illustrate the improvement of its indepen- | yet I must persist in saying, that those dence and dignity, than by saying, that will ever appear to me to have evinced a her situation will from that moment be more genuine, a more profound and soprecisely the same in all points with that licitous affection for their country, who of Great Britain herself. Unless we sup- have not refused to deliberate on such pose, therefore, Ireland in her present si- mighty interests, but have resisted a first tuation, more independent and less sub- and false impulse, and chosen for their ordinate than Great Britain, we cannot guide rather the slower and less captivatimagine that her independence will be di- ing torch of reason, than the more lively minished by the union. And if it be true, flashes of passion and prejudice. Nor as we have shown, that she is at present can I refrain from adding, that if there be dependent, and subordinate to Great Bri- indeed any individuals, or descriptions of tain in many respects, it is clear, that a men, who, not misled themselves, but far union which shall have the effect of plac- above the influence of those delusions ing the two countries on a footing of which they have practised upon perthe mulfect equality, must improve the independence and dignity of the inferior, that is to say, of Ireland. Is Ireland then annihilated by these means? No; Ireland is still Ireland, while a new scope is given to the pride, and a larger field opened to the patriotism of every Irishman. Let me ask, in fine, where we shall discover in the present condition of Ireland, that superior degree of independent dignity, which should outweigh the real and solid benefits of union: or where we can per ceive in the change which that union will operate on the political situation of Ireland, the degradation and indignity which should forbid her even to deliberate, and raise an inseparable barrier, both to her aggrandizement and happiness? I do conceive, indeed, how the situation of some individuals may be such as to afford a greater share of personal consideration or advantage in Ireland, while confined within its present limits, than they might obtain on the greater theatre of the united kingdoms. Even here, indeed, the computation may be fallacious; but however that question may stand with regard to individuals, I am sure that the inhabitants of Ireland will gratify a sound love of national dignity, while they procure to their country unspeakable advantages of every other sort, by their accession to the noble empire of which the union would make them citizens. I must therefore conclude, that although I must respect the feelings of those who, following this instinct of national pride, which I have allowed to be in some sort natural, have been blinded to the true merits of this question, either as it regards the interests or the dignity of their country; and although I cannot refuse a considerable degree of indulgence even to the intemperance and violence excited by any form of patriotism, and even by its errors; [VOL. XXXIV.] titude, have seen nothing in this great question but personal or local interests, and have sought to mask a narrow preference of individual and partial advantage under this pretence of national pride and feeling; if such men, I say, with these motives at the bottom of their hearts, and with the profanation of a great public virtue on their lips, have frustrated the wise and paternal counsel given by our common sovereign for the permanent and perpetual benefit, and not less for the present and immediate preservation of the empire in all its parts, and especially of their own particular country; I own I cannot part with this subject, without declaring loudly that I envy neither the pillows and consciences of those men, nor the place they are likely to fill in the history of their country. There is yet one objection on which I am disposed to trespass on your lordships indulgence, rather from the importance which has been given to it by those who oppose the union, than from any weight I think it entitled to myself. The point I now allude to is, a supposed disability in the respective parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland to sanction such a measure. This is another objection on which the merits of the main question are waved, and in which those who have been defeated on that ground, or who are conscious that they must be so, would still take refuge. It resembles a plea_to_the jurisdiction; and although I am far from assenting to a very absurd doctrine which I have heard falsely ascribed to our law, that he who pleads to the jurisdiction shall abide by that plea: and when it has been over-ruled shall not plead over, but be concluded on the facts and merits of his cause; yet I think myself entitled to claim thus much from those who resort to this objection. That, although after it has. [3 F] limited sovereignty of the British legisla ture. I am aware of the reply generally made to this assertion of unlimited power. I may be told, that powers unlimited in theory are yet finite and controlled in practice, and that, in its exercise, the most unbounded authority is still circumiscribed, at least within the moral boundaries of right and wrong. I assent to this restriction, and even assert it; but what does my adversary gain by this concession? Parliament ought not to do what is wrong, and is to be supposed incapable of doing it. In this sense, the power of parliament is no more limited than the Divine Omnipotence itself, which is incapable of evil. I say also of Par been over-ruled, and the jurisdiction of parliament has been established, they shall be at liberty to recur back to the question of expediency; yet while we are discussing the question of competence, and for the purpose of that argument, the merits shall be granted, The objection cannot otherwise be placed on its own proper and peculiar ground: for if the competence of parliament were disputed merely on the ground of inexpediency