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ing which may have given rise to the passages I have referred to in De Foe. But it is no wonder the sort of argument there stated is so loosely, generally, and shortly expressed, and that so little attention seems to have been paid to it at the time, or by that very historian. Was the mention made of the war, in the same proclamation, a special or necessary notice to the electors of Scotland to instruct their representatives how they were to act in the ensuing parliament, as to granting or refusing supplies? If it had been all at once discovered, that all former par. liaments which had entertained the question of union had exceeded the power and authority incident to their constitution, would there not have been some more solemn and specific recital to that effect in the proclamation itself? Would that subject have been lumped, as it were, with so common and usual a cause for holding a parliament as the circumstance of a war? Would not the proclamation have proceeded to give new and peculiar directions for the method of communicating to the electors the notice that they were to exercise a novel and extraordinary sort of deliberation, and to communicate a new power to the elected, not necessarily vested in them by the act of election and consequent commission, appointing them inembers of the legislature? Would not the proceedings at the subsequent elections, the summons, the returns, or, as they were called, and were in fact in Scotland, the commissions of the persons chosen, have contained some reference to the subject? Would not the minutes of the election meetings, whether of counties or burghs, which in that country are drawn up with so much form and precision, have recorded the especial object and purpose for calling the parliament, and the instructions on that account given by each body of constituents? Would there have been no trace of any thing of that sort among the entries in the corporation books of Edinburgh, or of the other cities, towns, and boroughs of the kingdom? Would there not have been some tradition, some memorial, some narrative, or some hint of a formal, or at least of some incidental allusion to the subject of union at some of the elections -of some contest founded on the known or declared opinions of different candidates, for or against the measure? And, lastly, would not the very act of the Scotch parliament, which ratified the

treaty, have recited the special power which alone warranted them in that act, and which their general character as a parliament did not authorize? Now, Sir, not one of those circumstances exists. The proclamation gives no particular direction as to the elections. The summonses for election, the commissions, the minutes, the corporation books, bear no marks or signs of any thing special. History, memoirs, tradition, are all silent; and the act of the Scotch parliament is equally so.

It is hardly necessary to wind up the narrative I have been giving, by stating that the commissioners who met by virtue of the two acts of 1702, never came to any conclusive treaty or agreement. Their meetings were finally adjourned on the 3rd Feb. 1703. The new Scotch parliament did not meet till the 6th May 1703. On the 9th Sept. 1703, they voted, that "the commission of parliament," as they called it, was terminate and extinct; and that there should be no new one without the consent of parliament. In February 1704-5, the English parliament passed a new act, empowering the queen to appoint commissioners, when a similar act should have passed the parliament of Scotland. On the 5th April 1705, that first English parliament of queen Anne was dissolved, and the new one met on the 27th October. In the mean time, after a great deal of angry proceedings in the parliament of Scotland during their first and second session, in the third, which began on the 28th June 1705, an act also passed, authorising the queen to appoint commissioners. Under these two acts new commissions issued; that for Scotland on the 27th Feb. 1705-6, and that for England on the 10th April 1706. The commissioners met at Whitehall on the 16th of that month: on the 22nd of July the articles were executed; on the 16th of January 1706-7, they were ratified by an act of the Scotch parliament; and on the 6th March of the same year, by the English statute of 5th Anne, cap. 8; and the union took effect on the 1st of May 1707.

Sir, I did, in a prior debate, advert to the authority of several eminent persons in Ireland, on this question of the competency of their parliament; and referred to a debate in the Irish House of Lords, in which the lord chancellor, the two chief justices, and the chief baron had voted, and three of them spoke in support of its

8431 39 GEORGE III.

competency. What I then said has been
misunderstood. I have been supposed
not only to have asserted what I have just
mentioned, and (which I also admit I did)
that Mr. Foster and sir John Parnell had
avoided giving their sanction to the con-
trary doctrine, but to have added, with
some exultation, that there had nobody
been found to maintain it but M'Nevin
and Lewins. Sir, that is not what I
stated. I did perhaps discover the satis-
faction I felt from the consideration that
the distinguished characters I have men-
tioned had supported that side of the
question which I thought was necessarily
connected both with the general princi-
ples of government and those of the Bri-
but I never said, or
tish constitution;
meant to say, that no opinion had been
delivered of an opposite sort by any body
in Ireland, except M Nevin and Lewins.
It was therefore unnecessary to question
me, whether I did not know in particular
that three considerable lawyers, and mem-
bers of the Irish parliament, had denied
this competency; and whether I doubted
of their legal learning and abilities? I
dare say they have denied it. I have in-
deed read, in a printed letter, to which
the name of one of those gentlemen is
subscribed, "That the parliament of Ire-
land, true to itself, and honest to its
country, will never assume a power ex-
trinsic of its delegation." (Mr. Barring-
ton's letter to Mr. Saurin, dated 20th
January, 1799.) Similar sentiments may
have been delivered by the other two,
and by others in the sister parliament;
and as to the legal abilities and acquire-
ments of those gentlemen, far be it from
me to express or entertain any opinion to
their disparagement. But, Sir, I am per-
suaded those gentlemen themselves would
not think it implied any disrespect to
them, as members of the profession to
which I once had the honour to belong, if
1 were now to say, that the opinions of
barristers, however able or eminent, are
not, in point of authority, to be put in
the balance, on a great constitutional
point, with those of the heads of his ma-
jesty's supreme tribunals, the fathers and
oracles of the law; especially when those
great judicial stations are so filled as they
at present are.

