bellious fide, poffeffes or admits of faculties fufficient to provoke feparation; but does not poffefs, as it has been stated on the oppofite fide, fufficient to root rebellion rapidly out; fuch a Government, every man will allow, is pofitively bad. But it is relatively worfe, if a better can be established. The Government thus complained of by the conflicting parties in Ireland, (for we reafon upon their complaints in order to inveftigate, and lay before them, the remedy) is an executive Viceroy with a Legislative Parliament. And against the influence of which, operating reciprocally as cause and effect, ⚫the loudeft murmurs have gone forth, and been fwelled with every aggravation for the cause of feparation. What then must follow?

This Government confists of two parts: to which of these two is a remedy to be applied? Is it to the Viceroy? On account of the natural feparation of the two kingdoms, the Executive Government in England cannot immediately difcharge its functions in Ireland. Thefe operations must therefore be deputed to fecond means. The fyftem of Lords Juftices has been already tried for this purpofe, and was found highly pernicious. The fyftem of Viceroys has been tried, and is found lefs pernicious. But ftill there is a bane in Viceroyal Government which, not only according to feparatifts, but others, has been Parliamentary influence. The executive power, however, muft exift in the Viceroy, and the legislative one must exist in the Parliament; and therefore fince neither must be destroyed, what is to be done? -There is manifeftly no medium left, in order to fi lence all those complaints, but to diffolve the contact and confequently the reciprocal operation of this influence, by incorporating the Irish with the British Legislature. And thus, according to the circumstances and conftitution of the two countries, all the good of the Viceregal Executive

G

is

is confiderably ameliorated, and all the murmured at evil of Parliamentary influence wifely removed from the organ of feparation.

Prejudice alone can be blind to conviction upon the advantage, as well as the neceffity of this incorporation. For the whole matter refolves itself into a queftion of one fimple point that every reasonable man can answer. Is it better to have a Viceroy in contact with Parliament as heretofore in Ireland, or to have the Monarch co-operating with Parliament, as at prefent in Britain? Upon this question we believe no man can entertain a doubt. And should it even be asked, may not Parliamentary influence operate from Britain? The best answer is: contemplate its effects in Britain: examine her exalted fituation; and then let us weep over the deplorable condition of Ireland.

i

It appears throughout the history of past ages, that the civil, religious, and political state of that ifland have been peculiar beyond example. It appears throughout the existing evidence of facts, that the difcord of internal interefts, and the jarrings of external policy have been by no means harmonised. Rebellion and a defire of feparation have been uniformly and throughout time a prominent feature, under Viceroyalty in contact with Parliaments. We do not however attribute this to the Government: the disease is not of the physician's creation, but its continuance may argue incapacity. Befides, it appears that this conta& and its confequences have furnished murmurs and pleas for feparation. Is it not reasonable then to fuppofe, that a diffolution of the causes will be followed by a diffolution of the effects; rather than feparation fhould enfue with more certainty, the less the causes for it fubfift?

Whether the complaints of parties in Ireland be true or falfe, there are arguments as clear as existence itself, that

Ireland

Ireland should defire incorporation: that the fhould gladly embrace the fame Legislative Government as England, and prefer its King, Lords, and Commons, to a Viceroy, Lords, and Commons. Facts are folid and irresistible proofs. Britain offers them in the abundance of its glory, opulence, and profperity, in favour of Incorporation; Ireland in the history of its poverty, complaints, and rebellions.