in the particular act, it must be felt in a moment that the question of competence, with regard to the union, would stand exactly on the same footing as if it related to any other legislative measure, however clearly within the acknowledged powers and daily practice of parliament. In order to obtain, therefore, a distinct and substantive judg-liament that it is incapable of evil; ment on the question of competence, it must be kept pure, and uncomplicated with any other consideration; which can only be done by trying it in a case of admitted expediency. I think myself entitled, then, for the purpose of this argu. ment, to assume, that the proposed union would be beneficial to both countries, and I am at liberty to state its advantages, or its necessity, as high as I please. In a word, my adversary in this argument must assent to the measure as expedient and necessary, denying only the authority of parliament to execute it. and I say it in this sense, that what parliament does is not to be accounted evil, but is to be taken and acquiesced in as right-Why? will it be said, Is not parliament composed of men, and therefore fallible? Yes; but who must judge the fallibility of parliament, and to whom must its questionable acts be submitted-if it be not to other men, yet more fallible than themselves? For I wish to know where men are to be found or in what forms or combinations they are to be assembled, to whom such a superlative authority could with safety be confided. Now, if a measure be expedient, I am to ask, in the first place, why may it not The more we turn this argument, and be executed by parliament ? And, in the the more carefully it is viewed on all its next place, if parliament is not competent sides and bearings, the more we shall be where shall we find a more adequate au- satisfied that the only security we possess thority? I have for me, the general rule for every thing valuable in the British goand law of the constitution, which esta-vernment; that all that conduces to order blishes the universal authority of the legislature, and defines it by no limits or qualification that I am acquainted with. Whatever the whole nation could do, if there were no parliament, is within the regular and fundamental powers of parliament. This is admitted to be the general rule; and here I might plant my foot, at least until the exception were specified, and the principle of that exception established. The universality of parliamentary power has been characterised by the strong and emphatic title of Omnipotence. And, in the theory of our constitution, strong and emphatic as this phrase is, it need not, I think, be deemed merely a bold figure, as it has been called by some writers on our government, but as literally and correctly descriptive of parliamentary supremacy, and of the un and happiness; that the whole efficacy of our constitution towards its great and be neficial purposes resides in this single principle, of the unlimited, unqualified supremacy of parliament. There is no appeal acknowledged in the constitution, from that authority, because no appellate tribunal can be imagined, habile to such a jurisdiction; none from which the wis dom of those many ages, which have brought our constitution to maturity and excellence, has not already constituted an appeal, final and conclusive in all cases whatever, to that very parliament, from which you would again appeal back to them. Observe the vicious circle into which this appeal from the parliament to the people must lead us. The people at large cannot conveniently, nor safely for themselves, make law, or administer go vernment. The constitution of parlia- | ment has therefore been framed, as affording the most commodious and perfect organ of law and government, and the best and most secure depository of the sovereign authority. But their acts must, it seems, be questioned, and their authority superseded by that very people at large, whose inability and maptness have given occasion to the institution of parliament. The speedy resolution of the argument into this contradiction and absurdity, is, therefore, manifest. It is easy to foresee that this claim of unlimited power may be opposed by the counter-claim of a right to resist an abuse and perversion of authority, however legal. This question of resistance, that is to say, concerning the right of the subject to oppose by force the acts or orders of the legal sovereign, by which your lordships know, I should not mean, in this country, merely the throne, but that I speak of that body in which the full sovereignty of any nation resides, according to the established constitution of its government, and which, with reference to this kingdom, would be the parliament; the point, I say, thus explained, of resistance, at the discretion of the subject, to the legal sovereign, is of no trivial concern, and ought not to be rashly or irreverently approached. The question is of high import, and delicate complexion. It appears to me, to be one of those mysteries, the acknowledgment of which is much connected with its recluse sanctity, and its being withdrawn from daily and vulgar contemplation, to be reserved only for the great occasions which are worthy to draw it forth, and, "like a robe pontifical-ne'er to be seen, but wondered at." I believe it is impossible that any thing better should be said on this subject, than what I find quoted by an eloquent patriot of my own country, Mr. Fletcher, of Saltown, from the mouth of Mr. William Colvin, whom he styles one of the wisest men Scotland ever had, and who, speaking of defensive arms, that is to say, the right of the subject to carry arms, for the purpose of resisting oppression from the sovereign, was used to express himself in these remarkable words:"That it were to be wished all princes thought them lawful, and the people unlawful." No wish can be more salutary, and no answer to this delicate and important question can be more perfectly wise as well as discreet. I confess, also, that on