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country during the awful suspension of the executive power in 1788. It was by accident alone that the executive authority was vested in the same person; and though by good fortune this circumstance took place, yet it was to be observed, that the tenure of the power given by the one legislature was essentially different from that which proceeded from the other. Different limits were actually set to the power of the executive government in each country; and it was even a perfect matter of chance that two independent executives had not been established in one and the same empire. He would mention another point which would also expose the absurdity of the arrangement of 1782; and the complete inadequacy, and even perniciousness, of two independent legislatures, and of the whole imperial connexion as then established, and now subsisting, between the two countries. He alluded to what happened when the commercial propositions were brought forward in 1785. He did not say in this case as in the regency, that the very existence of the empire was endangered by the distinctness of the two legislatures, but that this distinctness operated most materially to the prejudice of Ireland; for the fourth proposition having been considered by the parliament of that country as interfering with its legislative independence, and having been, with the others, on that account rejected by them, it was clear that the legislative distinctness was the real cause which had ever since deprived Ireland of the immense commercial advantages which were offered to her by those propositions. In scholastic disputations, or in abstract and theoretical discussions, it might be sufficient to urge objections, without substituting any thing in the place of that which was opposed. Such reasoning might be fair in these cases, but he never could allow of it in practical questions of the nature of that then under consideration. It might not therefore be unfair to ask the noble lords who opposed the measure of union, what other measure they would substitute in the place of it? From their speeches it certainly appeared that their opinions, as to the present unfortunate state of the sister kingdom, in no way differed from those entertained by the supporters of the present measure; and the same senti

might be consistent with the security of the state and the establishment? Was there any one who knew the blessings of the British constitution, but must wish those blessings to be extended to every rank and sect of his fellow subjects. It might be asked, whether the measure to which he had been alluding, might not be adopted as well by a separate as by an imperial legislature? That question should be answered by the Irish themselves. Six weeks had not elapsed since the question was brought under the consideration of the House of Commons of Ireland, and met with the support of precisely three individuals!—A great deal had been said relative to the adjustment of 1782. If that adjustment had at that time been considered final, he never could have admitted that circumstance as a conclusive argument against a union at present; but the fact that those persons most concerned in its completion did not consider it as final, afforded a strong argument in favour of the present measure; inasmuch as the measure of itself created the succedaneum which was confessed to be absolutely necessary at that time, and which was wanting to supply the place of that system, and that power which had just then been annihilated. He grounded his assertion relative to the opinions held upon this adjustment by those who concluded it, upon Mr. Fox's speech on the commercial proposition in 1785. Mr. Fox then expressly declared, that "the resolution of the House of Commons of the 17th of May 1782, in no way referred to arrangements of commerce, but solely and exclusively to objects political and imperial."* Now it was no small recommendation of the present measure, that the persons by whom the adjustment of 1782 was concluded, thought that their own work was not sufficient, and that a succedaneum was necessary to replace the power which they had annulled. At any rate, let the opinions have been what they might, by no principle of reason could that adjustment have been considered as final. Even during the short space of time which had elapsed since its conclusion, the absurdity of considering it as final had been sufficiently demonstrated by the facts which had happened. Every one of their lordships must recollect the discordant proceedings which were adopted by the legislature of eachment as to the necessity of attempting

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some amelioration must naturally follow. But, did they think that confidence and

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tranquillity were likely to be re-established
in Ireland without some great measure of
empire, and by the limited powers of a
local and separate legislature? Did they
think a general concession to the Catho-
lics would tend to convey confidence and
security to the great body of proprietors?
Did they think a radical reform in the re-
presentation would tend to assimilate the
Irish to the British constitution, and
thereby fasten the tie of connexion be-
tween them? Did they recommend the
renewal of the attempt at compact, and
conceive that the spirit which led to the
rejection of that which was attempted in
1785, no longer existed? In short, during
the whole of these discussions, in both
countries, he had not heard of one singlein-
dividual proposing anyone single planwhich
he gave it as his opinion would have the
effect of restoring peace and tranquillity
to that divided country. The measure of
union, though it had to combat much
prejudice and much violence, certainly
enjoyed a superiority to which no other
could pretend, since it had already re-
ceived the decided support of one of the
two houses of the legislature, and of near
one half of the other. And it was impos-
sible for him to observe the comparative
moderation of the latter debates in the
House of Commons, nor the addresses
from Antrim, Galway, &c. without in-
dulging a hope, that, by persevering with
firmness and moderation until the pas-
sions of men should have somewhat sub-
sided in that country, truth would triumph
over prejudice, and patriotism over cla-
But if Ireland was determined to
reject the plan offered to her, the presen-
tation of the proposed address was essen-
tial for the
of making known to
purpose
her and to the world what were the con-
ditions on which we were willing to unite
with her.

mour.

