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threaten her necessary food supply from the Euxine. After the siege of Samos in 366–365 Athens was constantly interested in the Chersonese and seems to have maintained regularly a fleet and a force of men near the Hellespont, one of the duties of which was to see that the corn fleet came safely through the Hellespont.' In addition the commanders of the Athenian forces among the islands in the fourth century made it a part of their duty to care for the safe convoy of the corn fleet through their waters,2 and there is record of the assignment of special convoy duties to state officers. It is perfectly obvious that all through the fourth century some means had to be taken to insure the safe arrival of these supplies.

In addition to this strong argument from probability there are a few passages in the literature that may be easily construed to imply the existence of a squadron in home waters always ready to do guard duty or to perform on short notice other tasks which would not require a large number of ships. In the first place it seems very probable that when Sparta in 404 allowed Athens to retain only 12 ships this fleet was reckoned to be the minimum number that would be needed to patrol the Athenian coasts and the trade routes, and doubtless two of the 12 were the sacred triremes. Such protection was absolutely necessary for the existence of Athens and at the same time would not allow her to menace Spartan supremacy. Next, it has been observed that during the Corinthian War squadrons of from 10 to 13 vessels operated in defense of Attica while the main fleet was overseas; and that, after 387, Isocrates complains of the relaxed vigilance over the pirates. Finally, two incidents in the history of the Second League point to the maintenance of a cruising fleet. In 372 Iphicrates made every possible effort to take a strong fleet to the west on short notice; his vigorous measures excite the admiration of Xenophon, who reports, among other details: Tроσéλaße δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ̓Αθηναίων καὶ εἴ πού τις ναῦς περὶ τὴν ̓Αττικὴν ἔπλει

1 Dem. 1. 6, 17, 19, 20 ff. (Athenian Hellespontine fleet required to act as escort). 2 Cf. especially Antiphanes ap. Athen. viii. 342 E, and Wilhelm, Urkunden tragischer Aufführungen, p. 248; Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, p. 142, n. 3.

3 Dem. xviii. 73 (one of the inserted documents): a squadron of 20 ships sent to the Hellespont. Trierarchs appointed érì tùy puλakýy tŵv λnotŵv in 335-334: I.G., II, 804, col. b, ll. 32 ff.

4 See p. 365.

καὶ τὴν Πάραλον καὶ τὴν Σαλαμινίαν (vi. 2. 14). This must mean that he took the regular coast patrol ships; so Grote1 assumes, who remarks that when the fleet reached Sphacteria and found that the Corcyrean crisis was past the extra ships were doubtless sent back. The other incident occurred in 366. Corinth, having learned that Athens desired to acquire a permanent foothold, requested that the Athenian garrisons in her territory be removed, and Chares suddenly appeared off Cenchrea with a fleet. The maneuver accomplished nothing and was but a display of force, but in view of the fact that it was so hastily executed it seems probable that Chares could call upon a small guard fleet that was immediately available.

The facts mentioned are certainly enough to show that there was a guard fleet in the fourth century, especially when they are taken in connection with our knowledge that this was no new thing but had been regarded as a regular and necessary institution in the fifth century. But the fleet was probably not a large one. In the first place, it was not successful enough in the suppression of piracy; the proposal of Moerocles in 340 or thereabouts to secure greater protection of commerce against piracy shows that the evil persisted to an alarming extent.3 Again, in 404 it seems to have been composed of 10 ships and during the Corinthian War of from 10 to 13. The 20 guard ships at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War were maintained at a time when the enemies of Athens menaced her from all sides and when the business of her great maritime empire demanded constant activity among the islands, and furthermore, half of them seem to have been required for the station at Naupactus. Probably in the fourth century no more than 10 ships were needed and then not for the full cruising season, except when the Aeginetan pirates were active. As an average for the decade, four months cruising each year is enough to estimate for the full strength of the squadron, for they would not always sail together and in the years when the great fleets under Timotheus or Chabrias were at sea there would not be so much need for their protection. The expense of such a fleet for this length of time would be 2663 talents, or roundly 260 talents.* 2 Xen. vii. 4. 5.