this single subject; I do not like the solution the worse for being somewhat oracular. But if a peremptory opinion be demanded, and we must needs pronounce, I think myself entitled to answer generally in the language of the constitution. No limit has been appointed to the authority of the sovereign; nor any exception specified to the obedience of the subject. The constitution has not foreseen any case of resistance, and has made no provision for it. Such a case is not, and cannot be, in' the contemplation of any constitution whatever. A pre-established, that is to say, a constitutional right of resistance to the constitutional sovereign, is a solecism; a mere contradiction in terms. It can exist in no constitution that either is, or ever was, because it is inconsistent with the very notion of constitution, or government. We must answer, then, that' resistance is illegal, and is contrary to the law, in every form of government of which law is the foundation. If an extreme case be put to me, I may well refuse to answer it, until the case arise in practice. Stated theoretically, it is always a snare. When it happens practically, the case will answer for itself; and if resistance would not follow on the spur of any provocation that can be stated, without the previous sanction of some declared and anticipated au-* thorization in the constitution to legalize it, it is a case which we may pronounce, by that very criterion, unfit to produce or justify resistance. Every case of resist ance must stand, as it were, upon its own individual responsibility, and must be such as to provide for itself, without the aid of any antecedent principle to lean upon.' Such cases, whatever may be said of them by history, whatever may be felt of them by the generous sympathies of mankind, must look for no support from law, with which they cannot co-exist; they are all' without the pale of law, and all illegal; they are all extra-constitutional; all in direct contradiction with the particular constitution, as well as with the general principle of government; they are mere solitary, insulated, substantive facts, equally incapable of deriving from, or generating any binding analogy of general and permanent authority. These questions are not new in this country. We have passed through a century of such controversics, and have, since that period, enjoyed a century more of happiness, the fruit of the wise and profound, as well as spirited judgment of our ancestors on these debates; a judgment, as your lordships know, equally removed, on one hand, from a mean and pusillanimous acquiescence under oppression, and, on the other, from those shallow but ruinous abstractions which so much pains are taken to bring once more into fashion. We do not come, therefore, in England, so raw into these discussions, as to be misled by the juvenile refinements cf political metaphysics, or by the early puerilities of those who may have read their Locke without reading history, or who in reading their Locke have forgot their history, into errors, which we know to be as fatal to the practicable blessings of liberty, as to the strength and stability of government. We know that an established system and theory of resistance is but another word for anarchy; and that, whatever be the excellence of any constitution in other respects, however wisely and skilfully constructed it may be, even for stability, in its other provisions, let there be added this one principle of a permanent and subsisting right to resist, even in the most limited case, since the existence of that case must, by the very nature of the thing, be submitted to the discretion of every individual in the state, that constitution will bear in its bosom the seed of its own dissolution, and a principle of dispersion and demolition, utterly irreconcileable with the tranquillity or peace of the people, and destructive of all tenacity and duration in the government. But it will be said, this is not a question of resistance, and we are inquiring only whether this measure does not exceed the limits of that authority with which the constitution has invested parliament. I am, then, to ask, since the power of parliament is general and undefined, in what respect is this particular act distinguishable from others which are admitted to be within its competence, in such a manner as to become an exception to the general rule of the constitution? And here I am under the difficulty of those who are to combat without an adversary, or to combat an adversary whom they cannot see. I am to search for my opponent, or must begin by creating the enemy whom I am afterwards to engage; for as yet I have certainly heard nothing precise on this subject. I must, therefore, look among the distinctive qualities of this measure, for some circumstance on which to found the exception. The first circumstance I observe in the union of two countries, is an extension of territory, compared with the former bounds and surface of each, since each is respectively augmented by the accession of the other. But this effect of union cannot be a ground of disqualification to parliament, since the constitution commits the same power to a narrower authority, I mean the prerogative of the crown alone. If a conquest be made without any contrary stipulation, the conquered country becomes subject, ipso facto, to the legislation of parliament. The king may also obtain by treaty the annexation of any new territory to his crown, by which means it will fall, of course, under the government of the British parliament. In both these ways the dominion of Great Britain can be enlarged, to any extent, by the sole prerogative of the crownand much more by the king in parliament. We must look, then, for some other circumstance in this case to exclude the general authority of parliament. Besides extending the bounds of the kingdom, at present subject to the sovereignty of parliament, a legislative union extends and enlarges parliament itself, accommodating the size of the