faid upon
This Head, would amount to This only;
that it exifts, because it exifts; that it therefore
does and always did exift, because it does and al-
ways did exift. Which the Followers of Spinoza
will, with equal strength of reason, affirm con-
cerning every Substance that exifts at all.

Nothing, is That, of which every thing can truly be denied, and no thing can truly be affirmed. So that the Idea of Nothing, (if I may fo fpeak,) is abfolutely the Negation of All Ideas. The Idea therefore either of a Fimite or Infinite Nothing, is a contradiction in Terms.

If the Idea of an Eternal and * Infinite Nothing, were a Poffible Idea, and not contradictory in itSelf; the Existence of the First Caufe would not be neceffary: (For Neceffity of being, and Poffibility of not being, are contradictory. Ideas.) And if the Existence of the First Caufe, was not neceffary; it would be no contradiction, to suppose it either not to have exifted in time paft, or to cease to exift at any time to come. The Exiftence therefore of the First Cause, is Neceffary: Neceffary abfolutely, and in itself. And therefore That Neceffity is, a priori, and in the Order of Nature, the Ground or Reafon of its existence. For That, which exifts Neceffarily; or in the Idea of which, Existence and Neceffity are inseparably and neceffarily Connected; muft either therefore be neceffary, because it exifts; or elfe it must therefore exift, because its Existence is Neceffary. If it was therefore neceffary, because it exifted; then, for the fame reason, every thing that exists, would exift neceffarily; and either every thing, or nothing, would be the First Caufe. On the contrary; if the First Caufe does therefore exift, because its Existence is Neceffary; then Neceffity is the Ground or Reafon or Foundation of that Exiftence: And the Exiftence does not infer, (that is, a priori, or in the order of Nature and Confequence, antecede) the Neceffity of Exifting; but the Neceffity of existing does on the contrary infer, (that is, a priori, or in the

order

order of nature, antecede the Suppofition of) the Existence. Which is, what I propofed to prove. The Argument a pofteriori, is indeed by far the most generally useful Argument, most easy to be understood, and in fome degree fuited to all Capacities; And therefore it ought Always to be diftinctly infifted upon. But forafmuch as Atheistical Writers have fometimes opposed the Being and Attributes of God by fuch metaphysical Reasonings, as can no otherwise be obviated, than by arguing a priori; therefore This manner of arguing alfo, is useful, and neceffary in its proper place.

The Eternity of God, can no otherwife be proved, than by confidering à priori the Nature of a Neceffary or Self-Exiftent Caufe. The Temporary phænomena of nature, prove indeed demonftrably a pofteriori, that there is, and has been from the Beginning of thofe phenomena, a Being of Power and Wifdom fufficient to produce and preferve thofe phænomena. But that This First Caufe has exifted from Eternity, and fhall exift to Eternity, cannot be proved from thofe Temporary phenomena; but must be demonftrated from the intrinfick Nature of Neceffary-Existence. If the First Cause exifts" abfo"lutely without any Ground or Reason of Existence; it might as poffibly in Times paft, without any Reafon, have not existed; and may as poffibly in Times to come, without any reason, cease to exift. Can it be proved a pofteriori, that the First Cause of all things will exift to morrow? Or can it be proved any otherwife, than by fhowing that Neceffity is a certain ground of Future as well as of Prefent exiftence? And if fo; then the Ground or Reafon, upon which the First Cause now does, and hereafter always will, and cannot but exift; is the very fame Ground or Reafon, upon which he always did exift: And confequently it cannot with Truth be affirmed, that the First Caufe exifts" abfolutely without Any

H

"Ground

Ground or Reason of Existence." When Atheistical Writers affirm, that the material Universe, and· every exifting Substance in particular, was Eternal "abfolutely without any Ground or Reafon of Existence;" can This affertion be confuted by Him, who fhall himself affirm, that God was Eternal absolutely without Any Ground or Reason of Existence? Or can it be any other way confuted at all, than by fhowing that Something must be neceffarily-existent, (elfe nothing would ever have exifted ;) and that That which is neceffarily-exiftent, cannot poffibly be either Finite, or Moveable, or at any time capable of Any Diminutions, Alterations, Limitations, Variations, Inequalities, or Diverfifications whatsoever, either in whole, or in part, or in different parts either of Space or Time?

