on the part of this country, has been made till lately. I admit, that after the siege of Valenciennes, I did say, it was not then advisable to make conditions, and I admit also, that when we struggled under disadvantages, I was equally averse: whence the right hon. gentleman infers, that "if you will not treat for peace when you are successful, nor treat for it when you are unfortunate, there must be some secret cause, which induces us to believe you are not disposed to treat at all." Is it reasonable, I ask, when a just hope is entertained of increasing our advantages, to risk the opportunity which those advantages would secure of making better terms; or, is it reasonable when we experience great and deplorable misfortunes, to entertain a just apprehension of obtaining a peace, on fair and permanent conditions? These are the principles on which I have acted, and they are raised upon the fair grounds of human action. If success enough were gained to force the enemy to relinquish a part of their possessions, and we might not yet hope to be wholly relieved from similar dangers, except by a repetition of similar efforts and similar success, was it inconsistent for a lover of his country to push those efforts farther, upon the reasonable expectation of securing a more permanent and honourable peace? And, on the other hand, when we experienced the sad reverse of fortune; when the spirit of our allies was broken, our troops discomfited, our territories wrested from us, and all our hopes disconcerted, did it argue a want of reason, or a want of prudence not to yield to the temporary pressure? In carrying on the war, we have met with misfortunes, God knows, severe and bitter! Exclusive of positive acquisitions, however, have we gained nothing by the change which has taken place in France? If we had made peace in 1793, as the right hon. gentleman says we ought to have done, we should have made it before France had lost her trade; before she had exhausted her capital; before her foreign possessions were captured, and her navy destroyed. This is my answer to every part of the right hon. gentleman's speech relative to making peace at those early periods. | guarded and warm expressions of individuals in favour of the war, for declarations of ministers. Thus, many things which fell from that great man, Mr. Burke, have since been stated as the solemn declaration of government; though it is known that, to a certain extent, there is a difference between ministers and that gentleman upon this subject. But then it is to be taken as clear, that ministers are not only anxious for the restoration of monarchy in France, but the old monarchy with all its abuses. That ministers wished to treat with a government in which Jacobin principles should not prevail, that they wished for a government from which they could hope for security, and that they thought a monarchy the most likely form of government to afford to them these advantages, is most undoubtedly true; but that they ever had an idea of continuing the war for the purpose of re-establishing the old government of France, with all its abuses, I solemnly deny. If, for the reasons I have before stated, it would not have been prudent to have made a peace in the early stage of the contest, surely it would not have been advisable when the enemy were inflated with success. The fate of the campaign of 1794 turned against us upon as narrow a point, as I believe ever occurred. We were unfortunate, but the blame did not rest here: that campaign led to the conquest of Holland, and to the consternation which immediately extended itself among the people of Germany and England. What, however, was the conduct of ministers at that period? If they had given way to the alarm, they would have been censurable indeed. Instead of doing so, they immediately sent out expeditions to capture the Dutch settlements, which we may now either restore to the stadtholder, if he should be restored, or may retain them ourselves. If, instead of that line of conduct, ministers had then acknowledged the French republic, does the right hon. gentleman suppose that the terms we should then have obtained would have been better than those we can now expect? Then, it was asked, why did not administration negociate for peace before the confederacy was weakened by the defection of Spain But a discussion is once more intro- and Prussia, because of course, better duced as to the object of the war. Mi- terms might have been obtained when the nisters have repeatedly and distinctly allies were all united, than could be exstated the object; but it is a custom, on pected after they became divided? It unthe other side of the House, to take un-doubtedly would have been a most ad vantageous thing, if we could hava pre- The right hon. gentleman has also vailed upon Spain and Prussia to have thought proper to dwell at considerable continued the war until the enemy were length on the state of the enemy's fibrought to terms, but that not hav-nances. He is willing to admit that their ing been the case, we at least had the ad- finances are, as he says I have stated vantage of the assistance of those powers, them to be, in the very gulf of bankwhile they remained in the confederacy. ruptcy-in their last agonies. But then Before any blame can attach upon mi- the right hon. gentleman proceeds to ask nisters upon this ground, it will be ne- me whether, notwithstanding this financessary to show, that, prior to the defec- cial bankruptcy, they have not prosetion of Prussia and Spain, terms were cuted their military operations with inproposed to us, which we rejected. Whe- creased vigour