Gentleman, in one of the more early debates), that there could never be a lawful Union, unless the numbers in the united legislature were made correctly and arithmetically equal on both fides. If so, had England agreed to the unreasonable demand, during the last century, on the part of Scotland, of joining the two Parliaments according to their then exifting numbers, or were Great Britain now to receive into her Houfe of Commons, all the 300 reprefentatives of Ireland, and to unite together the two Houses of Peers as they now ftand, the tranfaction would still have no legal folidity; the Scotch Parliament formerly, and the Irish Parliament now, would still have betrayed their trusts.

But this junction of the Parliaments, this identification or incorporation of the two Houses of each, in analogy to the identity which already exifts as to the third eftate, is treated as a destruction, an extinction, an utter annihilation of the conftitution of Ireland. The fame terms were mifapplied in Scotland to the Union of that country with this; for, ingenious and inventive in arguments on moft fubjects as fome of our opponents are, they will give me leave to fay, that on many of the points of this question, they appear to me mere plagiarists, to a degree of fervility, not only of the topics, but, in general, even of the very language and expreffions which were then employed. Of this any man may convince himself by comparing the late debates here and elfewhere, with the Hiftory of De Fee, and the Memoirs of Lockhart.

cach Legislature, though for the time ît centred in the fame perfon, was so far from being infeparably mixed, fo as to form one indivifible whole, that a law actually existed, by which its feparation, at no diftant period, into two dif tinct fovereignties, was expressly established.

It were to be wifhed that Gentlemen would explain what that effential part of the conftitution of Ireland is, which the incorporation of its Lords and Commons with ours will annihilate. It has always appeared to me that in two principles is comprehended the effence of ours and of the Irish conftitution, which, with the exception of certain abuses, real or imputed, of different forts, to be found in each kingdom, is one and the fame. How often have I heard Gentlemen in the Irish Parliament boaft that they enjoyed, how often read in the published harangues and effays of Irish politicians, their exultation in the poffeffion of the British conftitution! I fay, I have always conceived that the most effential principles of that conftitution are two: 1. That it is compofed of three independent eftates or branches, forming checks each upon the other two. 2. That no law can pafs, affecting the life, the liberty or property of the fubject, without the concurrence of a representative body chofen from among the people, in a mode formed on the confideration of property and franchife, and confifting of an adequate number of perfons; and of fuch a mixed description, as to bring to the legiflative affemblies competent knowledge, both of general and local concerns, and a fympathy of intereft in regard to every thing that can affect their constituents and the nation at large.

a The Scotch Act of Anne, called the Act of Security, 1ft Parliament of Queen Anne, 2d Ses. c. 3. P. 723.

Now,

Now, Sir, if this description is in any degree true, how can it be faid, that the combining into one fupreme Imperial Council a just number of the representatives of both nations for one House, and of the Peers for the other, will be the annihilation of the conftitution? The Legiflature of the empire may, in my opinion, in one point of view, and that perhaps the moft enlarged and the foundeft, be confidered as one great political machine; confifting of one and the fame fupreme head, both executive and legislative; to which are attached, or linked and knit, two separate members, while each of those two is fubdivided again into two analogous parts: the one member, the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, empowered to prepare for the Sovereign's deliberation, fanction, or rejection, whatever may feem neceffary for Great Britain, and for the empire at large: the other, the Lords. and Commons of Ireland, poffeffing only, but exclufivelyas far as fuch exclufion is confiftent with the idea of an unity of empire, either on the present or any other poffible frame of fuch a machine-the fame power as to the kingdom of Ireland. Let me afk, whether this machine, confidered theoretically at leaft, would not be fimplified, its ftructure improved, and the two effential objects I have pointed out, better fecured, by blending and incorporating, in a fit proportion, the two feparate members into one?

1

But,

But, Sir, after making the beft ftand they can on this quickfand of incompetency, the Gentlemen proceed to the real merits of the queftion, and exprefsly deny that Ireland will reap any benefit from the measure; meaning, I fuppofe, alfo to deny, that it will prove beneficial to this country, or to the empire at large. I fuppofe they mean this, because I cannot think that any man of good fense, or who is a real friend to Ireland, can disjoin her interefts from thofe of this kingdom, and of the other parts of the British dominions, or contend that any great arrangement is unadvisable and unjust, which shall tend to the general advantage of thofe other branches of the empire, merely because no particular advantage may accrue to Ireland, provided that country is not thereby exposed to fome detriment or danger.

Let us therefore examine a few of the most prominent circumftances of advantage which may be reasonably expected to flow from a Union, in the first place, to Great Britain, and to the rest of his Majefty's dominions; but, fecondly, to Ireland ;-confidering the subject in a general view of legislative and executive government, of commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, of internal peace, civilization, and profperity: under which heads we may alfo difcufs fome of the principal objections which have been relied on, either here or in the fifter country.

With regard to this country, its legislative and executive councils would no longer be liable to be perplexed in confequence of the diftinct machinery of a separate Irish Parliament, nor the general government continue

in conftant danger of mifapprehension and difputes, and fubject to the inconveniences which inevitably arife from circuity of communication, and the impediments and ́embarraffing modifications to which jealoufy or ignorance on the one fide or the other will fo often give occafion (while things remain as they are), in many of the most important concerns of the empire.

In other refpects it may be difficult to foresee any immediate advantage to Great Britain; to her manufac tures, her agriculture, her trade, or general profperity. Some people, indeed, rather apprehend danger to British commerce and manufactures; and that fuppofed migration of capital and skill to a cheaper country, to a country pok feffing à fuperiority of fituation as to inany branches of bufinefs which has been often the fubject of public difcuffion, is argued upon as a too probable confequence of a Union. To this it might be a fufficient answer for the ftatefman to fay, that if what one part of the united kingdom shall lose another will gain, there will be no pub lic detriment to the whole. But that anfwer, I own, founds harsh to my ears. I think you ought not, on fuch general confiderations of policy, to overlook the feelings and interefts of the numerous individuals and claffes of men, who have, as it were, localized their ingenuity, their industry, their wealth, and their habits of life, under the countenance and implied faith of pre-exifting laws and inftitutions. There is a better anfwer, I believe, in the fact, that capital and induftry fo localized are not safily influenced at once to change their situation, by such temptations. The attempts which have been made, at various times, to transfer, by fome fudden effort of fpeculation and enterprife, English money and credit, and

Mr. Peele's Speech.

English