The question was then put upon the Address, and agreed to,

Protest against the Address relative to a Union with Ireland.] The following Protest was entered on the Journals:

"Dissentient.

cumstances which ought imperiously to
have deterred us from the prosecution of
it.-The moment of civil disturbance and
division, when the necessity of military
law is alleged by ministers, and acknow-
ledged by parliament, seems ill calculated
for ensuring the full and unequivocal con-
sent of the Irish people, without which,
even the supporters of the measure must
confess it to be illusory and dangerous in
the extreme. And to commit the parlia-
ment of Great Britain to the wisdom of a
project which the Commons of Ireland
have rejected, and to which the inhabi-
tants of that kingdom are disinclined,
appears to us a whimsical expedient for
securing the connexion of the two coun-
tries, and consolidating the strength of
the empire.

2. "Because, as no jealousy or division has existed between the two legislatures, the present dangers and discontents in Ireland cannot be attributed to the independence of parliament, but must rather be considered as the bitter fruits of a coercive system of policy suggested by his majesty's advisers, and enforced under the sanction of the executive power with unconstitutional and wanton severity.

3. "Because, though the possibility of a different will in the two separate legislatures cannot be controverted, yet possible inconveniences in remote and extreme cases from supposed legislative measures, or possible instances of additional embarrassment to the executive government, are no arguments for the subversion of a system in which no such inconveniences For the consehave been experienced, and no such difficulties encountered. quences of such reasoning would lead us to consolidate into one the different branches of our own excellent constitution; to remove all the checks which the jealousy of our ancestors have imposed on the executive government; to condemn whatever theory might suppose difficult, though practice had shown it to be easy; and to substitute hypothesis and speculation for history, fact, and experience.

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4. Because the notion that a legislative 1. "Because, the measure of a legisla-union will either conciliate the affections tive, union between Great Britain and Ireland, the policy of which is highly questionable, and the importance of which demands the most calm, dispassionate, and deliberate examination, is persisted in and urged forward in compliment to his majesty's ministers under cir

of the discontented in Ireland, or furnish more effectual means for defeating the design of the enemy in that country, seems unsupported by reasoning, and in direct contradiction to analogy and experience. Were we to admit the beneficial consequences of a union, yet, the benefits

Scotland, and that two rebellions broke out in that kingdom, subsequent to its accomplishment. Farthermore, from what information we have been able to procure we observe with the deepest concern and alarm, that its discussion in Ireland has already been attended with the most fearful symptoms. From the increased powers with which it has recently been deemed necessary to arm the executive power, we cannot but infer, that the prospect of an incorporating union has failed to conciliate the minds of the disaffected; and from the ferment occasioned by its discussion, it is evident that all other parties in Ireland are alienated or divided, and the means of resistance, in case of insurrection or foreign invasion, thereby materially weakened. We thought it therefore more prudent in this moment of alarm to desist from the prosecution of a measure, which might become a fresh subject of complaint, and a new source of discontent and division. And we were more disposed to seek for the re-establishment of mutual confidence in the adoption of conciliatory laws, in the removal of odious disabilities, in the redress of grievances, and the operation of a milder system of policy on the affections of the Irish people, than in any experiment of theory and nominal union of governments.