and success? Whether ther these two powers have gained much notwithstanding these their last agonies, from the peace they have made, is not they may not make such dreadful struga question very difficult to be answered. gles as may bring their adversaries to the Whether Spain was really in that state grave? I will not now detain the House that she could not have maintained ano- by contrasting the finances of this counther campaign, without running the risk try with those of the enemy; I will not of utter destruction, is a point upon which now dwell on the impossibility of a naI do not choose to give an opinion; tion carrying on a vigorous war, in which but with respect to Prussia, she certainly it is annually expending one-third of its enjoys the inactivity of peace, but she has capital; but I will tell the right hon. genall the preparation and expense of war. tleman, that the derangement of the French armies at the latter end of the last campaign, the exhausted state of their magazines and stores, and their ultimate retreat before the allied troops, decline of their finances begins to affect in the greatest degree their military operations. How far their recent successes, on the side of Italy deserve credit to the extent stated by the right hon. gentleman, I shall not take upon me to say; I have had no intelligence on the subject, and therefore shall offer no opinion to the House. The right hon. gentleman again adverts to the form of government which, he says, it was the intention of ministers to establish in France, and alludes, particularly to the affair at Toulon; and from that sub-furnish a convincing proof that the rapid ject he makes a rapid transition to the case of M. de la Fayette. With respect to the treatment of that unfortunate gentleman, the government of Great Britain had no share in it; nor did ministers think themselves warranted in interfering with the allies upon the subject. With regard to M. Lameth, the right hon. gentleman certainly did ministers justice, when he said they could feel no antipathy to that person; and they certainly did feel great reluctance in ordering him to quit the kingdom; but as to the motive which induced them to take that step, they did not conceive it to be a proper subject of discussion. The act of parliament had vested discretion in the executive government, and they must be left to the exercise of it. The right hon. gentleman has also alluded to the situation of the emigrants, and asserted, that if government were of opinion that there was no prospect of making an attack with success upon France, it was the height of cruelty to have employed them. This, however, was not the case: there were, at different times, well grounded expectations of success against that country, and surely it cannot be considered as cruelty to have furnished the emigrants with the means of attempting to regain their properties and their honours. & The next topic which I have to consider, is the argument drawn from the question of our sincerity in the message delivered to the French minister at Basle, on the 8th of March. One inference drawn by the right hon. gentleman arises from the circumstance of this message having been communicated four months after his majesty's speech, and three months after the declaration made to parliament, that his majesty was ready to give effect to any disposition manifested on the part of the enemy for the conclusion of a general peace. In the first place, it must be remembered, that neither the speech from the throne, nor the declaration expressed any intention in the British government to be the first in making proposals for opening a negotiation. The fair construction went no farther than to invite the enemy to make the first advances, if they were so dis posed. Gentlemen, therefore, have no was made on our part, and it would have been ridiculous to propose any particular terms to them, till we were informed whether they were willing to treat at all. It has also been alleged that we must have been insincere, because when we employed the minister at Basle to make this application, we did not at the same time give him the power to negociate. It was extraordinary indeed, that an observation of this kind should be urged by any person who professed the slightest acquaintance with diplomatic proceedings. Was it ever known that the person employed to sound the disposition of a belligerent party, was also considered as the proper minister for discussing all the relative interests, and concluding a treaty? The gentleman through whom the communications were made at Basle, is perfectly qualified by his talents, his zeal, and his integrity, to conduct any negotiation; but whatever may be his character, it would be the height of folly, to entrust the management of a negotiation of such moment to the discretion of an individual at such a distance. We wished to avoid right to feel in any degree disappointed at the delay of the communication, since, in being the first to make any overtures of peace, his majesty's ministers went beyond any pledge they had given, or any expectation that ought to be entertained. It has farther been objected, that those proposals must be insincere, because it did not appear that on this occasion we had acted in concert with our allies. A sufficient answer to this may be given by the peculiar circumstances of affairs, the lateness of the season, and those communications being cut off, by which we and our allies were before enabled to maintain a ready intercourse. They are, however, as much mistaken in their facts, as they are in their inferences for this step was not taken