other, he would not fail to be delighted with that which had the preference, and to pronounce it beautiful. But fhould he afterward become converfant with the works of a Vandyke or a Reynolds, he would discover the uncertainty of his former judgment, and what pleased him before as beautiful, he would then defpife as defective. In this fenfe, we may be allowed to say, that judgment in the fine arts is never certain, but when matured and refined to tafte. At the fame time it may be doubted, whether genius and tafte can be strictly confidered as the fame faculty, differently exerting itself under different names. Genius, as the derivative fenfe of the word implies, denotes the faculty of inventing, or of forming new affociations of ideas; but the business of selecting fuch images as are truly beautiful, feems to be the province of tafte; which, as the term imports, is the faculty of difcerning, or in its etymological fenfe, of feeling what is beautiful. It is as usual, and perhaps as proper, to say a writer of tafte, as a critic of tafte: and it seems easy to conceive a writer of genius, that is, of strong creative powers, without tafte to Select fuch images as are truly beautiful, from group which throng before him. This defect is fometimes, perhaps oftenest, obfervable in writers of the greatest genius; and feems to arife from too quick a fenfibility, which caufes the novelty of various images, to make fuch a the F 4 power powerful impreffion on their minds, as to pre vent the timely interpofition of judgment, to diffipate the charm which misleads them in their choice. But though tafte is spoiled by too exquifite a fenfibility, yet without a certain degree of it, neither tafte nor genius can exift. They fpring from the fame common stock; fenfibility is the root of both: and though both may be improved and refined by exercise, yet the feeds of each are fown by nature. The poet himself, indeed, feems to have had the diftinctions in view which I would endea vour to point out. He fays; "Authors are partial to their wit, 'tis true, "But are not Critics to their judgment too? "Yet if we look more closely, we shall find "Most have the feeds of judgment in their "mind: "Nature affords at least a glimm'ring light; "The lines, tho' touch'd but faintly, are "drawn right." Taking thefe lines, and thofe before quoted together, it should feem from the context, that the poet ufes judgment and tafte, as two words denoting degrees of the fame faculty, and that he confiders gepius as fomething diftinct from both. Among the caufes which prevent the due culture of the seeds of judgment, our Author reckons reckons falfe learning, false reasoning, false wit, and falfe politenefs: on which he farther expatiates in the fecond part. Against falfe wit, which is the moft frequent caufe of a perverfion of judgment, he is particularly fevere. "Some have at firft for Wits, then Poets past, "Turn'd Critics next, and prov'd plain fools "at laft. "Some neither can for Wits nor Critics pass, "As heavy mules are neither horse nor ass. "Thofe half-learn'd witlings, num'rous in our ifle, "As half-form'd infects on the banks of Nile; Unfinish'd things, one knows not what to call, "Their generation's fo equivocal." Nothing can be more keen and farcaftic than thefe lines, in which the images are moft happily chofen to heighten the fatire. He next proceeds to deliver the precepts of criticism, recommending it to the critic in the first place to examine his own ftrength: nature he observes has fet fixed limits to the human faculties The lines by which he expreffes this fentiment are incomparable. "Nature to all things fix'd the limits fit, "And wifely curb'd proud man's pretending wit. "As on the land while here the ocean gains, "In other parts it leaves wide fandy plains; " Thus "Thus in the foul while memory prevails, The poetry as well as the philofophy of this paffage, can scarcely be too much admired. How chafte and elegant, yet how ftrong and lively,, is the imagery by which he illustrates the tendencies of the different faculties! There is peculiar beauty in representing the beams of warm imagination, as melting away the foft figures of memory. Every epithet is fo happily adapted, that it is impoffible to change a word, without doing prejudice to the image. Having fhewn that nature is the proper foun-. dation on which to establish criticism, he points out the aids which may be borrowed from art. He intimates that the rules of art were not invented by the fancy, but difcovered in the book of nature and are ftill nature, though methodized. This he explains by a happy illuftration, wherein he gives a juft definition of liberty; from whence we may perceive how effentially it differs from that licentiousness, which too often ufurps its name and character. "Nature, like Liberty, is but reftrain'd By the fame Laws which firft herself ordain'd." 6 Thefe These rules of art, he obferves, the critics borrowed from the antient poets, who drew them immediately from nature. "Juft precepts thus from great examples giv'n, "She drew from them, what they deriv'd from "Heav'n. "The gen'rous Critic fann'd the Poet's fire, "And taught the world with Reason to admire. "Then Criticism the Mufe's handmaid prov'd, "To dress her charms, and make her more "belov'd: "But following wits from that intention ftray'd, cr "Who could not win the mistress, woo'd the "maid; Against the Poets their own arms they turn'd, "Sure to hate moft the men from whom they "learn'd. "So modern 'Pothecaries, taught the art There is a great deal of sprightly wit and keen raillery in this paffage, in which the poet has drawn his obfervations from Quintilian; but has fkilfully enlivened them, as he seldom fails to do any trite or borrowed fentiments, with all the graces of a fplendid imagination. Our author next obferves, that there are graces beyond the reach of precept. |