substantially departing from the principles stated above. It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.

20. INFLUENCE OF DECISION UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Law. A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may become a precedent unsettling accepted principles and may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.

21. IDIOSYNCRASIES AND INCONSISTENCIES.

Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgments, or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of the court. Though vested with discretion in the imposition of mild or severe sentences, he should not compel persons brought before him to submit to some humiliating act or discipline of his own devising, without authority of law, because he thinks it will have a beneficial corrective influence.

In imposing sentence he should endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional. severity or undue leniency.

In order that a litigant may secure the full benefit of the rights of review accorded him by law, a trial judge should scrupulously grant to the defeated party opportunity to present the questions arising upon the trial exactly as they arose, were presented, and decided, by full and fair bill of exceptions or otherwise; any failure in this regard on the part of the judge is peculiarly worthy of condemnation because the wrong done may be irremediable.

23. LEGISLATION.

A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation of statutes, especially those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to impede the just disposition of controversies; and he may well contribute to the public interest by advising those having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the result of his observation and experience.

24. INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS.

He should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions.

25. BUSINESS PROMOTIONS AND SOLICITATIONS FOR CHARITY.

He should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is

utilizing the power or prestige of his office to pursuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he should not solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in the normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.

26. PERSONAL INVESTMENTS AND RELATIONS.

He should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. He should not utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for purposes of speculation, and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of his judicial judgment for him at any time to become a speculative investor upon the hazard of a margin.

27. EXECUTORSHIPS AND TRUSTEESHIPS.

While a judge is not disqualified from holding executorships or trusteeships, he should not accept or continue to hold any fiduciary or other position if the holding of it would interfere or seem to interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, or if the business interests of those represented require investments in enterprises that are apt to come before him judicially, or to be involved in questions of law to be determined by him.

28. PARTISAN POLITICS.

While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against another. He should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in party conventions.

29. SELF-INTEREST.

He should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation in the court of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.

30. CANDIDACY FOR OFFICE.

A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudice of the appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.

While holding judicial office he should decline nomination to any other place which might reasonably tend to create a suspicion or criticism that the proper performance of his judicial duties is prejudiced or prevented thereby.

If a judge becomes a candidate for any office, he should refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the success of his party.

He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy which would reasonably lead to such suspicion.

31. PRIVATE LAW PRACTICE.

In many states the practice of law by one holding judicial position is forbidden. In superior courts of general jurisdiction, it should never be permitted. In inferior courts in some states, it is permitted because the county or municipality is not able to pay adequate living compensation for a competent judge. In such cases one who practices law is in a position of great delicacy and must be scrupulously careful to avoid conduct in his practice whereby he utilizes or seems to utilize his judicial position to further his professional success.

He should not practise in the court in which he is the judge, even when presided over by another judge, or appear therein for himself in any controversy.

If forbidden to practise law, he should refrain from accepting any professional employment while in office.

He may properly act as arbitrator, or lecture upon or instruct in law or write upon the subject, and accept compensation therefor, if such course does not interfere with the due performance of his judicial duties and is not forbidden by some positive provision of law.

He should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment.

33. SOCIAL RELATIONS.

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as reasonable attention to the completion of his work will permit, he continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that he should not discontinue his interest in or appearance at meetings of members of the Bar. He should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships, constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct.

34. A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL OBLIGATION.

In every particular his conduct should be above reproach. He should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private, political or partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal with his appointments as a public trust; he should not allow other affairs or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity.

We invite particular attention to canon 28, entitled "Partisan Politics."

We are at the present time of the opinion that it would be unfair and illogical to adopt this particular canon in its present form. As long as our state judiciary is elective, some political activity during the campaign is necessary and desirable, especially by those members of the bench seeking reelection.

J. FOSTER SYMES, Denver, Chairman.
SAMUEL D. TRIMBLE, Pueblo,

JOHN S. MACBETH, Denver.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON MEMBERSHIP

To The Colorado Bar Association:

The following applicants for admission to The Colorado Bar Association have, during the present year, been received into membership of the Association, pursuant to favorable action of the Executive Committee and the Committee on Membership, in form and manner as by the by-laws provided:

Akron : Antonito: Aspen:

Berthoud:

Boulder:
Craig:

Cripple Creek:

Denver:

Samuel Chutkow.
Jack Garrett Scott.
Benjamin R. Kobey.

C. E. Johnson.
Birger Tinglof.
Charles E. Herrick.

Wilbur M. Alter.

Charles L. Allen, Frederick D. Anderson, Walter M. Appel, Rodney J. Bardwell, Charles L. Beard, Milton E. Blake. Ross Bray, Albert S. Brooks, John Horne Chiles, Patrick D. Connor, W. Felder Cook, Michael T. Corcoran, William C. Danks, David Davis, Wm. B. DePue, Richard E. Downing, Warwick M. Downing, Louis H. Drath, Wm. G. Edwards, Charles R. Enos. A. X. Erickson, Golding Fairfield, Ernest B. Fowler, J. A. Gallaher, John S. Gibons, Samuel S. Ginsberg, Warren A. Haggott, Kenaz Huffman, S. M. January, Bryan G. Johnson, George R. Larwill, Harmon L. Lawyer, Wm. H. Loughridge, Edgar McComb, Booth M. Malone, D. A. Maloney, Charles A. Mantz, Max. D. Melville, Henry D. Meyers, Victor Arthur Miller. Norton Montgomery, Charles F. Morris, Lewis de R. Mowry, Herbert M. Munroe, Erskine R. Myer, Fritz A. Nagel, Con K. O'Byrne, Armand Offutt, Samuel R Owens, Richard Peete, Merritt H. Perkins, James S. Polk, Jr., Tom L. Pollock, Simon Quiat, Boswell F. Reed, Harold D. Roberts, S. R. Robertson, Harry W. Robinson, Kenneth W. Robinson, P. J. Edwin Robinson, W. F. Robinson, Jr., Douglas A. Roller. Stephen W. Ryan, E M. Sabin, E. E. Sarchet, Frederick Sass, Jean Stauffer. Robert W. Steele, Jr., Harold C. Tallmadge, James M. Taylor. M. F. Wasson, Daniel L. Webb, James Herbert Wilkins, Jr., Floyd J. Wilson, Andrew H. Wood.

Fort Collins: Jay H. Bouton, Claude C. Coffin, Charles F. Davis, H. H. Hartman, Fancher Sarchet, George H. Shaw, Lawrence R. Temple, Thomas J. Warren.

Sterling: Norris C. Bakke. H. Lawrence Hinkley, H. E. Keating. W. Mabry King, Marcus C. Leh, George F. McConley, Jr., J. V. Redmond, Raymond M. Sandhouse, Leland N. Scofield, A. E. Seidel.

Trinidad: Eusebio Chacon.

The Weld County Bar Association, Greeley.
The Pueblo County Bar Association, Pueblo.
The Prowers County Bar Association, Lamar.
The San Luis Valley Bar Association, Alamosa.