The reafons are numerous and undeniable for Ireland's placing herself under the immediate vigilance of her Sovereign and Parliament, rather than remaining as heretofore under a Viceroy. The pofition of a Viceroy in contact with Parliament differs widely from that of his Sovereign : Because, with respect to Parliament, the Monarch is above all party; because, with refpect to intereft, the Viceregent has no hereditary intereft, infeparable from the profperity of the state because with refpect to the ftates, there must ever be under the existing system a species of rivalry subfifting between the country which he is fent to govern, and the one from which he may be chofen, and wherein all his interefts lie. Whereas both are equal to the Sovereign: his intereft arifes from both; and his high honours and emoluments are perfonal, permanent, and entailed upon his pofterity. Confequently, with this view, he will watch Parliamentary influence, and find his own intereft, and that of his descendants infeparably linked with the intereft of each state. Hofts of arguments might be produced upon this head, were it neceffary: and all tending to fhow that when Incorporation places Ireland under fuch vigilance, there cannot be much dread of feparation.

It may also be briefty remarked, that in all Governments whatever, where Legislative influence is connected with temporary executive authority, the effects are pernicious. In confirmation of this, let the Ecclefiaftical Government

of Europe be confidered for a moment: where the chief has infinitely greater interefts at ftake on the well-doing of the country, than a deputed ruler can poffibly have in Viceroyalty. Yet the influence of fuch Ecclefiaftical Governments marks itself for the traveller's eye in the wretched face of the country, the neglect of agriculture, and the poverty of the fubjects. And whence all this? Evidently because the ruler's intereft is too little, while the action and reaction of Influence between his Councils chambers and himself, are too great. His reign, however, clofes but with his existence. But were it limited to four or five years inftead of being permanent for life, or rather were its duration dependant on the will of another, then with the rapidity of fucceffion the mischiefs of Influence would increafe. Since therefore, even this Ecclefiaftical Government has advantages above Viceroyalty connected with Parliamentary Influence; for, the Ecclefiaftical Ruler muft, by any immoral exercise of his power, defile the facred character of his own fovereignty; whereas the Viceroy, under the a&tion and re-action of Parliamentary influence, plays with the awful dignity of another's fceptre; were it not better for the nation, to be placed under the personal vigilance of its Hereditary Monarch immediately co-operating with its Parliament? Were not fuch a Governmental fyftem far preferable to the one heretofore in ufe, and lefs liable to cause a feparation between the great Members of the Empire?

Surely, fince it appears, through the experience of ages, that Parliament cannot exist in Ireland, without this influence operating under Vice-royal government; and fince it appears, that murmurs upon this head have been long and loud; and that in those days it has been the war-whoop for rebellion; and has armed Separatifts to drench the land with blood furely then, if fuch mischiefs can be barred for

ever,

not

not only with fafety but with fupreme advantage: it were fomething worse than folly, it were a fhameful ftupidity to the fufferings of fociety, and to the future glory of men and things, if they be facrificed to vain pride or idle prejudice.

There are other motives, no lefs cogent for the adoption of this measure, in order to guard against feparation.The councils of Ireland either originate or are decided in the British Cabinet. So long as the two kingdoms remain feparated, as they are at prefent, their interests certainly are not identically the fame. What then must be the confequence? Partialities or neglects must inevitably appear toward one or the other country, notwithstanding the wisest deliberations and most upright intentions. The plans, there-, fore, participating of those, are to be fubmitted for the fanction of Parliament, by a Viceroy enjoying all the patronage of the Crown. What then must be the refult? Either the plan does or does not fucceed: but, in both cafes influence is exerted. If it fucceeds, all is anger and animofity on one fide, and the old horn of feparation may be blown again. If it does not fucceed, while the Government is defeated, it is difgraced, if not endangered: for amidst the triumph at the oppofite fide, feparation may not be far from discontent at the attempt. Whereas, if the kingdoms be incorporated, all this rivalry, this partiality, this influence generating party in the Nation, all these attempts creating ill blood between the States, cannot poffibly exist. And hence we believe no feparation will follow.

Again: fuppofe there be no partialities whatever in a plan proposed; but that it is a great Imperial measure, confequently, the neceffity of unity in the fyftem eftablishes the neceffity of Viceroyal exertion and influence to carry it into execution. If then this influence fucceed, and the people without the doors of Parliament be rendered averse by the party of oppofition within, or by factious

leaders