NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

ON CICERO DE DIVINATIONE i. 80

Mr. Pease's proposal (Classical Philology, XIII [April, 1918], 211) to move mentis away from sensu seems unquestionably correct. But it should be put between eum and vis quaedam. The "homoeographon" mentis vis was the cause of the omission of the word which was subsequently restored to the text but not to its right place.

LIVERPOOL

J. P. POSTGATE

THE STATUS OF CALLISTRATUS IN THE LITIGATION OVER THE ESTATE OF CONON [DEMOSTHENES], xlviii. 31, 43 ff.

In Callistratus v. Olympiodorus suit is brought for the moiety of an estate, left by one Conon, which has been adjudged to the present defendant. The plaintiff's account of the circumstances which led up to the suit is as follows: In the Stadikaσía, which resulted in the judgment, both Callistratus and Olympiodorus had filed claims, separately, the former for half of the estate, the latter for the whole. Olympiodorus succeeded in establishing his title through fraud, with the connivance and actual co-operation of Callistratus. Subsequently he refused to carry out an agreement by which the two were to share equally whatever property or moneys either might secure from the estate. The present action seeks to enforce fulfilment of this agreement.1 In the plaintiff's account of the proceedings before the court in this diadikaσía are found the following statements: (31) καὶ οὑτοσὶ Ὀλυμπιόδωρος ἠγωνίζετο πρῶτος, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅ τι ἐβούλετο, καὶ μαρτυρίας παρείχετο ἃς ἐδόκει τούτῳ· κἀγὼ ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ σιωπῇ ἐκαθήμην ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου βήματος. (44) κἀγὼ οὐδ ̓ ὁτιοῦν ἀντέλεγον τούτοις, οὐδ ̓ ἤκουσέ μου φωνὴν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων, ὅτε οὗτος ἠγωνίζετο, οὔτε μικρὰν οὔτε μεγάλην, ἀλλὰ προσωμολόγουν ἀληθῆ εἶναι πάνθ' ὅσα οὗτος ἠβούλετο λέγειν. The problem here is to determine the status of Callistratus in the Sadikaσía. Was he at the time of the hearing a party to the suit?

1 For the details of the case and the interpretations here discussed, see Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III (Leipzig, 1858), 236 ff.; Kennedy, The Orations of Demosthenes, IV (London, 1880), 366 ff.; V (1878), 100 ff.; Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts (Chicago, 1905), pp. 89-90; Leisi, Der Zeuge im Attischen Recht (Frauenfeld, 1908), p. 120, n. 2; Lipsius, Das Attische Recht, II (Leipzig, 1912), 782, n. 16 fin.

Bonner, who first raises the question, infers from Callistratus' allusions to his silence that he had not carried his claim into court.1 Leisi also (loc. cit.) takes these passages to mean that Callistratus did not address the court, though he maintains, as does Lipsius (loc. cit.), that he was still a party to the suit at the time of the hearing.

Bonner is unquestionably right in declining to regard the phrase ènì Toû Tépov Býμatos as proof positive that Callistratus was a party to the suit, but his view involves other more serious difficulties. In the first place, the statement (31) καὶ μετὰ ταῦθ' ὁ ἄρχων ἀνέκρινε πᾶσιν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, καὶ ἀνακρίνας εἰσήγαγεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, carries a distinct implication that Callistratus had not allowed his claim to lapse between the ȧváκpiois and the trial. Again, Callistratus could have had no object in filing a claim, presenting himself at the ȧváκpiois, and then dropping out of the case before the hearing. Such a course not only would have failed to aid Olympiodorus but might well have aroused suspicions of chicanery. The elaborate argument by which he undertakes to establish the fact of his collusion with Olympiodorus and his constant references to the agreement under which they were proceeding are made necessary by the very fact that throughout the trial he had maintained, ostensibly, the status of an independent claimant. And finally he states specifically (30) that the object of their scheme was to get two chances at the estate; that the understanding was for each to prosecute his claim independently, and for the one who was successful to divide on equal terms with the other.