1 History of Greece, X, 135.

3 (Dem.) lviii. 53, assigned to ca. 340 by Blass, Chronologia Demosthenica, p. 33. Cf. (Dem.) lviii. 56.

On the method of calculation see pp. 371-72.

b) Garrisons outside of Attica; c) sacred triremes; d) cavalry: It is useless to speculate as to the expenditures made by the Athenians in maintaining garrisons, for the matter is very indefinite; but it may be worth while to review the evidence that garrisons were from time to time placed outside Attica. Just before the Peloponnesian War 2,000 men yearly were employed in this way,' but when the Second League was organized Athens declared her intention of giving up the practice. The exigencies of war, of course, might demand temporary guards, and as the league again grew more like an empire they were sometimes sent to revolted towns, but probably they never gained the permanent character of the garrisons of the fifth century. The only attested case where a garrison was placed in a city of the league is that of Andros, as shown by I.G., II, 62, but this falls outside the decade under discussion. In this case the expense was to be paid from the island tributes. More often the garrisons were placed either as offensive or as defensive military measures, as when Chabrias left one to annoy Oreus in 378-377, or when they held exposed positions like Potidaea. Again, forces left for some time in certain regions, as those sent to help Corinth and the Peloponnesians against Theban invasion, and the battalion led by Stesicles to Zacynthus and Corcyra, practically amount to garriBut no estimate of cost can be made.

sons.

The sacred triremes at this time probably were two, the "Paralus" and the "Salaminia," waiving the question whether there was a special craft for the Delian voyage. The latter was a small boat and its upkeep purely a religious matter; but the two former were the express ships of the state, whose crews, whether at sea or not, were paid through the year by the state. They received 4 obols a day, and Boeckh reckons the annual cost of the two ships at 16 talents 1,333 drachmas. It is probable that this money came out of the war chest and should therefore enter our reckoning. For ten years it would

total in round numbers 160 talents.

1 Arist. Const. Ath. 24.

2 See Busolt, p. 729; Gilbert, p. 439; I.G., II, 17, 11. 20 ff.

3 Diod. xv. 30. 5; xvi. 8. 5.

4 Boeckh, I, 305 ff.; Gilbert, p. 348, n. 4; Köhler, A.M., VIII, 168 ff.

5 Gilbert so judges (p. 348, n. 3). The sacred triremes were sometimes used as

war ships; Xen. vi. 2. 14; Dem. xxi. 174.

The cavalry was paid even in time of peace about 40 talents for the support of their horses.1 Gilbert says that this came from the war funds; Boeckh, from the current revenues. The former seems more likely. In times of war, on active service, the cavalryman received a drachma a day.

2. Occasional armaments; military and naval expeditions.-Boeckh states that if the necessary details are known about Greek military operations it is possible to estimate their cost. The factors that have to be considered are the number of men, the length of service, and the rate of pay; by simple arithmetic the normal cost can be figured from these, but of course to the result should be added the inevitable incidental expenses and the cost of munitions and fortifications, while from it should be subtracted any amounts that are acquired as booty or otherwise and applied to the cost of an expedition. Since the incidental expenses are impossible to estimate, and the value of booty and reprisals is often difficult to discover, at best only approximate accuracy can be secured.

In view of the general agreement of modern investigators it may be assumed without further argument that both soldiers and sailors in the fourth century were paid usually at the rate of 4 obols a day, including wage (molós) and ration money (σurηpéσiov),3 and that for financial purposes the crew of a trireme was reckoned at 200.4 On this basis we may record and estimate the cost of the military and naval operations of this decade. They are as follows:

1 Gilbert, p. 348, n. 4; Boeckh, I, 317. Xen. Hipparch. i. 19; I.G., I, 188: payment in 410-409 of more than 16 talents in four prytanies by the treasurers of Athena to the Hellenatomiae, σίτος ἵπποις. Payments still made in Demosthenes' time; Dem. xxiv. 97.

