ried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or by notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either Constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.

After citing a number of instances in which conclusive judgments are rendered without other than constructive notice, Justice Holmes says: "I see no reason why what we have said as to proceedings in rem in general should not apply to such proceedings concerning land. In Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316, 327, it is said to be established that: 'A State has power by statute to provide for the adjudication of titles to real estate within its limits as against non-residents who are brought into court only by publication.' In Hamilton vs. Brown, 161 U. S., 256, 274, it was declared to be within the power of the State 'to provide for determining and quieting the title to real estate within the limits of the State and within the jurisdiction of the court after actual notice to all known claimants and notice by publication to all other persons.' I doubt whether the (United States Supreme) court will not take the further step, when necessary, and declare the power of the State to do the same thing after notice by publication alone."

The court indulges in a lengthy discussion of nearly every objection that could be raised against a similar law in this State.

This case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error, and five of the judges holding that the writ had been improvidently granted, the case was dismissed without a decision upon its merits. There was a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Fuller, holding that the court should have taken jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. But the general opinion of the Massachusetts bar seems to be that in effect the dismissal of the Tyler suit was a practical affirmance of the constitutionality of the Massachusetts act. And the matter is by the newspapers and general public of the Commonwealth considered as settled. The leading case relied upon by all of the State courts in support of the validity of the various Torrens Acts is the above cited decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arndt vs. Griggs. The court, after considering some objections, proceeds

as follows: "While these propositions are doubtless correct as statements of general rules respecting bills to quiet titles and proceedings in courts of equity, they are not applicable or controlling here. The question is not what a court of equity, by virtue of its general powers and in the absence of statute might do, but it is what jurisdiction has a State over title to real estate within its limits, and what jurisdiction may it give by statute to its own courts to determine the validity and extent of the claims of nonresidents to such real estate? If a State has no power to bring a non-resident into its courts for any purpose by publication, it is impotent to perfect the titles of real estate within its borders held by its own citizens; and a cloud cast upon such title by a claim of a non-resident will remain for all time a cloud unless such nonresident shall voluntarily come into its courts for the purpose of having it adjudicated. But no such imperfections attend the sovereignty of the State. It has control over property within its limits, and the condition of ownership of real estate therein, whether the owner be stranger or citizen, is subject to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing titles thereto. cannot bring the person of a non-resident within its limits—its process goes not out beyond its borders-but it may determine the extent of his title to real estate within its limits; and for the purpose of such determination may provide any reasonable methods of imparting notice. The well being of every community requires that the title of real estate therein shall be secure, and that there be convenient and certain methods of determining any unsettled questions respecting it. The duty of accomplishing this is local in its nature; it is not a matter of national concern or vested in the general government; it remains within the State, and as this duty is one of the State, the manner of discharging it must be determined by the State, and no proceeding which it provides can be declared invalid unless in conflict with some special inhibitions of the Constitution or against natural justice." (Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U. S., 316).

It

The case of Roller vs. Holly (176 U. S., 398), has an important bearing in this connection. In that case the court in the first place hold, on the authority of Arndt vs. Griggs (supra), that a State may provide by statute that the title to real estate within its limits may be settled and determined by a suit in which a nonresident defendant is brought into court by publication; that the State "has control over property within its limits; and the condition of ownership of real estate therein, whether the owner be stranger or citizen, is subject to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing titles thereto."

In the second place, they hold that a proceeding to foreclose a lien upon real estate is a proceeding in rem, and that the Texas statute providing for service by publication upon non-resident defendants is restricted to actions in rem; but that a non-resident defendant in a proceeding in rem may be brought in by personal service outside of the State, as well as by publication.

The Massachusetts Land Registration Act differs quite materially in some of its provisions from the Illinois act. A special court of two judges, with a recorder, who is the clerk of the court, is provided, while the registers of deeds of the several counties are assistant recorders. The judge of this special court, called the Court of Land Registration, is the Hon. Leonard A. Jones, above referred to. The associate judge is the Hon. Chares T. Davis, and the recorder is Clarence C. Smith. In a recent letter to the writer, explaining quite fully the workings of the system in Massachusetts, after discussing many other questions concerning the operation of the law, Judge Jones says: "Many petitions cover only small lots, having been brought to cure defects in titles. Our court now gets most of the cases of this kind, because almost any informality in the record can be cured by giving notice to the parties who have a possible interest. In fact, our court would have good reason for its existence if it were used merely to cure defects in titles. This is, however, properly only an incidental use of it. Our act works smoothly and without friction. Attorneys and others who come before the court or transact business with the

recorder are surprised that there is so little for them to do in cases where there is no contested matter. The act seems very complicated to one who reads it without having seen the working of it. It has proven satisfactory to every one who has made use of it, either as petitioner or counsel.

"I think our Massachusetts act is in its general provisions far better for this State than any form of the Torrens law that I have seen. It differs from the acts adopted in Illinois, California, Minnesota and Oregon in providing for a separate court, instead of having the petition presented to a superior or county court in the different counties; and the reasons are:

"First-That the judges of the special court are selected because of their supposed knowledge of real property law; and, "Second-That they soon have a familiarity with the questions that arise in title.

"Moreover, although the examiners appointed are lawyers of skill and experience in the examination of titles, one of the judges examines the abstract throughout to see if there is anything lacking to make a title of record, and in a few instances serious errors have been found. Then, again, some familiarity with the abstract is of much use if there is occasion for a hearing. The questions that come up for hearing very frequently relate to rights of adjoining owners-questions of boundary, rights of way or other easements. There have been in some cases such defects of title and such absence of record title that we have had to rest upon adverse possession, and, of course, much evidence is required in such cases.

"In some large States with a scattered population it has seemed to the framers of their acts for land registration, impracticable to have a separate court; partly because of the expense, and partly because of the inconvenience to persons having business before the court to go out of the county. The Massachusetts act provides that the court shall hold its sittings in Boston, but may adjourn to such other places as the public convenience may require. The general office and sittings of the court in Boston accommodate the entire eastern part of the State; and as the registers of deeds are made assistant recorders, petitions and other papers may be

filed with them in the several counties to be transmitted to the Boston office; and in the published notices of application for the registration of land remote from Boston, it is stated that the plan filed by petitioner may be seen in the registry of deeds for the county in which the lands are situate. In such cases if there are hearings and there are several witnesses to be called, one of the judges goes to that county.

“Another advantage of a special court and a recorder for the whole State is that this recorder supervises the work of the assistant recorders in all the counties, so that the administration of the system is uniform throughout the State.

"In framing an act you should avoid any long period of limitation within which the decree of registration may be attacked. In our act there is a right of appeal for thirty days; and a right of review in case of fraud in obtaining registration for one year, provided the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser. In the Illinois act there is a period of limitation for two years; and the Oregon act, which is copied from that, has the same provision. The Minnesota act limits the time to sixty days. A long period of limitation defeats one purpose of the act, which is to give an indefeasible title to all persons purchasing the land in good faith. The acts giving two years of uncertainty will be amended as soon as possible.

"You ask whether this system is advisable for a young and rapidly growing State. I deem it particularly advisable for such a State. It is much easier NOW than it will be at any time in the future, to change the system. The cost of examinations of title is small now that the transactions are few since the title came from the United States. The defects in titles are few compared with those that are found in the older States.

"I deem it essential that there should be an assurance fund to compensate persons who may be deprived of any rights through errors of examiners or recorders. Thus far in this State no claim has been made against this fund, and in Australia the experience is that a claim upon the fund is of very rare occurrence. I think that in a few years the old system of recording deeds will be superceded