An attempt to prove the existence and absolute perfection of the supreme unoriginated being, in a demonstrative manner |
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abfolutely perfect affert againſt alfo all-perfect alſo anſwer arguing argument a pofteriori atheiſtical attri becauſe beſt butes caufe chooſe cife circumftance conceive confequence confider confifts creatures defign demonftration diftinct divine Doctor Clarke's eaſily eternal exerciſed exift exiſtence expreffed faid fame fays fecond fections feems felf felf-exiftent fenfe fhall fhew fince firft firſt cauſe fome fome cauſe ftrictly fubftance fubject fuch fufficient fuppofe fupreme fyftem fynthetic goodneſs happineſs himſelf Hume ideas immutable impoffible inconfiftent independent infinite itſelf leaſt manner method of reafoning moft moral attributes moral perfections moſt muft muſt neceffarily neceffary neceffity non-exiſtence obferve objections occafion otherwiſe perfons pleaſed poffeffed poffible poſed power and intelligence preſent priori proof propofition prove the exiſtence purpoſe queftion reaſoning reſpect ſay ſelf-exiſtent ſeveral ſhall ſhould ſome ſtate ſubſtance ſuch ſuppoſe thefe themſelves theſe thing thoſe tion truth underſtanding unity univerſe unlimited unoriginated uſed whofe whoſe wiſdom writers
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 16 - And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is very possible) this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.
Seite 16 - The Brahmins assert that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again and resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony which appears to us ridiculous because a spider is a little contemptible animal whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe. But still...
Seite 26 - Why is there any misery at all in the world ? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity ? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention:* But he is almighty.
Seite 27 - ... of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them— a topic which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.
Seite 94 - ... self-existent Being; that there is but one such; and that he is needful in order to the existence of all other things. Which makes me think, that though it may be true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity : otherwise it would have been generally used, as a fundamental argument to prove the being of God.
Seite 28 - The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
Seite 130 - Manner' (1785). It assumes the " axiom " that " whatever is contingent, or might possibly have been otherwise than it is, had some cause which determined it to be what it is.
Seite 122 - ... which determined it to be what it is. Or in other words : if two different or contrary things were each of them...
Seite 33 - ... of this work in a manner between jest and earnest, no doubt he expected it would have a serious effect in promoting the cause of infidelity and scepticism, in which he had laboured so long. For he has here openly inveighed against revealed religion under the title of vulgar and popular superstition, and endeavoured to remove the very foundation of natural religion by denying the probability of God's moral attributes. I know not how his admirers will be able to reconcile that wisdom and gravity...
Seite 26 - Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?