one of the fathers of Irish legislative independency, insomuch that the material statute of that country relative to it is known by his name, but who had made no scruple to declare, that it was in his view and his wishes in 1782, that the transactions of that day might lead to the happy measure of a union; the chief justice of the Common Pleas, lord Carleton, a man not less remarkable for legal knowledge and abilities than for integrity of character, and mild and amiable manners; and lastly, lord Kilwarden chief justice of the King's-bench, whose virtues, understanding, skill, and experience, in the science and practice of the law, would reflect honour on the bench of any country. Of these four persons, all had voted for the measure: and the three first had delived solemn and elaborate opinions in support of it. As the hon. gentleman had seemed desirous that the House should attend to the sentiments of men on the other side of the water, he hoped he had gratified him, by placing those for and those against the competency of the Irish parliament opposed to each other in battle array before their eyes.

Dr. Laurence began by observing, that the speech of his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Perceval) must, in his opinion, have convinced every impartial hearer, that the minds of those who supported the measure were by no means in a temper to go calmly and dispassionately into the consideration of so important and delicate a question. It had consisted in great part of personal attack, and some of it totally unconnected with the subject of debate. He should indeed think an apology necessary, if he were to undertake answering all the topics which had been so introduced; but he could not agree that any would be necessary for discussing, at whatever length, a subject that so deserved and demanded the most ample discussion. On the importance of the question, there was no difference of opinion. It was admitted by all, that the connexion of the two countries was essential to the prosperity and safety of the British empire. But the hon. and learned gentleman, and others who had spoken on the same side, seemed to him to have insisted, a little fallaciously, on the benefits which Ireland derived from the connexion; as if she were not equally as necessary to Great Britain, as Great Britain to her. If such a notion could at any time pre

vail, this certainly was not the time. We should look seriously at our situation in Europe. Shut out from all communication with the continent, from the Douro to the Elbe, by the too successful arms of the enemy; threatened to be excluded from Portugal; having no access beyond the narrow line of coast which forms that kingdom; possessing, with the single exception of Gibraltar (now, in effect, an insulated rock), no friendly port on all the left shore of the Mediterranean, nearer than the dominions of the king of Naples; we had now, at this critical period of the war, been unable for months, through the inclemencies of the season, to send even a common message to any of the northern potentates, upon whom, at this moment, the fate of the whole civilized world so much depended. One side alone was open for the passage of our fleets; and on that side lay Ireland. Let us figure to ourselves that island as a separate state, the rival of our commerce, even if she should remain at peace with us. But that would not be possible. No: if Ireland were once severed from the British empire, nothing but war between the two countries could ensue, inexpiable war, till one or the other were finally subjugated; and in such a war Ireland must inevitably seek the alliance and protection of those powers which are most hostile to Great Britain. What then, if that enemy, which has so repeatedly sworn our destruction, should, by arms, or by arts still more formidable, get possession of that outwork on our most vulnerable flank? Our domestic security would be most directly menaced. We must fight for our altars and our firesides, under circumstances of peril hitherto never felt, never imagined. Nothing therefore is given, which is expended for the preservation of the sister kingdom. It is laid out in the most œconomical manner for our own preservation. For our own sakes we do, what justice no less than liberality forbids us to place on the debtor side of the account against Ireland. Too great sacrifices could hardly be made to engage her confidence, conciliate her warm affections, and excite her active zeal in the common cause. Too much care could not be taken, not to alarm her jealousy, not to make an ostentatious display of the benefits which we confer, not to offend her honest pride and laudable prejudices.

On these grounds of policy it was, that the measure had been principally com

bated. No man on the same side of the House with himself, had asserted, that no sort of union could be desirable under any circumstances; no man, as far as he recollected, had gone the length of contending, that even the proposed scheme of union might not, under some possible circumstances, if it were freely offered, be fairly accepted by this country, whatever dangers might arise from it to our own trade and our own constitution. They were not called upon by the argument to go any such length. Much less were they bound to trace out any system of internal policy, from which they would promise the tranquillity and happiness of that miserable country, in its present condition; especially as they could not superintend the execution of that which they might advise, and the success of their counsels would depend on men who would have an interest of reputation in their failure.

It had been constantly assumed on the other side of the House, that a union with Ireland would strengthen and consolidate the empire; and we had been told (a topic which had been used centuries since on similar occasions), that all the great states of Europe have gradually grown up to be what they are, from the union of many smaller dominions. This was undoubtedly true; but it was true likewise, as in former instances it had been remarked, that many princes, on the other hand, value themselves on the multitude of their separate titles. In truth, few monarchs are to be found who do not wield more than one scepter. The crown is often surmounted with the coronet; and there is not a sovereign in the north, who is not, like the king of Great Britain, a member also of the Germanic body. In all periods of political society, mighty kingdoms, which once were separate, had been united in every possible manner, under every possible compact; some, which were once united, had been again separated; and they had alike flourished and decayed indifferently in one or the other mode of existence. This union, however, we were given to understand, is wished by the ministers of our allies. Of what allies? Was the present measure suggested by the cabinet of Berlin? Was it the want of this consolidation to the British empire, that kept the king of Prussia in a no less ruinous than inglori ous inactivity? It could not be. That prince himself possessed various territories, which were subject to very different

forms of government, some without assemblies of the states. Did baron Thugut wait to know the result of the present discussion here, before he would venture to advise a more decisive tone in the negotiations at Radstadt? The Emperor certainly could not be that ally who had called for the present measure. Not to mention what that sovereign had lost in the Netherlands, nor what he had acquired as well as lost in Italy, he could not from his experience of the emulous zeal which his Hungarian and Bohemian subjects had displayed in the maintenance of his just quarrel, and the defence of his Austrian capital, have thought it indispensable, that every distinct portion of a great empire should be incorporated under one sole legislature. If Austria and Prussia were willing once more to take the field, in concert with Great Britain, against the common enemy, he did not believe, that the chancellor of the exchequer would insist, as a preliminary, that all the countries belonging to the two crowns should be respectively consolidated into one uniform system; neither, if the overtures of Mr. Grenville were likely to be accepted, did he fear one embarrassing question on the subject of the union with Ireland.

