man came to a man's dwelling to see whe- | ther he had taken into, or sent out of his house, some particular articles, without having previously paid a given sum to the revenue; but here a spy comes, not only into the House, but opens the bureau of every man, and becomes acquainted with his most secret concerns. A man must show to this spy his bills, his notes, his bonds, and all his securities. This was monstrous. He knew that a tax on income had the appearance, upon a glance at it, of being an equal tax; but he would ask, what sort of equality there was between 10 per cent upon income merely, and 10 per cent upon that income which is the produce of a capital? There was another species of property which was of a peculiar nature, he meant that which belonged to a church establishment. He was a friend to a church establishment; he was of opinion that the clergy were very serviceable to every community where they were known, for they instructed the mass of the people in their duty. He would ask, whether any persons having a 1,000l. a year in the church, ought to pay the same sum as a person of a 1,000l. a year landed property? Besides this, he objected to the scale of duty. It was said, that men might reduce their expenses, in order to enable them to pay this impost. A gentleman of only 1,000l. a year could not reduce. He considered a tax upon income as a tax upon industry, and such as would make men unwilling to labour. They would argue with themselves thus; why should we labour when government runs away with the effect of it? If this bill was supposed chiefly to affect the rich, it was a mistake. It did not hurt the rich man, it only made him curtail his expenses. And who suffered? The industrious poor who were employed by him.

The Solicitor General said, that if when the legislature imposed a tax, they were to wait until they found one which was perfectly popular, he was afraid they would wait long enough: for all the observation he had been led to make, induced him to believe that most people were inclined to evade the payment of taxes. When it was proposed to repeal the assessed tax bill, and to substitute this mode of collection, the principle was preserved, though the means were altered. The experience of last year had fully proved the wisdom of raising a considerable part of the supplies within the year. The hon.

baronet must know, that the novelty was the introduction of the funding system, and not the raising the supplies within the year. The system of borrowing and funding certainly afforded greater facilities, but still it ought not to be carried to too great an extent. It seemed to be just upon every principle, that we ought for a time to pay more than usual, rather than throw the whole burthen upon posterity. The principle of the measure of last year was this, that a tenth part of the income of every person should be contributed. The question was, how that tenth part was to be ascertained? It was imagined that the extent of a man's income might be ascertained by the amount of his taxes. On this supposition the tax of last year was adopted. Wherever the operation of the tax was such as to take more than onetenth from any individual, then the bill pointed out the means by which he might obtain relief. But in those cases where the assessed taxes did not take one-tenth, the individual could make up the deficiency by voluntary contributions. Many, however, had taken very improper means to evade the payment of the tax. He was aware that the present plan would not, in every instance, produce the tenth of a man's income. But if they could not obtain perfect equality, they ought to adopt such measures as seemed most likely to produce that effect. This was the object of the present bill. He was surprised the hon. baronet was an advocate for taxing capital, because it was almost universally agreed, that income and not capital, was the proper object of taxation. Taxes upon capital had been attempted, but it was found that they produced great inequality. In the beginning of the reign of queen Anne, an attempt was made to tax capital. The provisions of that act were infinitely more objectionable than the present; but it never was suggested at that period that they were unconstitutional. It certainly was found that they were not effectual, as far as they related to capital; but as far as they related to income, they proved to be effectual: the result was, that the tax, as far as it affected capital, was given up; but, with respect to income, it was retained. It must be obvious, that an attempt to tax capital, with respect to land, would be wholly impracticable. How would it be possible for commissioners to examine into the various kinds of estates and the different interests which different people

might have in the land? How could they distinguish between settled and unsettled estates? If they were to tax the tenants for life according to his interest, then the reversioners would not be taxed at all. In many cases, those who least deserved it would be most favoured; and on the other hand, those who had the greatest title to indulgence would receive the least. It was therefore obvious, that to attempt to tax the capital of land would be impracticable; or, if it could be effected, would be productive of the greatest inequalities. But if the principle of taxing capital was applied to money, the inequality would be much greater, because the value of money depended, in a great degree, upon the mode in which it was employed. A sum of money in the hands of one man, might be infinitely more valuable than an equal sum in the hands of another. But a tax upon capital would make no such distinctions; two persons possessing the same sum, must pay the same tax, though the value of the capital might be five times greater to one than to the other. He did not mean to say that a tax upon income was, in every instance, free from these objections. It was not possible to devise any mode of taxation which should operate equally upon all. But a tax which would take, as nearly as possible, the same proportion of income from all, would be the most desirable one that could be imposed. One great advantage arising from this mode of taxation was, that that which was raised came into the public coffer, and had not the effect of raising the price of any article of consumption. It would be an extremely difficult task to discover other means by which the same beneficial effects could be produced with as little inconvenience.