But is it true that, with a disproportion
of members, such as it may be supposed
will be settled between the two countries,
Ireland would only give, and Great Bri-
tain only acquire? I speak now of legis-

| lative authority. In my judgment quite
otherwise. There would be a reciprocal,
and, having regard to the respective
weight of each in the scale of empire, an
equal communication of power. The Lords
and Commons of Great Britain would in-
deed acquire a direct share in the legisla-
tion of Ireland, but so would the Lords
and Commons of Ireland in that of Great
Britain. Mutually they would relinquish,
or, if gentlemen like a more exceptionable
word better, would surrender, the exclu-
sive jurisdiction over their respective
countries; but each would obtain a share,
commensurate with its relative importance
in the united state, of the supreme domi-
nion over the whole; and, therefore, as
to the distinction attempted on the ques-
tion of right, how can it be contended
that the British parliament may lawfully
receive within its bosom, say 80, 100, or
120 strangers, vesting them individually
with the same authority as its original
members individually possessed, if the
Irish parliament cannot, on the condition
of participating, according to due propor
tion, in the government of Great Britain
and the empire, lawfully admit the legis-
lators of this island and of the empire to a
share, adjusted by the same rule of pro-
portion, in the local government of Ire-
land? The idea that inequality of num-
bers would vitiate the transaction on the
side of the weakest country, leads to this,
that there could never be a lawful union,
unless the numbers in the united legisla
ture were made arithmetically equal on
both sides. If so, had England agreed to
the unreasonable demand, during the last
century, on the part of Scotland (in 1660)
of joining the two parliaments according
to their then existing numbers, or were
Great Britain now to receive into her
House of Commons all the 300 representa-
tives of Ireland, and to unite together the
two Houses of Peers as they now stand,
the transaction would still have no legal
solidity; the Scotch parliament formerly,
and the Irish parliament now, would still
have betrayed their trusts.

But this junction of the parliaments, this identification or incorporation of the two Houses of each, in analogy to the identity which already exists as to the third estate, is treated as an utter annihilation of the constitution of Ireland. The same terms were misapplied in Scotland to the union of that country with this; for, ingenious and inventive in arguments on most subjects as some of our opponents

council a just number of the representatives of both nations for one House, and of the peers for the other, will be the annihilation of the constitution? The legislature of the empire may, in one point of view, be considered as one great political machine; consisting of one and the same supreme head, both executive and legis

are, on many of the points of this question | they appear to me mere plagiarists, to a degree of servility, not only of the topics, but even of the very language and expressions which were then employed. Of this any man may convince himself by comparing the late debates here and elsewhere, with the History of De Foe, and the Memoirs of Lockhart. In the case of Scot-lative; to which are attached, or linked land and England, the misapplication was not so great. In that case, the third branch of each legislature, though for the time it centered in the same person, was so far from being inseparably mixed, so as to form one indivisible whole, that a law actually existed, by which its separation, at no distant period, into two distinct sovereignties, was expressly established.

*

It were to be wished, that gentlemen would explain what that essential part of the constitution of Ireland is, which the incorporation of its Lords and Commons with ours will annihilate. It has always appeared to me, that in two principles is comprehended the essence of ours and of the Irish constitution, which, with the exception of certain abuses, real or imputed, of different sorts to be found in each kingdom, is one and the same. How often have I heard gentlemen in the Irish parliament boast that they enjoyed, how often read in the published harangues and essays of Irish politicians, their exultation in the possession of the British constitution! I say, I have always conceived, that the most essential principles of that constitution are two: 1. That it is composed of three independent estates or branches, forming checks, each upon the other two. 2. That no law can pass, affecting the life, the liberty, or property of the subject, without the concurrence of a representative body, chosen from among the people, in a mode formed on the consideration of property and franchise, and consisting of an adequate number of persons; and of such a mixed description, as to bring to the legislative assemblies competent knowledge, both of general and local concerns, and a sympathy of interest in regard to every thing that can affect their constituents and the nation at large. Now, Sir, if this description is in any degree true, how can it be said, that the combining into one supreme imperial