without pre vious communication with our allies, and we acted in concert with them, though they were not formally made parties to the proposal. Another proof, it should seem, of our insincerity is, that, in the message alluded to, we did not recognize the republic. It is truly generous in the right hon. gentleman, to find out an objection for the French which they them-any thing which could excite the slightselves did not discover. We had the answer of the Directory to our note, and they took not the least notice of the republic not having been recognized. If that had been an indispensable form, without which they considered themselves insulted, their natural conduct would have been to give no answer at all. On this point of recognition, however, the right hon. gentleman is always extremely tender. He holds up the example of America to us, as if it was an instance that had any application to the present question. The right hon. gentleman boldly contends, that if we had paid the French government this mark of respect and confidence, it would have induced them, in return, to propose more moderate terms. I am, however, very far from expecting any such effect; for, in fact, the government of France never seemed to think of it. I do not consider the omission as an act of hostility, and they must be aware that the proposal to treat in itself implied a recognition, without which it was impossible that a treaty should be concluded. Another argument of insincerity is, that we did not propose terms to the enemy, while we called upon them for theirs. This I conceive to be that which we had no right to do; the application did not come from the enemy, it est suspicion, that we were disposed to a separate negotiation, which was what France would wish, and what was her uniform aim during the present contest. This was a policy which in some instances was too successful with some of our allies, and which enabled her to enforce on them successively more harsh and unequal conditions. It was with a view to the same open dealing, that it was thought proper to publish to the different courts of Europe the message and the answer, that the world might judge of the moderation or the allies, and the arrogance of the enemy. There is one ground of insincerity which I believe the right hon. gentleman did not state; but which the directory rested upon, principally, in their answer. This was the proposal for holding a general congress. How this could support the charge of insincerity, I am at a loss to conceive. The British government pointed out the mode of pacification. This the enemy thought proper to decline and to reproach, but did not attempt to substitute any other mode by which the object was likely to be obtained. So far from projecting any thing which could even justly be an object of suspicion, ministers had preferred that of a congress, which was the only mode in which wars Tellers. YEAS {General Tarleton Mr. J. Smyth · So it passed in the negative. List of the Antonie, William Lee :} 42 216 Minority. were concluded in all cases wherein allies were concerned, ever since the peace of Munster, the two last treaties only excepted. This charge of insincerity was represented by the right hon. gentleman as the probable cause of the exorbitant terms demanded by the enemy. In my humble apprehension, the extravagance of their terms leads to an opposite conclusion, and proves that the plea of insincerity is with them only a pretence. If they really thought ministers insincere, their policy would have been to make just and moderate demands, which, if rejected, would exhibit in the face of the world, that want of candour and that appetite for war, which the right hon. gentleman so unjustly attributes to us. But having, in fact, no disposition for peace, the government of France offered us such terms as they knew could not be complied with. But, however, the spirit of this country may be roused, and its indignation excited, by the exorbitant conditions proposed to it by the enemy, yet even these extravagant pretensions should not induce us to act under the influence of passion. We have long waited for the return of reason in our deluded enemy, and whenever they shall descend from those inadmissible projects which they seem to have formed, we shall still be ready to treat with them upon fair and honourable terms. We do not shut the door against negotiation whenever it can be fairly entered upon; but the enemy so far from meeting us, say plainly they cannot listen to any terms, but such as in honour we cannot accept. The terms of peace which the right hon. gentleman pointed at, and which, after all, he considers as very disadvantageous, are, that the French may Debate on the Earl of Lauderdale's Mo retain their conquests in Europe, and that tion respecting the State of the Public Fi we should keep our acquisitions in the co- nances.] May 13. The Earl of Lauder lonies. What, however, is the proposal dale rose and said :-My lords; when we of the Directory? No less than this: that reflect on the manner in which the modern every thing should be restored to them, system of European politics has impliand that they in return shall give up no- cated the finance of every country with thing. It is also urged by the right hon. the nature and existence of its governgentleman, that we were to blame in soment, the review of the comparative state abruptly breaking off the negotiation, and communicating the result to the world. To this I answer, that the terms proposed by the enemy cut short all farther treaty; and as to the communication of the result, it will have the important consequence of