Leisi's theory does not entirely dispose of these difficulties and is open to the further objection that we know of no case in which a litigant attends in court and then declines to address the jury, and we have no ground for believing that the court would have permitted such a proceeding. This suggests the advisability of scrutinizing carefully the interpretation which understands σιωπῇ ἐκαθήμην (31) and οὐδ' ἤκουσέ μου φωνὴν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων (44) to mean that Callistratus made no address to the jury. In the first passage quoted above does not the imperfect ἐκαθήμην balance ἠγωνίζετο čλeyev. . . . πapeíxero? Does it not really mean "Olympiodorus was arguing his case, the first, and was saying what he pleased, and presenting what testimony he liked, and I (while that was going on) was sitting in silence"? Here is at least an ambiguity, and that ambiguity is noticed by the speaker and cleared up in the second passage by the clause ὅτε οὗτος ήγωνίζετο. "And no man heard my voice, while he was arguing his case." Nothing could be more explicit than this, and it is strange that it has been overlooked. Callistratus denies, not that he addressed the court in due form, but that he interrupted Olympiodorus during the latter's speech.2

1 Loc. cit. Bonner's later views on this case are reported by the writer in Classical Philology, XI (1916), 379, n. 3.

2 The words ovтe μikpàv oûte μeyáλŋy, which Kennedy renders "not a word, not a syllable," although they are a formula merely of emphatic denial, nevertheless suggest informal interruption or protest rather than a set speech.

The working out of this neat coup appears to have been about as follows: Callistratus and Olympiodorus filed separate claims in order to secure two chances, and with the understanding that whatever either might receive was to be shared equally. But it was to their advantage to establish the claim of Olympiodorus, if possible, rather than that of Callistratus, who would be co-heir with his brother and could hope for only a moiety. Consequently, when the "case" of Olympiodorus was working out well and his argument was seen to be making a good impression, it devolved upon Callistratus to "play into his hands." This he could easily do, simply by not challenging the truth of the assertions Olympiodorus had made and by devoting most of his argument to attacks upon the claims of the other suitors. Perhaps he even contrived adroitly to create the impression that he had always recognized the validity of Olympiodorus' claim, and had been induced to become a suitor only by the advent of other claimants. As to his real reasons for preferring to divide with Olympiodorus rather than his own half-brother, we may note, in addition to the motive suggested by Kennedy (loc. cit.), the fact that at the time of Conon's death the brother was absent from Athens while Olympiodorus was on the spot, and the distinct possibility that the latter's claim was in reality as good as his own or better.1

If this analysis of the case seem startling, one has but to turn to the speech Against Macartatus to find a parallel.2 Practically the same maneuver is executed on a more elaborate scale.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE MILLER CALHOUN

NOTE ON DIOGENES LAERTIUS ix. 108

οὔτε γὰρ τάδ' ἑλούμεθα ἢ ταῦτα φευξόμεθα ὅσα περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐστι· τὰ δ' ὅσα περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην, οὐ δυνάμεθα φεύγειν, ὡς τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ἀλγεῖν.

Should we not read here παρ' ἡμᾶς instead of περὶ ἡμᾶς ? In later discussion of freedom of the will rò Tap' quâs is almost technical, though it seems to be overlooked in the grammars and lexicons. I cannot find that περὶ ἡμᾶς is so used. περὶ ἡμᾶς might conceivably be understood here of the things that really concern us. But that would yield a very imperfect antithesis with kaт' áváyêŋν. Cf. Hippolytus Philos. 21 [Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 571, 11]: ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης, with Aetius Plac. i. 27. 3 [Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 322, 5]: IIλátwv ¿ykpívei pèv tùv εἱμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίων, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ ̓ ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. οἱ Στωικοὶ Πλάτωνι ἐμφερῶς· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνίκητόν φασιν αἰτίαν καὶ βιαστικήν, τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν ᾗ συμπλοκῇ καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, ὥστε τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνειμάρθαι.

1 Cf. Libanius in hypothesis 1: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τάχ' ἂν ψεύδοιτο, κτλ. 27 ff. Cf. the writer's Athenian Clubs (Austin, 1913), p. 88, n. 1.