* The Scotch act of Anne, called the Act of Security, 1st parliament of queen Anne, 2nd ses. c. 3.

and knit, two separate members, while each of those two is subdivided again into two analogous parts: the one member, the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, empowered to prepare for the sovereign's deliberation, sanction, or rejection, whatever may seem necessary for Great Britain, and for the empire at large; the other, the Lords and Commons of Ireland, possessing only, but exclusively as far as such exclusion is consistent with the idea of a unity of empire, either on the present or any other possible frame of such a machine-the same power as to the kingdom of Ireland. Let me ask, whether this machine, considered theoretically at least, would not be simplified, its structure improved, and the two essential objects I have pointed out, better secured, by blending and incorporating, in a fit proportion, the two separate members into one.

But, Sir, after making the best stand they can on this quicksand of incompetency, the gentlemen proceed to the real merits of the question, and expressly deny that Ireland will reap any benefit from the measure; meaning, I suppose, also to deny, that it will prove beneficial to this country, or to the empire at large. I suppose they mean this, because I think that no man of good sense, or who is a real friend to Ireland, can disjoin her interests from those of this kingdom, and of the other parts of the British dominions, or contend that any great arrangement is unadvisable and unjust, which shall tend to the general advantage of those other branches of the empire, merely because no particular advantage may accrue to Ireland, provided that country is not thereby exposed to some detriment or danger. Let us, therefore, examine a few of the most prominent circumstances of advantage which may be reasonably expected to flow from a union, in the first place, to Great Britain, and to the rest of his majesty's dominions; but, secondly, to Ireland; considering the subject in a general view of legislative and executive government, of commerce, manufactures.

and agriculture, of internal peace, civilization, and prosperity; under which heads we may also discuss some of the principal objections which have been relied on, either here or in the sister country.

With regard to this country, its legislative and executive councils would no longer be liable to be perplexed in consequence of the distinct machinery of a separate Irish parliament, nor the general government continue in constant danger of misapprehension and disputes, and subject to the inconveniences which inevitably arise from circuity of communication, and the impediments and embarrassing modifications to which jealousy or ignorance on the one side or the other will so often give occasion (while things remain as they are) in many of the most important concerns of the empire. In other respects it may be difficult to foresee any immediate advantage to Great Britain; to her manufactures, her agriculture, her trade, or general prosperity. Some people, indeed, rather apprehend danger to British com merce and manufactures; and that supposed migration of capital and skill to a cheaper country, to a country possessing a superiority of situation as to many branches of business which has been often the subject of public discussion, is argued upon as a too probable consequence of a union. (Mr. Peel's speech). To this it might be a sufficient answer for the statesman to say, that if what one part of the united kingdom shall lose another will gain, there will be no public detriment to the whole. But that answer, I own, sounds harsh to my ears. I think you ought not, on such general considerations of policy, to overlook the feelings and interests of the numerous individuals and classes of men, who have, as it were, localized their ingenuity, their industry, their wealth, and their habits of life, under the countenance and implied faith of preexisting laws and institutions. There is a better answer, I believe, in the fact, that capital and industry so localized are not easily influenced at once to change their situation, by such temptations. The attempts which have been made, at various times, to transfer, by some sudden effort of speculation and enterprise, English money and credit, and English art and skill, to cheaper and more eligible places in Scotland, Wales, and even Ireland, have rarely been successful, or persevered in; and it is no inconsiderable illustration and proof of this position, that even with

regard to external trade, which is certainly more locomotive than manufactures, those towns and ports where accident at first, and a long series of causes afterwards, have operated to establish it, are seldom or never out-rivalled, or their commerce drawn off, by any exertions, however powerful, in favour of situations better adapted by nature for carrying it on. Gradually, however, after a union, Ireland will undoubtedly attract much wealth, capital, and credit from this country, not only by the circumstances of advantage to which I have alluded, but also, more especially, because a uniformity of laws and legislature will give greater confidence to those who may be disposed to embark in enterprises of speculation, or place their money on commercial or landed securities in that kingdom. This, one should think, would be a strong and reasonable argument for Ireland (of which afterwards); but such gradual benefit to be reaped by her, will not affect the interests of individuals now engaged in business here, and will unquestionably, from the known principles and history of public wealth, tend in its progress, by multiplying intercourse, and the returns of profit in and between both countries, to increase the riches of both, and of the whole empire.