dividing the opinions of France, and uniting those of England. After a short reply from Mr. Fox, the House divided: [VOL. XXXII.] Kemp, Thomas Tarleton, general A motion, couched in the same terms, was this day moved in the House of Lords by the earl of Guilford. It was supported by the dukes of Bedford and Grafton, the marquis of Lansdown, and the earl of Lauderdale; and opposed by lords Sydney, Hawkesbury, Fitzwilliam, Grenville, and Mulgrave. It was negatived, on a division, by 110 to 10. of the public income and expenditure forms, perhaps every where, the most important object that can occupy the at tention of the politician; but in this country, and in the critical situation in which we are involved by his majesty's ministers, a more interesting subject of investiga tion never was presented to any public assembly. Unaccustomed till of late to attend to the minute details of finance, [4 D] placed the second in my hands. This arrangement however of the business was the course that prudence would have dictated to any man; and it must have more forcibly suggested itself to the noble marquis, who could not but recollect the pains and the attention which he, as well as the late marquis of Rockingham, bestowed, at the close of the American war, on the means of preventing such abuses in future; who must have seen with astonishment, the total deviation from that solemn pledge which he, in conjunction with the present first lord of the treasury, gave to the public in the speech which they put into the mouth of their sovereign in the year 1782.* and compelled by a sense of duty to advance opinions in direct opposition to those who profess to have spent their lives in the study of this intricate science; I 'should be confident indeed if I did not feel some apprehension in submitting my opinions to their criticism, and to your lordships' consideration. Before I proceed to call your attentions to the papers which were moved for by my noble friend (the marquis of Lansdown), a recollection of the mode in which his conduct was commented upon in this House, and of the authentic manner in which these comments have been since handed to the public, makes it necessary to state to your lordships the futility of the insinuation, that the noble marquis did not in his motion agitate the subject you were led to expect, and to explain to you the reasons why it falls to my lot to discuss before you the expenses of the present war, and the debts and revenues of this kingdom. It must be in the recollection of your lordships, that the principal object held out to you by the noble marquis, when he originally mentioned this subject in your House was, the departure from that system of economy so strongly enforced in the reports of the commissioners of accounts. When he arraigned the measure, it was natural for him to wish to present to your lordships view, the consequences that ensued from it. It was in this point of view that my noble friend moved for the papers on your table, that you might see the fatal effects of the departure from those regulations, and of the contempt of those salutary restraints which the forms of parliament and the law of the land have placed on the public expenditure. But when he saw the extent of the materials on the table of the House, he judged, and judged well, that to comprise the whole of the subject in the discussion of one day would have been inconsistent with that desire he had of exhibiting to the public, in the clearest and most distinct point of view, topics so materially interesting to the welfare, perhaps to the existence, of the state. The division my noble friend adopted was that which naturally presented itself:-to discuss, in tne first instance, the causes of our calamities; and, in the second, to exhibit the effects they have produced. As the more important consideration, he called your attention to the first of these subjects; I regret for the sake of the public, that the partiauty of my noble friend has† Lord Auckland. See his Speech at p. 1052. The topics my noble friend upon that day discussed before your lordships, though flippantly undervalued in the commencement of the speech given to the public by the noble baron,† were of the most grave and important nature. The neglect of the measure recommended by the commissioners of accounts; the total contempt of the Appropriation act; the new institution of barracks; of a secretary of state's office; a transport board, and the additional appointments in every department; the unparalleled amount of extraordinaries in the army and navy, are subjects of such a nature, that to lessen their consequence in the public estimation, was an attempt as bold as it will be inefficacious. But the noble lord, not choosing to meet my noble friend upon such an investigation, quarrels with certain expressions and opinions, which he feels it "a sacred duty incumbent on him to resist, as far as God has given hin faculties." These opinions, however, I must observe, with all due respect for the faculties bestowed on him, it will be difficult for him to controvert. My noble friend stated, "that our trade was reduced to a dependence on the very warfare which is fundamentally destroying it; and that our resources were so exhausted as to force us to the wretched expedient of reviving taxes which were a few years since repealed;"-propositions, which the noble baron did wisely to dismiss with epithets, rather than to controvert by argument. It would indeed be difficult to overthrow opinions which must pervade the minds of the people, when they reflect that the war expenditure of last year * See Vol. 23, p. 204. |