But of what nature is our actual connexion with Ireland? Is there no sort of union between the sister kingdoms? There is; not of the crowns only, but of the entire executive governments. It is not only, that the king of Great Britain becomes at once by his accession here, and without any other title, king of Ireland; but every instrument emanating from royal authority in that kingdom, must be verified by the great seal of this; every act, which the king of Ireland does, can only be done by the advice of the British ministers. For that advice they are responsible not to the Irish, but to the British parliament, in which they sit, with which they are in immediate contact; of which they are individually a part; for which, consequently, they must feel much greater deference and much greater awe. Would they then be likely to prefer the counsels of the Irish, to those of the British parliament? Was even the legislation of the sister kingdom absolutely free and independent? In speaking of the legislature, we were too apt, and even the ministers of the crown were as apt as any, to point only to the two branches of the Lords and Commons. The trunk of the

indeed to convince me, that the real fault is not in those who have undertaken, but want the skill, to manage and direct its operations. The danger of a disagreement between the two parliaments on the great questions of war and peace, on alliances and treaties, had been emphatically pressed. Yet, seriously, where was the practical danger? That no such disagreement ever had actually existed, was admitted in the same breath. And what was our experience on that subject? Was it of sixteen or seventeen years only, from the year 1782? No; but of centuries; from the day that a parliament first sat in Ireland. In these respects, the adjustment of 1782 made no alteration. And was there any apparent reason now, for the first time, to apprehend any such danger? Had any such alarm been expressed by any of the foreign statesmen, to whose opinions we were taught to look? If Ireland should think this, or any other war unjust and unnecessary, which Great Britain might think just and necessary, would our exertions be much crippled by the loss of the supplies, which she might in such an event refuse to furnish? Should we offer a subsidy to any foreign prince, would he hesitate till he was as sured, that Ireland had consented to guarantee the payment? Has the ratification of any one alliance ever been delayed a single hour to inquire, whether the king of Great Britain could answer for its being approved by the king of Ireland? If France would, if Spain, if the Batavian, if the Cisalpine, if the Roman, if the Ligurian republic, could make peace with this country, did the right hon. gentleman believe that the most insignificant of them all was likely to express the slightest anxiety, lest Ireland might withhold her sanction, and pour forth her fleets and her armies, in a new war, insatiable of vengeance or of glory?

Well, but, it is said, the parliament of Ireland has been factious. If it were meant that differences of opinion had arisen there; certainly so. He knew not why parliaments existed at all, but for the purpose of that discussion, which springs from a difference of opinion. Was it the objection, that sometimes those discussions kindled into a heat, perhaps a little, and not dishonourably, characteristic of the nation? Such ebullitions were often seen on the surface of generous minds, and lively imaginations. Or was the charge levelled against the principle of a [VOL. XXXIV.]

systematic opposition to government? On the existence of such parties did the security of free states in a great measure depend. The only question was, did they according to their honest judgment, pursue the interests, and maintain the cause of their country? Now disregarding the cry with which one party, whenever it has the advantage, will attempt to hunt down another, let us coolly reflect, what has been the conduct of the opposition in the Irish parliament. How far have they been factious, especially in the dangerous crisis of these latter times? We have the most unexceptionable testimony at the period, when the first society of United Irishmen was founded at Belfast. In the confidential letter, which developed the first rudiments of the plot for the separation of the two kingdoms, the arch-conspirator Tone pronounces the opposition "not to be sincere friends to the popular cause ;" and he particularly declares himself to be sure, that Mr. Grattan would hesitate very much at the resolutions, which he then sent, dressed up as attractively as he could for plausible pretexts to catch the people. Nor was he deceived. Mr. Grattan acted so as, in a great measure, to baffle the conspiracy. He suffered many popular questions to drop, which he had before countenanced, but which, however expedient he might believe them to be in times of tranquillity, he thought of hazardous experiment in a moment, when all the holdings and fastenings of civil society were loosened. One thing above all others was made the subject of much intemperate clamour against him. It was a proposal for a modification of tithes. But when he saw how soon the destruction of all property followed in France from the first dilapidation of the property of the church, he silently declined to agitate the subject again. And now what had we witnessed? That very scheme brought forward as a leading recommendation of the Union, in a pamphlet to which frequent allusions had been made, and which had been repeatedly attributed without denial to a confidential friend of the chancellor of the exchequer. Such was the picture of the Irish opposition before the war: when that new theme was afforded them, how did they then display their faction? A noble lord had informed the House the other night. Mr. Grattan was the first to oppose a motion for papers to inquire into the justice and necessity of the war. In fact, he and his friends supported the [2 E]