reverse, there are too many among us, who, while they abhor and reject such opinions, when presented to them in their naked deformity, suffer them, in a more disguised shape, to be gradually infused into their minds, and

even upon the worst! Pregnant as it is with danger and confusion, shall it be received and authorized in proportion as every reason, which can ever make it necessary to recur to it, is not likely to exist? Yet, Sir, I know not how it is, that, in proportion as we are less likely to have occasion for so desperate a remedy, in proportion as a government is so framed as to provide within itself the best guard and control on the exercise of every branch of authority, to furnish the means of preventing or correcting every abuse of power,

and to secure, by its own natural opera- | tories of all the countries, the most proud tion, a due attention to the interest and feelings of every part of the community, in that very proportion persons have been found perverse enough to imagine, that such a constitution admits and recognizes, as a part of it, that which is inconsistent with the nature of any government, and, above all, inapplicable to our own.

and fondly cherish that opinion, I can indeed well understand that such a country must be jealous of any measure, which, even by its own consent, under the authority of its own lawful government, is to associate it as a part of a larger and more extensive empire.

tion in many parts of the country, and by increasing greatly the number of absentees. I do not mean to deny that this effect would, to a limited extent, take place during a part of the year; but I think it will not be difficult for me to prove, that this circumstance will be more than counterbalanced by the operation of the system in other respects.

If it be true that this measure has an inevitable tendency to admit the introduction of that British capital which is most likely to give life to all the operations of commerce, and to all the improvements of agriculture; if it be that, which above all other considerations is most likely to give security, quiet, and internal repose to Ireland; if it is likely to remove the chief bar to the internal advancement of wealth and civilization, by a more intimate intercourse with England; if it is more likely to communicate from hence those habits which distinguish this country; and which, by a continued gradation, unite the highest and the lowest orders of the community without a chasm in any part of the system; if it is not only likely to invite (as I have already said) English capital to set commerce in motion, but to offer it the use of new markets, to open fresh resources of wealth and industry, can wealth, can industry, can civilization increase among the whole bulk of the people without much more than counterbalancing the partial effect of the removal of the few individuals who, for a small part of the year, would follow the seat of legislation? If, notwithstanding the absence of parliament from Dublin, it would still remain the centre of education and of the internal commerce of a country increasing in improvement; if it would still remain the seat of legal discussion, which must always increase with an increase of property and occupation, will it be sup

But, Sir, if, on the other hand, it should happen that there be a country which, against the greatest of all dangers that threaten its peace and security, has not adequate means of protecting itself without the aid of another nation; if that other be a neighbouring and kindred nation, speaking the same language, whose laws, whose customs and habits are the same in principle, but carried to a greater degree of perfection, with a more extensive commerce, and more abundant means of acquiring and diffusing national wealth; the stability of whose government-the excellence of whose constitution, is more than ever the admiration and envy of Europe, and of which the very country of which we are speaking, can only boast an inadequate and imperfect resemblance; under such circumstances, I would ask, what conduct would be prescribed by every rational principle of dignity, of honour, or of interest? I would ask, whether this is not a faithful description of the circumstances which ought to dispose Ireland to a union?-Whether Great Britain is not precisely the nation with which, on these principles, a country, situated as Ireland is, would desire to unite? Does a union, under such circumstances, by free consent, and on just and equal terms, deserve to be branded as a proposal for subjecting Ireland to a foreign yoke? Is it not rather the free and voluntary association of two great countries, which join, for their common benefit, in one empire, where each will retain its proportional weight and importance, under the security of equal laws, reciprocal affection, and in-posed, with a view even to the interests separable interests, and which want nothing but that indissoluble connexion to render both invincible?

"Non ego nec Teucris Italos parere jubebo, Nec nova regna peto; paribus se legibus ambæ Invictæ gentes æterna in fœdera mittant."