2 I, 357.

3 Boeckh, I, 340 ff.; Francotte, L'industrie dans la Grèce antique, II, 34; Busolt, p. 721; A. J. Reinach, "Les mercenaires et les colonies militaires de Pergame," Rév. Arch. (1908), pp. 174 ff., especially p. 201. The locus classicus on this matter is Dem. iv. 28, which seems to deal with the ordinary rates. In times of especial stress they were raised. Other citations on rate of pay: 4 obols a day, Xen. Anab. i. 3. 21 (1 daric, or 20 drachmas, a month, raised to 11 darics); 3 obols a day, Xen. Hell. i. 5. 5; Thuc. viii. 29; 1 drachma a day, Thuc. ibid.; 2 drachmas a day. Thuc. iii. 17. 3; promises of extraordinary pay, Xen. Anab. vii. 2. 36; 3. 10.

4 Torr, Ancient Ships 11; Boeckh I, 346 ff.; but Zimmern, Greek Commonwealth 401, 411, reckons on the basis of 170 rowers, 10 marines, and 8 officers at the time of the Peloponnesian War.

1. 378. Mobilization of the troops after the attempt of Sphodrias to surprise the city. Probably no expenditure involved.

2. 377, end of March to end of April. Chabrias in Boeotia opposes Agesilaus on his second raid.2 Little was done, and Chabrias was at sea the rest of the year. The number of men is not known, but in the preceding spring on a similar occasion Chabrias had led 5,000 mercenaries and 200 cavalry into Boeotia.3 The pay of this body for a month would be 18 talents 40 minas (16 talents 40 minas for the infantry and 2 talents for the cavalry), and may be taken as a fair basis for estimating the cost of the second campaign at about the same amount, in round numbers 15 talents.

3. 377, summer; activity of Chabrias in the Aegean with a fleet.1 The size of his fleet and the length of his campaign are not reported; the fleet, however, must have been large enough to command respect, while it was not powerful enough to reduce Oreus, and the voyage must have lasted the rest of the cruising season, after the campaign in Boeotia, from May till November, six months. Timotheus took Samos with 30 ships and a force of peltasts; Chabrias' fleet would be no larger, and perhaps would best be estimated at about 20 sail. On this basis the cost would be about 20 talents, from which no deductions for booty or assistance from the islanders should be made, for there seems to have been little chance to secure booty, save at Oreus, and an Athenian general would not wish to ask for funds from the islanders while soliciting them as allies.

4. 376, spring. Third expedition of Chabrias into Boeotia; details unknown; cost probably about the same as that of the former (No. 2).5

5. 376, summer. The accounts of the battle of Naxos are full but confused. Diodorus says that the Athenian fleet numbered 83;

1 Xen. v. 4. 21, Diod. xv. 29. 7.

2 Xen. v. 4. 47 ff.; Diod. xv. 34; cf. Busolt, p. 745; Meyer, p. 388; Marshall, p. 58. The time estimate is Busolt's.

3 Diod. xv. 32. 2; cf. Beloch, II, 237; see Kromayer, Klio, III, 47 ff., for evidence that 5,000 or 6,000 men were usually dispatched on ordinary campaigns by Athens. Diod. xv. 30. 2-5; Beloch, A.P., p. 316; Busolt, p. 745; Meyer, p. 387.

Xen. v. 4. 59; Beloch, II, 237.

* Diod. xv. 34 ff.; Dem. xx. 77-80; Xen. v. 4. 61 ff.; Plutarch Phoc. 6; Polyaenus iii. 11. 2; Meyer, p. 393, Marshall, pp. 59 f.

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