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force fecurity is established—that as by the force of interest it is no less firmly established; therefore, upon those two principal and great grounds of force and intereft, no fepa ration can follow.

Moreover the Proteftants, in general, ftate (notwithstanding the contrary opinion on the part of others as to the change of political tactics) that the address of the Catholics not only was to get poffeffion of the Parliament-" for then, fay they, equality of power and fuperiority of numbers would have rendered them paramount"-but they state, that this plan is fill perfevered in. Be it granted, then :-and what follows?—that the object of this scheme, if it be feparation, perishes at the moment of Incorporation.

But, fuppofe that Incorporation should not take place, and that the Catholics feek parliamentary power; their objec either is, or is not feparation. If it be not separation : is it a matter of much moment to the Government whether Catholics get into the Irish Parliament or not? If it be separation why, then, not terminate it by Incorporation? But, whether it be feparation, or otherwife; the Catholics either will or will not get into Parliament. So long as they do not, the legislative privilege will be fought with more avidity and more difcord, the more it is refufed. And if it be gained, let thofe, who refift incorporation, pause upon their fears.

Further let it be confidered, that, if Incorporation takes place, and the Irish Catholics were to request admisfion into the British Parliament, one of two events muft follow either the request would or would not be acceded to. But in both cafes, the fears of the Irish Proteftants muft cease. For if the national voice, or the feelings of a British Parliament, were to filence the demand, the Proteftants of Ireland could confequently have nothing to dread. Or-if, on the contrary, the British Constitution were not

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found too ftrong; and if such an act were not an annihilation of its charters, but the Catholics were to be admitted into its Parliament; certainly, the Irish Protestant could not poffibly have any objection: because the inferior number of the Catholics, in fuch an united Parliament, and the identity of constitution in both countries, would form the protection of Ireland, as well as of Britain; and because the former could not be injured without the latter. Hence, therefore all idea of feparation vanishes.

Thus the one party, finding by Incorporation, fecurity against the physical force or civil infringements of the other; and the other party finding, by Incorporation, like fecurity against all factious oppreffion, in whatever sense or strength they have thought proper to place it; we may, therefore, without charge of fancy, found the dirge of Separationrequies ea certa laborum! All parties will hence enjoy repose and fecurity and unquestionably this fecurity and repose will throw open the improved commerce of the universe. Herein, then, perish all thoughts of feparation; and the Conftitution must live, Amidst the golden glory of virtuous and active commerce, men will contemplate bleffings beyond the dreams of fancied power, and liberty beyond the flights of Republicanifm. Imperial ftrength will then be found paramount to all parties in the ftate,-paramount to all enemies over the globe. It is under fuch important advantages of Incorporation, that men will become attached to the Government and to the ftate: they will feel that they have a country; their first idea will be, fecurity and imperial ftrength; their fecond, profperity and national peace. And thus, the different members coalefcing into the amity of brethren-Will they exhibit a group tending ultimately to feparation?

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Far otherwife: but this great effect, fo directly contrary to separation, cannot be brought about without an Incorporative Union. And were it produced otherwife, which is utterly impossible under the existing circumstances of Ireland, it would be unftable and infecure. Civil mifery and feparation must follow. Let us fift this point.

As nearly as moral deductions can approach demonftrative proof, we believe it may have appeared that the jarring conflicts of parties will cease under incorporation. Whereas, it is manifest already, that without this Incorporation, the claims and difcords of party arife with new vigour, and upon new grounds; and that confequently tumultuary scenes menace an increase. Such then are the obvious effects of incorporation, and non-incorporation. Let us however, in order effectually to convince men that Union does not tend ultimately to feparation, but that the very reverse of this propofition is the case, give them the strongest ground of argument, whereon they could combat, and still they will be defeated.

Suppose therefore, that all these intestine struggles and tumultuary commotions were to fubfide, and that happiness and virtue were to bless all ranks and conditions of men : that the upper and the lower orders had established by wife regulations a civil system cementing them in love and friendship; and that Catholics, and Proteftants, and Diffenters, all. lived in the endearing amity of brethren.-A more complete fyftem of civil happiness, we believe no man will require, But the question, which follows this, is first, how long will it laft? And next, if feparation were to enfue, may not feparated Ireland, thus established upon a basis of civil hap pinefs and moral virtue, laft and enjoy herself long?

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To answer these queftions, we shall recur to experience and facts: for, opinions may be vague, or refifted however folid and conclufive.

Both ancient and modern times furnish us with examples, that small states have not fufficient force to infure them long life. It was the cafe in Greece; it is the cafe in Switzerland, was in Genoa, and will probably be in all the New Republics. Societies, being compofed of men, have the vices of men. Nations therefore are capable of ambition, hatred, and jeaJoufy; and where there are feeds for those paffions in feparate interests and pursuits, divifion is manifeft, and no NOMINAL UNION CAN HOLD OR LAST LONG. This being the cafe, and Ireland being feparated, its system of complete happiness, which we have fuppofed, would inftantly be disturbed; first, by the internal rivalry of individuals; and next by the external ambition of surrounding nations? The parties of Holland would foon be revived in Ireland, and contending nations make this feparated happy fpot a scene of civil tumult, and personal animofity? What a fource of hatred would feparation open for Britain? What a fource of war with France? What a scene of blood for Ireland? What a gulph of jealousy would commerce form? And in this detached ftate of Ireland, even those happy individuals would foon, through their paffions, enable the neighbouring power to profit of their divifions, and make one fwallow up the other. Or one of the great neighbouring powers of fuch a state, favoured by its ftrength, or fanctioned by its circumstances, would mark it for an object of conqueft, and terminate its hatred, its jealousy, or ambition, in its ruin.

The monuments of history have preferved for us the memory of those times, when all Europe, Italy, the Gauls, the Spains, and Germany, were fubdivided into a crowd of

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mall states: we know how they finished. England too was portioned out into small states, Ireland into petty monarchies: but they have all fubmitted to one. Should it however be anfwered that Venice, and other small states, have maintained themselves long in Europe; the reply is, that it was not the refult of their own power, but of the policy and intereft of their neighbours. And that very principle, which formed their prefervation, would form the deftruction of Ireland. The power, policy, and interest of other nations would make it the feat of war and scene of conquest, or the feal of amity by mutual abandonment, and guaranteed infignificance. Such is the refult of feparation; which is the refult of non-incorporation.

On these grounds therefore, an incorporative Union appears a meafure of prefervation from without and within; and a measure not only of aggrandizement and elevation to the state, but of repose and strength to the empire. It has not for its object a conquest of parties, but a balance of parties; to unite, and not to divide; to govern England by an Irish Parliament, and Ireland by an English Parliament, in as much as each will be governed by the united wisdom of both. All acts will then be the refult of the concurrence of the Empire: no misdeeds can then poffibly find security in the intrigues of little party: nor any mifrule be then founded either by calumny or by truth upon the Parliamentary influence of factions in a single state.

Ireland will no longer have to complain of Viceroys influencing Parliaments, or Parliaments influencing Viceroys. But, that country will have a King and a Parliament, as has been demanded by the voice of discontent, which sought for feparation.

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