Sir, I have nearly stated all that is necessary for me to trouble the House with; there are, however, one or two other objections which I wish not entirely to pass over: one of them is, a general notion that a union with Great Britain must necessarily increase one of the great evils of Ireland, by producing depopula

of those whose partial interests have been most successfully appealed to; with a view either to the respectable body of the bar, to the merchant, or shopkeeper of Dublin (if it were possible to suppose that a transaction of this sort ought to be referred to that single criterion), that they would not find their proportionate share of advantage in the general advantage of the state? Let it be remembered also, that if the transfer of the seat of legislature may call from Ireland to England the members of the united parliament, yet, after the union, property, influence,

and consideration in Ireland will lead, as much as in Great Britain, to all the objects of imperial ambition; and there must consequently, exist a new incitement to persons to acquire property in that country, and to those who possess it, to reside there, and to cultivate the good opinion of those with whom they live, and to extend and improve their influence and connexions.

cretion of the British parliament, unbound by compact, prompted only by its natural disposition to consider the interests of Ireland the same as its own: and if that has been done while Ireland is only united to us in the imperfect and precarious manner in which it is, while it has a separate parliament, notwithstanding the commercial jealousies of our own manufacturers; if under these circumstances we have done so, if we have done so with no other connexion than that which now subsists, and while Ireland has no share in our representation, what fresh ground can there be for apprehension, when she will have her proportionate weight in the legislature, and will be united with us as closely as Lancashire or Yorkshire, or any other county in Great Britain ?

Sir, I have seen it under the same authority to which I am sorry so often to advert, that the linen trade would be injured, and that there will be no security for its retaining its present advantages. I have already stated to you (and with that very authority in my favour) that those advantages are at present precarious, and that their security can only arise from compact with Great Britain. Such a compact this measure would establish in the most solemn manner; but besides this, Sir, the natural policy of this country, not merely its experienced liberality, but the identity of interests after a union, would offer a security worth a thousand compacts.

But, Sir, I need not dwell longer on argument, however it may satisfy my own mind, because we can on this question refer to experience. I see every gentleman anticipates that I allude to Scotland. What has been the result of the union there? An union, give me leave to say, as much opposed, and by much the same arguments, prejudices, and misconceptions, as are urged at this moment; creating too the same alarms, and provoking the same outrages, as have lately taken place in Dublin. Look at the metropolis of Scotland: the population of Edinburgh has been more than doubled since the union, and a new city added to the old. But we may be told, that Edinburgh has engrossed all the commerce of that country, and has those advantages which Dublin cannot expect. Yet while Edinburgh, deprived of its parliament, but retaining, as Dublin would retain, its courts of justice; continuing, as Dublin would continue, the resort of those whose circumstances would not permit them to visit a distant metropolis; continuing, as Dublin would continue, the seat of national education, while Edinburgh has baffled all the predictions of that period, what has been the situation of Glasgow? The population of Glasgow, since the union, has increased in the proportion of between five and six to one: look at its progress in manufactures; look at its general advantages, and tell me what ground there is, judging by experience in Sir, I hope the zeal, the spirit, and the aid of theory, for those gloomy appre-liberal and enlarged policy of this counhensions which have been so industriously try, has given ample proof that it is not excited. from a pecuniary motive that we seek a There remains, Sir, another general union. If it is not desireable on the line of argument, which I have already grounds I have stated, it cannot be reanticipated, and I hope answered, that commended for the mere purpose of taxathe commercial privileges now enjoyed by tion; but to quiet any jealousy on this Ireland, and to which it owes so much subject, here again let us look to Scotof its prosperity, would be less secure than land: Is there any instance where, with at present. I have given an answer to 45 members on her part, and 513 on our's, that already, by stating, that they are that part of the united kingdom has paid falsely imputed to the independence of the more than its proportion to the general Irish parliament, for that they are, in fact, burdens? Is it then, Sir, any ground of owing to the exercise of the voluntary dis-apprehension that we are likely to tax

Sir, the only other general topic of objection is that, upon which great pains have been taken to raise an alarm in Ireland. The idea that the main principle of the measure was, to subject Ireland to a load of debt and an increase of taxes, and to expose her to the consequences of all our alleged difficulties and supposed necessities.