which according to such hypothesis, are | likely to result to Ireland from the measure, are, at least, progressive and distant, and can furnish, therefore, no reasonable hope of allaying immediate discontent, suppressing actual rebellion, or defeating designs already on foot. If, indeed, the enemies of the connexion endeavoured to effectuate a separation of the two kingdoms, by sowing jealousies and dissen. tions between the two parliaments) as was the case in Scotland, immediately previous to the union) the measure proposed would manifestly be an effectual, it might be represented as the only, remedy for the evil: but if it be true that their object is to disseminate jealousy, and foment discontent, not between the distant legislatures and governments of England and Ireland, but between the people and parliament, between the governed and government of that country; and if by representing their legislature as the corrupt agent of British ministers, and slavish engine of British tyranny, they have succeeded in alienating a large portion of his majesty's subjects; and if it be farther true, as stated in the report of the committees of secrecy of the Irish parliament, that the misrepresentations of a few individuals have been found sufficient to seduce the allegiance of one whole province in Ireland; we are indeed at a loss to conceive how the danger of such designs is to be averted, or the force of such misrepresentations diminished, by a measure, which reduces the number of representatives of the Irish people, transfers the legal organ of their will out of the bosom of their own country, and annihilates all independent and exclusive authority in that kingdom. An examination of the immediate consequences which the union formerly produced in Scotland, and a contemplation of the recent effects of its discussion in Ireland, suggest yet stronger reasons for doubting its efficacy either in healing discontents, or furnishing the means of resistance to any attempt of the enemy. We learn from the most authentic documents of those times, that in Scotland its agitation produced disorder and tumult; that six years after it passed, nearly all the Scotch peers voted for its dissolution, and founded that vote on the discontents it had occasioned; that it remained for a long period a subject of sullen discontent; that a promise of its dissolution was consideredby the agents of the pretender as advantageous to his cause in

5. "Because at a time when the danger of innovation has been deemed a sufficient pretext for the continuation of abuses, the suspension of improvement, and the preservation of a defective representation of the people, we cannot regard without jealousy and alarm an innovation of direct contrary tendency, viz. the introduction of a number of members into the British parliament, from a legislature, one branch of which has acknowledged the imperfection of its own constitution; and against the other branch of which the sale of peerages have been publicly alleged, and as publicly offered to be proved. And, however invidious it might be to cite any example in confirmation of such opinion, we are not so blind to matters of notoriety, or so deaf to the lessons of experi ence, as not to apprehend from a measure of this nature an enormous increase of the influence of the crown; neither could we perceive, either in the present temper of the Irish people inflamed by civil animo. sity and exasperated by recent rebellion, or in the general moderation of his majesty's present advisers, any thing to allay

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our apprehensions or relieve our jea- | lousics, and we were unwilling to give our consent, at a period when new burthens are every day imposed, and new sacrifices every day required of the people, to a measure which must supply additional reasons for doubting the adequacy of their representation, and suspecting the independence of parliament.

(Signed)

"HOLLAND

"THANET
"KING."

Debate in the Commons on the Address relative to a Union with Ireland.] April 12. The Address of the Lords was communicated to the Commons at a conference, and ordered to be taken into consideration on the 22nd.

Some of those objections may have seemed plausible or ingenious; scarcely any, I think, have been weighty or substantial; none, I am sure, of sufficient weight to counterbalance the numerous benefits which there is such reason to expect from the adoption of the measure. But they have been frequently suited to meet those passions and prejudices, which naturally exist, or have been artfully excited in our sister kingdom; and, if we feel it our duty, to recommend the proposed incorporation to our fellow subjects there, we owe it to them and to ourselves to spare no pains in the endeavour to remove, by dispassionate reasoning and cool deliberation, such obstacles as may have appeared to them, or any number of them, to stand in the way of what most of us here, I believe, consider as material for our interests and essential to theirs.

April 22. The House proceeded to To those who have attended to the vatake the said Address into consideration. The Address having been read twice, rious modes of resistance to the proposal of a union, which have been resorted to Mr. Pitt moved, "That this House doth with the Lords in the said Address by different persons, two circumstances agree Upon must have occurred as very remarkable. to be presented to his Majesty." One has been so well expressed in the rewhich, Mr. Sylvester Douglas rose and said: solutions of the grand jury of the county Mr. Speaker-I took occasion on a former of the city of Cork, that I should do it inday to express my humble hope, that if a justice not to introduce the mention of it regular opportunity should again occur, in the very language they have used; the House would permit me to lay before" Whilst we lament," say they," that them some thoughts on this great subject, which have appeared to me worthy of their attention; and to explain some of the grounds on which my opinion has been formed in favour of a union with Ireland. Nobody to whom I am known, will, I am persuaded, impute to me the presumptuous folly of imagining that I have it in my power to improve on what those men of transcendent talents, and eminent political wisdom and experience, who have taken the principal share in the former debates, have advanced on the leading points of this question. But it is a question of such extent, that it may fairly be thought that even yet several important topics remain for consideration, and some new views of those which have been already discussed. It has been for a considerable length of time before the public in both kingdoms: it has given rise to various arguments in both Houses of this and the other parliament: and upon every fresh occasion, additional lights have been thrown upon it, and new difficulties and objections have been raised, by the fertility and eagerness of contest and opposition.