Let us now give a moment's consideration to the effects of the proposed union on that empire, as an aggregate of which, Great Britain and Ireland form the two chief and preponderating members. And here, Sir, it will be enough just to observe, what no man, I think, can deny, that in all cases where it is practicable, one general, superintending, and controlling legislature, is the best fitted for the steady, consistent, and rational government of all the parts of that combination of individuals and territories which constitute what is denominated a state. To endeavour to enforce this position by a long train of argument, indisputable as I conceive it to be, would be an unwarrantable waste of time and words. It has, indeed, been said, in answer to those who have pointed out the obvious inconvenience which might arise from a difference of opinion on any great imperial question, as of peace and war, between two distinct parliaments, that equal inconvenience would follow from a difference of a like sort between the several branches of the same parliament; but that such differences, though they may be suggested by theory, have not been found to happen in

practice. [Mr. Foster's speech, p. 51, 55.] They certainly sometimes have happened, both between the two Houses, and between those Houses and the sovereign, in the British parliament, and with the hazard, at least, of considerable detriment to the state. But there are material distinctions between the two cases. The identity of interest between the several branches of the legislative and executive government of the same country, is much more direct and sensible, and therefore, on discussion, much less apt to be mistaken by either, than what exists between two kingdoms, though forming parts of the same empire; besides, there is a facility of discussion and explanation, by conference, address, remonstrance, &c. between the respective branches of the same parliament, which cannot take place between two distinct legislatures.

It is also said, that the checks which the proceedings of the three branches of the same parliament produce, furnish a principle to which our constitution owes its stability, and that similar checks exist between the two sister parliaments. [Mr. Foster's speech, p. 55]. No doubt this is true to a certain extent; but it would be easy to show, that in the case of the two parliaments such checks exist in a very imperfect degree, without any foundation in their formal and legal constitutions,* , and with little more force or efficacy than those which prevail in the rela. tions of different states, having common interests, but no link or connexion in their governments. Such checks between the different nations of our part of the globe, contributed for a time to maintain what used to be called the balance of Europe; but although those of a more substantial and operative kind, in concurrence with other causes, have to this day preserved, and, I trust, if perpetuity can belong to human institutions, will ever preserve our frame of government, the other and inferior sort has not been found of equal power in giving permanency to that balance. I admit that circumstances

*This is not inconsistent with what is afterwards said of the jurisdiction the British parliament may exercise over the executive ministers who advise the king in assenting to, or rejecting Irish bills. That jurisdiction is without power to stop such assent or rejection; and, therefore, forms no immediate or absolute check, though it may afterwards punish those who have advised the crown to give or refuse its assent.

[VOL. XXXIV.]

of distance (there may be others) are sometimes such as to render so desirable an object as one common imperial legislature impracticable. Such I take to have been the case with regard to our colonies in North America. I believe all sober men of all parties, would have agreed, that, could it have been done, the admission into the British parliament of an adequate number of representatives from thence, would have been the happiest method of reconciling the disputes and removing the difficulties which terminated in a civil war, and the separation of that country from the empire. Dr. Adam Smith, and many others, recommended the experiment. The immense distance, and the uncertainty of regular, periodical, frequent, and early communication between American representatives in Great Britain and their constituents in America, seem to me to have opposed insurmountable obstacles to such a plan. But that no valid objection of a like nature exists in the case of Ireland, is abundantly manifest. Some gentlemen, indeed, of that country, have expressed, in very strong language, their ideas of the inconvenience which would attend what they quaintly term a transmarine parliament; and one learned barrister, at the celebrated meeting of the profession which took place early in Dublin, is stated to have pronounced, "That a British minister shall not, and cannot, plant another Sicily in the bosom of the Atlantic, and that God and nature never intended that Ireland should be a province."* If by this is meant, that the intervening channel is, in the nature of things, an insuperable difficulty in the way of a legislative union; I answer, that in principle (however widely the cases differ in importance) the reason would equally apply to the islands of Orkney and Shetland, and would have applied, in former times, to the town of Calais. As to the idea, that Ireland, by a union, will become a province, in any other sense than that according to which she and Great Britain are now provinces of the general empire, I deny it. Ireland, indeed, will no longer be a distinct kingdom; but neither will Great Britain; they will both become, as it were, aliquot parts of one incorporated realm, instead of remaining separate integral parts of the empire. It is true, that the interposition of

* Debates of the Irish Bar, 9th December 1798, p. 47. [31]

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