In these passages αὐτεξούσιον essentially equals τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς and τῆς ἀνάγκης is the equivalent of εἰμάρθαι. For other cases of this use of παρά cf. Alexander Aphrod. Quaest. ii. 16, p. 61, 1. 1, Bruns: τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυγχάνειν, κ.τ.λ. Plutarch De comm. not. 1071α: τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. Pp. 1041df.: καὶ πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει, κ.τ.λ. Cf. also Stobaeus Eclogue ii. 7: καὶ νομίζειν τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ' αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι, πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν· Sex. Emp. Πρὸς Μαθ. Β. 104 Bekker: δεῖ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' ἡμᾶς γινομένων τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἕλκειν καὶ ψόγους, εὐγένεια δὲ καὶ εὐτυχία κάλλος τε καὶ πολυτεκνία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἔστι παρ' ἡμᾶς γινόμενα, ὥστε οὐκ ἐπαινετέον ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Sex. Emp., ibid., c. 46: ἐπεὶ τῶν γινομένων τὰ μὲν κατ ̓ ἀνάγκην γίνεται τὰ δὲ κατὰ τύχην τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς. In Stobaeus, Eclog. ii. 102. 25 W: εἶναι δὲ τὴν μεταμέλειαν λύπην ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις ὡς παρ' αὑτοῦ ἡμαρτημένοις we should therefore probably retain the αὐτόν of F and not read with Meineke αὑτοῦ. Plut. De stoic. repug. 1043 F: οὐκ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ποιήσειν ἀγαθούς, καὶ ταῦτ ̓ ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ταῦτα ποιήσειν πρὸς τὸν συμφωνηθέντα χρόνον it is true πρὸς ἑαυτούς may mean with their power as in πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν [Plato, Phaedr. 231 Α]. But the thought is essentially that of the first quotation from Alexander above. The stochastic arts or professors do not promise success-but only to do their part.

In

Whether the proposed emendation be thought necessary or not, this use of rapá calls for fuller illustration.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PAUL SHOREY

BOOK REVIEWS

Vie de Porphyre, avec les fragments des traités Teρì ȧyaλμáтшv et De Regressu Animae. Par J. BIDEZ. Gand: Librairie Scientifique, E. van Goethem, 1913. Pp. vii+156+73.

In this admirable work of Professor Bidez we have a clear account of the life of Porphyry and of the development of his thought, together with a sympathetic picture of the age in which he lived. Other discussions of Porphyry, including that of Zeller, have suffered from the failure to distinguish sharply enough his different periods and hence have attributed to him doctrines obviously inconsistent, without attempting to settle the question whether he could have held them at one time. It is one of the chief merits of Bidez to have shown that these seeming inconsistencies, in great part at least, are to be explained from changes in Porphyry's philosophic position.

Bidez places a higher value upon Eunapius' Life of Porphyry than do Wolff and Zeller, insisting that in dealing with any statement of this author concerning which we are in doubt we must consider whether he may not have derived his information from work of Porphyry now lost to us.

Bidez does not regard it as possible to determine with certainty the questions whether Porphyry was born of Christian parents, and whether he was ever himself a Christian. But it may well be, he suggests, that the fact that he was a pupil of Origen and had a thorough acquaintance with the Scriptures led the Christians to accuse him of being an apostate. Porphyry's meeting with Origen, Bidez thinks, may perhaps have taken place at Tyre, as Zeller holds, but more probably at Caesarea.

The Philosophy of the Oracles, which gives a complete system of theurgy, is, as Eunapius perceived, a very early work. The treatise on the Images of the Gods, itself a defense of paganism, is based upon ideas very different from those contained in the previous work. This difference is noticed by Eusebius. In the treatise on the Images of the Gods there are, however, no traces of the doctrines of Plotinus; hence we are to suppose it written before Porphyry's coming to Rome. To the same general period as the latter work belong also the Homeric Questions and the History of Philosophy. In the Homeric Questions we do not find the method of interpretation by which Porphyry later discovered neo-Platonism in Homer. In the History of Philosophy we have a type of Platonism different from that of Plotinus.

The chapter which deals with Porphyry's work against the Christians is perhaps the most attractive in the book. In this Bidez gives a brief but