any difference of opinion should exist in
this kingdom upon so important a ques.
tion, we cannot but remember how una-
nimous the rebellious and traitorous ene-
The plan of the
mies of the country are in their reproba-
tion of the measure."
United Irishmen, with the assistance of
the inveterate foe of the British empire
and constitution, is, to effect a separation
between Great Britain and Ireland. It is
natural, therefore, that they should dread
nothing so much as any measure which
they must look upon as fatal to that fa-
incontes-
vourite object. That separation is their
favourite object, we have many
tible proofs, but it is sufficient for me now
to refer to the declaration of their founder,
Tone, subjoined to the Report of the Se-
cret Committee of the Irish House of Lords
in 1797; and the detestation of a union,
which on that account the same class of
men have always expressed is equally no
torious.

The furious declamations of M'Nevin, Lewins, and others, have been more than once referred to in this place: and within not many weeks from the present moment, some of those self con victed traitors have contrived to publish

*

to the world new libels on the government | constituent body, or the electors, have no and constitution of their country, their such authority; they have not, by the pracmain view in which has manifestly been, tice or true theory of our constitution, to co-operate to this particular end with any power of deliberation on any question those who, though of a very different whatever; their only business as electors description, and acting undoubtedly from being that of selecting and nominating motives of mistaken patriotism, have those whom they think the fittest persons exerted their talents and influence to to exercise that share of legislation which counteract and retard that happy conso- is vested in the third estate of parliament: lidation of the empire which his ma- the act of the election is the beginning jesty's paternal goodness has recom- and end of their functions; the latent pomended to the consideration of both his litical rights of the people at large, whatparliaments. ever they may be, have not been delegated to them; and those gentlemen, on the other side, who are the most strenuous advocates against a union, would, I should think, be very unwilling to devolve that authority which is denied to the elected, on the elective body, as now constituted; since, in their opinion, they ought to be deprived of the very elective franchise itself, by what they call a reform of parliament; the scheme of such reform being, in many instances literally, and virtually in all, to deprive the present electors of that franchise.

The other circumstance is, that the opposers of union have almost all endeavoured to convince us, that the case of the incorporation of Scotland and England in 1707, is not in any degree applicable on the present occasion. I think there is considerable dexterity, though perhaps not a great deal of candour, in this attempt. In all great political operations, experience and historical precedent are the best and safest guides. Those gentlemen have, therefore, justly thought they should have a better chance of gaining their end, if they could induce us to shut our eyes against history, and wander with them in the obscure mazes of theory and speculation. Their ingenuity might then, perhaps, bewilder and perplex us; whereas, if we recur to that memorable event, its similarity to what is now proposed, both in principle and in all its most characteristic features, is so great, that they naturally feel it furnishes, by its complete success, after the trial of a century, the strongest and most irresistible refutation of their arguments.

In the first and preliminary point, for instance, of the question of union, that transaction is most especially applicable, being the direct case of a national decision on the right and competency of parliament. I will not enter at large into the general argument concerning the extraordinary powers of the supreme legislature of a country. It has been amply and ably treated in several of the prior stages of the present business, in this House. If the parliament, in our representative government, is not competent to treat of, and conclude an incorporated union, there is no authority which is; and, consequently, a legitimate union, in such governments, never could take place. The

Arthur O'Connor's Letter to lord Castlereagh. Demonstration, &c. ascribed to Dr. M'Nevin.

But if the electors cannot deliberate and decide on such a measure, much less can the people at large; who never, I believe, in the smallest state, or most com plete democracy, have exercised, in fact, by universal individual suffrage, deliberative, judicial, or legislative authority. Yet to maintain that the constitutional legislature of a country has not the right of doing certain acts, however clearly beneficial to that country, without a previous special commission from the mass of the nation, leads immediately to the false and mischievous principle of the direct sovereignty of the people, and to that equally mischievous fiction to which it has given rise, viz. that an original compact between the governors and governed is the only lawful foundation of government. Indeed, to resort to the elementary parts of a nation, the numerical aggregate of individuals composing it, for authority to form an union, would be a complete admission of such sovereignty; as the terms and conditions with which this numerical mass might choose to accompany that delega tion of power, would be an exemplification of such original compact. But what sort of philosophy is that, which traces the foundation of all political phenomena to a fact which no history shows ever to have existed, which the consideration of the human character, and the daily transactions, and past and present situations of

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