In like manner, the Infinity or Immensity or Omniprefence of God, can no otherwife be proved, than by confidering a priori the nature of a Neceffary or Self-Exiftent Caufe. The Finite phænomena of nature, prove indeed demonftrably a pofteriori, that there is a Being which has Extent of Power and Wisdom fufficient, to produce and preferve all these phænomena. But that This Author of Nature is Himself abfolutely Immenfe or Infinite, cannot be proved from thefe Finite phænomena; but muft be demonftrated from the intrinfick nature of Neceffary Existence. If the First Caufe exifts" abfolutely "without any Ground or Reason of Existence; may as poffibly be Finite, as Infinite; it may as poffibly be Limited, as be Immenfe. It may as poffibly in Other places, without any reafon, not exist; as it does, without any reafon, exift in Thofe Places, where the phenomena of nature prove that it does exift. Can it be proved a pofteriori, that That Governing Wisdom and Power, which the phenomena of Nature in this material World demonftrate to be prefent Here; muft therefore be Immenfe, Infinite, or Omniprefent? must be prefent likewife in thofe boundlefs Spaces, where we know of no phanomena or Effects

It

Effects to prove its exiftence? Or can the Immensity and Omniprefence of the First Cause, be at all proved any other way, than by fhowing that Neceffity of Existence is capable of no Limitation; but muft for the fame reafon be the ground of Immenfe or Omniprefent existence, as 'tis the Ground or Foundation of any Existence at all?

Again: The Unity of God, (which, I think, has always been allowed to be a Principle of Natural Religion; Otherwife St Paul could not juftly have blamed the Heathen as inexcufable, in that they did not like to retain God in their Knowledge, and that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: The Unity of God, I fay,) can no otherwife be de monstrated, than by confidering a priori the nature of a Neceffary or Self-exiftent Caufe. The Phanomena of Nature which come within the reach of Our obfervation, prove indeed demonftrably, that there is a Supreme Author and Director of That Nature, or of Thofe phanomena, whereof we have any Knowledge. But that This Supreme Author and Governour of THIS NATURE, or of THESE phenomena, is likewife the Supreme Author and Governour of UNIVERSAL Nature; cannot be proved by Us from our partial and imperfect Know ledge of a Few phenomena, in that small part of the Universe, which comes within the reach of Our Senfes; but must be demonftrated from the intrinfick nature of neceffary existence. If the First Caufe exifts "abfolutely without any Ground or Reason of ex"iftence; " 'tis altogether as poffible, and as probable, and as reasonable to fuppofe, that there may, without any reason, exist numberless Finite independent co-exiftent First Canfes (either of like Nature and Substance to each other, or of different Nature and Substance from each other,) in different Parts of the immenfe Univerfe; as that there fhould, without any reason, exift

H 2

One

*Lock's Fa

4.09.

One only, Infinite, Immenfe, Omniprefent, First Cause,
Author, and Governour of the Whole.

That there is, and cannot but be One, and One only, fuch First Caufe, Author and Governour of the Univerfe; is (I conceive) capable of ftrict Demonftration, including That part of the Argument which is deduced a priori. The Subject of the Question, is no Trifle. If any fober-minded man is perfwaded, he can find any Flaw in That Demonftration; or cares not to examine it, least any of its Confequences fhould prove inconfiftent with fome other notions he may perhaps thro' prejudice have imbibed; I fhould be very Thankful to him, to fhow How the Unity of God (the First Principle of Natural Religion) can at all be proved by Reafon a pofteriori only.

*

Some fuch confiderations as these (I suppose) they were, or others of the like nature, which moved Mr Limborch to write thus to Mr Lock: Argumiliar Let- mentum defiderat Vir magnificus, quo probetur Ens, ters, pag. cujus exiftentia eft neceffaria, tantùm poffe effe Unum ; quidem ut id argumentum à neceffitate exiftentia defumatur, & a priori (ut in Scholis loquuntur,) non a pofteriori concludat; hoc eft, ex naturâ necessaria exiftentia probetur, eam pluribus non poffe effe com+ibid.pag. munem. To which Mr Lock replies: t Les Theolo422,423. giens, les Philofophes, & Defcartes luy-meme, fuppolent l'Unité de Dieu, fans la Prouver. After which, having fuggefted his Own Thoughts, he thus concludes: C eft là, felon moy, une Preuve a priori, que l'Etre éternel independent n'est qu' Un.

To argue therefore a priori cancerning the Exiftence and Attributes of the First Caufe, is no abfurdity. For though No Thing, no Being, can indeed be prior to the First Caufe; yet Arguments may, and must, be drawn from the Nature and Confequences of That neceffity, by which the First Caufe exits. Mathematical Neceffary Truths, are usually

demon