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those who have most interest in denying it."1 Yet it does not speak for itself; it speaks as the delegate of another-the capitalized experience of the tribe ? Not so; it speaks as the Vicegerent of God. Mr. Darwin, as we have said, makes the moral sense identical with the social instincts, and these of purely animal origin. But his argument is extremely illogical. He thinks that any animal would acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man; but in that case the animal would have become possessed of the ideas of good and evil; it would have arrived at some standard of right and wrong; "would," as Dr. Newman Smyth puts it, "acquire a moral sense; and as soon as an animal possessed moral ideas he would acquire moral ideas." It scarcely required the intellect of a Darwin to arrive at such a conclusion as this!

Kant said "an erring conscience is a chimera,” and declared that "two things fill my soul with always new and increasing wonder and awethe starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. . . . The first glance at an innumerable multitude of worlds annihilates my importance as an animal creature that must give back the matter of which it was made to the

1 Theism, Professor Flint, pp. 217-18.
2 The Religious Feeling, p. 38.

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planet-itself a mere point in the universeafter it has been for a short time, we know not how short, endowed with vital force. The second, on the contrary, exalts my worth as an intelligence infinitely, through my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animal nature, and even of the whole universe of sense, at least so far as the end of my existence is determined by this law, which is not limited within the conditions and bounds of this life, but goes on into infinitude." 1 No man, says Browning, is past hope—

"Don't each contrive,
Despite the evil you abuse, to live?—
Keeping, each losel, through a maze of lies,
His own conceit of truth? to which he hies

By obscure windings, tortuous, if you will,
But to himself not inaccessible;

He sees truth, and his lies are for the crowd." 2

"The main thing to ask for," says Ruskin, "is sight, there is light enough."

1 Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Beschluss, Werke, 8, 312.

2 Sordello.



OUR estimate of the worth of life depends upon our belief in God and the immortality of the soul. Postulating the true Theistic conception of God and the existence of the soul after death, our views of the present life will naturally differ toto cælo from those who deny the existence of a God who created, sustains, and loves the world, and hold that death ends all. Such an individual must almost necessarily be a pessimist, or one who believes that life is illusion, without meaning, and irremediably bad. "Of all possible worlds," said such an one,1 "that which exists is the worst. Its only excuse is that it tends of itself to destruction. The hope of the philosopher is that reasonable beings will shorten their agony and hasten the return of everything to nothing." The horrible doctrine that the world is the product of blind will naturally tends to kill all hope, consolation, and faith. Then follows melancholy, despair, and suicide.

1 Bahnsen, quoted in Amiel's Journal, 1892, p. 191.



Of course, not all pessimists proceed to such extremes, but such doctrines are all in the Atheistic germ. No Theist, certainly no Christian Theist, can logically be a pessimist. Amiel lamented that it seemed to him that everything was left to his own responsibility, and declared "it is this thought which disgusts me with the government of my own life. To win true peace, a man needs to feel himself directed, pardoned, and sustained by a supreme power, to feel himself in the right road, at the point where God would have him be,-in order with God and the universe. This faith gives strength and calm. I have not got it. All that is, seems to me arbitrary and fortuitous."

Kant's estimate of the worth of life was that it is "a perpetual contest with sheer hardships,' and "a trial time wherein most succumb, and in which even the best does not rejoice in his life." Fichte says that men "pine and fret their life through; in every situation in which they find themselves, thinking if it were only different how much better their lot would be, and yet, after it has changed, finding themselves no better off than before."


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Schelling says "The veil of sadness is spread over all Nature, the deep indestructible melancholy of all life." "Certainly it is a painful way the Being which lives in Nature traverses in 1 Amiel's Journal, p. 128.




his passage through it; that the line of sorrow, traced on the countenance of all Nature, on the face of the animal world, testifies. . . . But this misfortune of existence is hereby annulled that it is accepted and felt as non-existence, in that man seeks to bear up in the greatest possible freedom from it.... Who will trouble himself about the common and ordinary mischances of a transitory life, that has apprehended the pain of universal existence and the great fate of the whole?" "Anguish is the fundamental feeling of every living creature." "The unrest of unceasing willing and desiring, by which every creature is goaded, is in itself unblessedness."

Schopenhauer says-"We feel the wish as we feel hunger and thirst; as soon, however, as it is fulfilled, it is with it as with the enjoyed morsel, that ceases to be for our feeling at the moment that it is swallowed. Pleasures and joys we miss painfully as soon as they cease; but pains, even when they disappear after long presence, are not immediately missed, but their absence has to be brought home to us by means of reflection. In the degree in which enjoyments increase, the receptivity for them diminishes; the accustomed is no longer felt as enjoyment. For that reason however, the receptivity for suffering increases ; for the omission of the customary is painfully felt." "As we do not feel the health of our whole body, but only the little part where the shoe pinches

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