Sir. W. Young gave his entire assent to the principle of the bill. In considering the propriety of agreeing to this, or any other mode of taxation, it was always necessary to bear in mind the important objects for which we were contending. It was a circumstance which contributed much to the happiness and prosperity of this country, that all the links in the chain of its society ran naturally one into the other; that it was impossible to mark where one rank of society began, and where another ended. It was upon this principle that he had found fault with the measure of last year, because there were many people wholly exempted from its operation. It was highly unjust to say,

that one set of men should pay a tax because their property was of a certain description, and another should not. The most valuable property a man could have was enjoyed equally by all the subjects of this empire, namely, the protection of his property, his liberty, and every thing that was dear to him. It appeared to him, that the least valuable part of a man's property was that which he carried in his pocket. Where, therefore, all were concerned, all should come within the reach of the tax. This was the effect of this tax. It was urged, in opposition to this measure, that it would have been better to adhere to the funding system. Before this opinion was implicitly adopted, it should be recollected that we were a commercial people, and that great care should be taken that our wealth should not be diverted from our commerce, to which we owed all our greatness into other channels. Now, the natural consequence of pushing the funding system to an extreme, would be to raise the interest of money to a degree that would be extremely dangerous; because if men could get an extravagant interest for money, without exposing it to the risks of commerce, all commercial enterprise would be checked. One of the strongest objections urged against this measure was, that it would compel a disclosure of every man's private affairs. Now in the West Indies, a man could not have a bond or note without its being registered, and consequently to a certain degree disclosing his property; and yet he did not know that it had ever produced any prejudicial effects. Another objection urged against this bill was, that it invested the persons who were to collect the tax with inquisitorial power; but this objection was not more valid than the others; because, if every man was allowed to give in a statement of his property just as he pleased, the consequence would obviously be, that very little money would be raised. He by no means saw how this inquiry could be so painful to a man's feelings. Who were the persons by whom the inquiry was to be made? Why, just that description of persons to whom every man voluntarily submitted the investigation of questions respecting his property and his life. If, then, they were fit to be trusted with such important concerns as property and life, upon what ground could any man be afraid of being injured by their prejudices? If it was necessary to raise a large sum of money, and coercive means

quity of this measure would appear more strongly to the House, when shown in the words of an able writer, whose name he had the honour to bear. The opinion of Mr. Adam Smith would bear him out in his assertion. This valuable writer says: "Capitation taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a man's fortune varies from day to day, and without an inquisition more intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least once every year, can only be guessed at his assessments therefore must, in most cases, depend upon the good or bad humour of his assessors, and must therefore be altogether arbitrary and uncertain." The next object he would touch upon, was the profits arising from agriculture and trade, and this was evidently an object not directly taxable. The same author adduced a variety of reasons why it should not be taxed directly. "This profit," he says, "is the compensation, and in most cases it is no more than a very moderate compensation, for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must have this compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own interest, continue the employment." Here, therefore, was industry to be recompensed, and not confounded with indolence. The author next proceeded to show, that "the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses can never be a secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But the whole amount of the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a secret, and can scarce ever be ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides, to almost continual variations. A year seldom passes away, frequently not a month, sometimes scarce a single day, in which it does not rise or fall more or less. An inquisition into every man's private circumstances, and an inquisition which, in order to accommodate the tax to them, watched over all the fluctuations of his fortune, would be a source of such continual and endless vexation as no people could support." England, however, seemed doomed to support it; though he could not well imagine that Englishmen would tamely submit to a system of taxation that discouraged industry, and favoured indolence, and which put a surveyor, or a spy over every man's property. But it is said there was no inquisitorial power, [VOL. XXXIV.]

because we might make a declaration: to what, however, did this declaration amount, according to the same author?— He says, " In all countries a severe inquisition into the circumstances of private persons has been carefully avoided. At Hamburgh every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state one-fourth per cent of all that he possesses, and as the wealth of the people of Hamburgh consists principally in stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses himself, and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain sum of money, which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth per cent of all that he possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that subject." The disclosure of circumstances, we were also told was not to be dreaded. Yet hear Adam Smith: "Merchants engaged in the hazardous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged at all times to expose the real state of their circumstances. The ruin of their credit and the miscarriage of their projects, they foresee, would too often be the consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers to all such projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any such concealment."