legislature to the accession of territory. It amounts then to an alteration in the frame and condition of parliament; and we are to inquire. whether parliament is, on that account, disqualified from performing it. It may be worth while to remark, in the first place, that this formal change is, however, consonant with the general spirit and genius of the constitution. Is it not fair, while we are discussing the conditions under which two countries are to be united, to consider what would have been the case if they had been one from the beginning? Would not Ireland, in that case, have had representatives in the legislature? It would not be difficult to show from history, that while Ireland was considered as exclusively under the government of the English parliament, that is to say, before the institution of the Irish parliament, that country sent members to the parliament of England. The same principle has generally, though I do not say without exception, operated in similar cases, I mean in cases of the accession of contiguous territories. Of this, Wales, the Counties Palatine, and Scotland, are similar examples. The minor instances of Calais, and Berwick on Tweed, may have been less attended to, but they illustrate also this general propensity of our constitution. While Calais was subject to the Crown of England, that town enjoyed and exercised, by charter from Harry, 8th, the privilege of sending two burgesses to parliament. And as soon as Berwick on Tweed, which being a frontier town, frequently changed masters, according to the various fortune of war, was at length settled under the dominion of England, by the union of both crowns, and the final extinction of war, at the accession of James 1st, that town received also the franchise of returning members to parliament. The constitution, in a word, leans that way; and it may perhaps reasonably be thought a greater vio lence to that constitution, and a more fundamental and essential change, to add extensive territories to the country already governed by parliament, without giving to those territories a participation in the constitution, and a share in the representation, than to accompany such an accession of territory with a legislative as well as an incorporating union. Yet, no man disputes the power of the crown, according to the prerogative which I have lately stated, to operate the former and the greater change even without the aid of parliament. Is it not then fair to argue, à fortiori, and à multo fortiori, that the larger authority of the whole legislature shall be more competent, or much more competent, to the smaller change, that is to say, to extend the bounds of the empire in a manner congenial and in unison with the constitution, as it would do in the measure proposed, than the narrower power of the prerogative can be to the greater change, that is to say, to an accession of territory and a union with other countries, on a principle abhorrent from the genius of our government? Yet the competence of these latter acts, whether to the crown or to the parliament has never been disputed; and rests, indeed, too firmly on the repeated and ordinary exercise of their powers to admit of question. But let us return to this objection, and admit, that a legislative union with Ireland, must operate a change on the condition, or even the constitution of parliament; and let that change be as considerable as the objector would choose to state it. Does it follow that such a change on parliament cannot be made by parliament, as it may be said in physics, that a body cannot act upon itself? Such an alteration appears to me, neither more nor less than a law, and as such, to fall within the natural province of the law-giver, who in this country, is the parliament. How will it be shown that these laws, affecting the constitution of parliament, are alone incompetent to parliament? Our own experience has taught us the contrary. I dare say there are very few of your lordships who have not assisted in the passing of laws precisely of this description, and, however warmly such measures may have been resisted or debated on other grounds I will venture to say, there is not one of us who has ever heard or known this objection, of the insufficiency of parliament opposed to them. The various laws for limiting the duration of parliaments, for regulating elections, for altering the qualification of electors, or elected, for disfranchising offending boroughs, and communicating their franchises to strangers, that is to say, for example, to the freehol ders of a neighbouring hundred; all these, and many more, falling precisely within the principle of this objection, have been passed, by no higher authority than that of parliament. What are all those proposals for what is called sometimes moderate, sometimes radical reform, but laws for the alteration, for the total subversion of the constitutional parliament? To me they have appeared little short of revolu. tion, incipient revolution. Yet, I have never heard one of those, who with similar views of these projects, have been better qualified, than myself, by talents and weight in this country, to oppose them, object the incompetence of parliament to entertain and to adopt these changes in its own constitution, if they should appear expedient. An alteration of the established religion which has always been the work of parliament, is another change, and a most fundamental one in its constitution; since the whole parliamentary franchise, whether elective or representative, is transferred from one class and description of the people to another. The whole is taken from all those who possessed it, and vested in those who did not. The laws so frequently made by parliament for altering and regulating the accession to the crown, bear a strong analogy to the case which is now objected to, amounting indeed, to a total change in one whole branch or member of the parliament. This objection, then, cannot be maintained simpliciter, on the incompetence of |