Mr. Pitt said:-Sir; Impressed as I am with the conviction that there never was a subject of greater importance agitated within these walls, I should not have thought it incumbent upon me in the present stage of the business, to have troubled you with any observations, were there not some points which have been touched upon this night, which I am desirous, as soon as possible, to place in their proper point of view. What has been urged by some gentlemen, while it could not be considered fairly as argument, was 80 calculated to excite prejudice, and to beget misconception, that it demands some degree of notice. It is a satisfaction to me to find that the propriety of raising a certain part of the supplies within the year has in general been conceded. If we can judge from what has appeared tonight, no one, except the hon. baronet who opened the debate is disposed to contest the principle. I am thus relieved from the necessity of detaining the House with any argument upon that subject, or saying any thing in reply to one solitary antagonist by whom the principle was denied. Whatever

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authority may belong to that individual member, and no man has more, the worthy baronet himself seemed to rest entirely upon that authority, as he did not add a single argument in support of his position. There were some others, however, who, admitting the benefits which might be derived, both in present vigour and permanent resources, from the plan of raising great part of the supplies within the year, yet thought themselves at liberty peremptorily, and impatiently, to shut the door against all im provement, and to oppose all farther deliberation. Confessing the necessity of vigorous efforts for the salvation of the country, they do not wait to reject the measure upon any ground of invincible objection, but they come forward to resist it in the very outset, previous to a mature examination of its details, and a sincere endeavour to correct its provisions.

The hon. gentleman who spoke last approves of the principle of raising a considerable part of the supplies within the year, but he declares himself an enemy to any plan of rendering that principle effectual by a general tax. The House will, no doubt, think this a most valuable concession of the hon. gentleman. If it be necessary for the effort which we are called upon to make, if it be essential to the future prosperity of the empire to obtain that supply which is requisite for the vigorous prosecution of the contest, it is evident that it must be obtained by a sudden tax immediately productive. If the hon. gentleman admits that such an increase of the taxes on consumption as would produce ten millions within the year is impracticable, it follows that there is no other mode but a tax upon property, so far as it can be discovered. We must lay the contribution, then, either on capital or income. From this general operation, however, the hon. gentleman would exempt all those whom he is pleased to call exclusively the useful classes, and lay the whole of the weight on what he calls the useless class. In the class of useless the hon. gentleman has thought proper to rank all the proprietors of land, those men who form the line which binds and knits society together-those on whom, in a great measure, the administration of justice, and the internal police of the country depends;-those men from whom the poor receive employment, from whom agriculture derives its improvement and support,

and to whom, of course, commerce itself is indebted for the foundation on which it rests. Yet this class the hon. gentleman thinks proper to stigmatize as useless drones, of no estimation in the eyes of society. When the consequences with which this light flippant theory, the offspring of mere temporary unthinking policy, would be attended are fairly considered, the hon. gentleman will find that his distinction between useful and useless classes is as little founded in truth, as the practical system he founds upon it would be consistent with the general interest of those whom he thinks entitled to peculiar favour. The question then is, whether capital or income be the proper object of contribution? The hon. gentleman says that capital is the criterion which ought to be adopted in the case of the commercial man, and income where it is derived from land. Taking for granted, that the principles of the hon. gentleman were well founded, no less than threefourths of the whole income liable to contribution is calculated to arise from this source. Even upon his own argument, then, he ought not to consider this measure as so incurable as to refuse going into the committee. If he is sincere in his profession of desire to facilitate the raising of a considerable part of the supplies within the year, why should he refuse to proceed farther in a measure which is at least capable of embracing three-fourths of his object; and in other parts susceptible of alteration and improvement? If, however, what has been so universally recognised as important to be done, is to be done effectually, and the great consideration is, on which of these leading objects it will be most advantageous to the public, and least inconvenient to the classes of contribution to impose this general and, comprehensive tax, I am afraid, that to that very plan, which he himself thinks preferable, those objections on which he rested the desponding hope, that the country neither could, nor would submit to the measure, would apply with aggravated force. Every objection, which he so vehemently urged against the danger of disclosure, will apply to those new theories of policy on which he would act. The hon. gentleman says, he is against disclosure. How, then, is he to ascer⚫ tain the amount of that commercial capi tal, the profits of which he thinks might justly be made to contribute? Would he be contented with that loose declaration, which experience has proved to be so fa