eafily fucceed in cutting off the communication between Dartmouth, Plymouth, and Portfmouth. It would not, however, be advifeable for you to approach too near to thofe places, on account of the numerous garrifons which they contain, unlefs, indeed, you had informatiou of any commotion having taken place, which you fhould labour to promote. It is therefore of importance, that immediately on your debarkation, you should direct your march towards "Dedmana and Newport." Above the latter, and without paffing through it, you will cross the Tamer, a river which feparates Cornwall from Devonshire, beyond which it will be your object to take up a pofition. Your march fhould be conducted with brifknefs and celerity. You should never keep the high road, but, on the contrary, proceed through the bye-ways and narrow tracks, and efpecially thofe that are most remote from the great road. Before you enter a city or town, you should enquire whether it contains any, and what number of troops, whether there is any river in it, and what number of bridges, and whether it has any fortifications; you must then take your meafures accordingly. You fhould frequently change your guides, in order to conceal from the enemy the knowledge of your marches, and never take a fresh guide in the prefence of the one whom you difmifs; you should make frequent counter-marches; always tell your guides that you have quitted a different road from that which you intend to purfue, and enquire the road to those towns and villages which you mean to leave behind you, or to which at leaft you do not intend to go. The better to create furprize and confternation, you must now and then take poffeffion of fome little town or harbour, and lay it under contribution. You perceive by this, that all places of any note will apply to Government for troops, which will be in want of them, and will be compelled to divide those which it can fpare; this will enable you to deftroy a great many of them, by engaging feparately with the different detachments fent against you. It is only by means of moveable columns that you can be oppofed with fuccefs; it will not, however, be difficult to deftroy their effect. If they should be weak, you may eafily overpower them; if they fhould be ftrong, you may difperfe yourfelves, and commit hoftilities in different quarters. This will alarm the towns, and they will immediately require the protection of thofe troops which compofe the columns, in order to ferve as garrifons against your attacks. You will thus remain mafters of the country, and starve both the inhabitants and the troops who are in the towns. I doubt whether the English understand the ufe and advantages of moveable columns; but even if they do, you may render them of no avail, fince the Government has not a fufficient number of troops to cover every point at once. 8 A No. 33. The The foldiers fhould not carry any thing befides their arms, ammunition, and bread; they will every where find linen, shoes, and other articles of drefs. The inhabitants muft fupply their wants, and gentlemen's feats will ferve you for magazines. In cafe the country fhould be too much ravaged to fubfift you any longer, or in cafe the number of troops fent against you should compel you to quit the fpot where you have taken pofition, you muft quit with expedition, make forced marches by night, and reft during the day in the woods and mountains. If you are under the neceflity of ftopping at any place to procure provifions, make choice of a good poft, from whence you must send your detachments into the neighbouring villages. Your cavalry, for you must on your first establishment create force of that defcription, will be moft proper for this fervice, and may and ought to change horses as often as neceffity fhall require. As you will proceed by hafty marches, the enemy's troops will not be able to come up with you on account of the difficulty of procuring provifions; but even if you fhould be obliged to fight, you must remember that you are Frenchmen, and ftrike a great blow. Bear in mind, at the fame time, that neceffity only should induce you to risk the fate of an engagement; but then you must make a defperate attempt. If you mult force your way through the enemy you have to attack, let it be done in the night. About eleven or twelve o'clock at night fend three or four patroles, confifting of four or fix men, to fet fire to fome houses in your rear, and in different quarters. The enemy, imagining that you are flying, will, perhaps, endeavour to purfue you, and then you may either prepare an ambufcade, elude them altogether, or fall upon the rear of one of their columns, which you may eafily overpower in the dark, and in the confufion into which troops unexpectedly attacked are thrown. If the enemy fhould fend affittance to the perfons whofe houses have been fet on fire, the thing is the fame, and you have the choice of either fighting or eluding them, which, however, is not of fo much advantage as the firft alternative. If the enemy should remain under arms, and fend patroles to reconnoitre, you must furround them, and put them to the bayonet, without firing a fhot. In three or four hours afterwards you should depart in column, and proceed, an pas de Charge," against one of the wings, which you fhould drive in, and, without attempting any thing elfe, pursue your march, and make two or three counter-marches in the course of the day. The night will alfo afford you a fit opportunity to furprize and put to the word any poft that may be oppofed to you. In the day time, and in an open fituation, you must not hesitate to attack two thousand men, and in the night from four to five thousand, with a force force of twelve hundred. From a poft that is not intrenched, you ought to diflodge eight hundred men; but if it should be intrenched, and defended by cannon, you must take care to avoid it. In order to pass a river, the bridges of which are guarded, you muft, if you cannot procure boats, endeavour to afcend to its fource, to find a ford, or the causeway of a water mill. If you are very much pushed, you must ftretch a strong rope across from one fide of the river to the other, and make fuch of the troops as cannot fwim take hold of it and pafs over. In fuch cafes their muskets must be carried in the flings, with the butt end upwards, in order that the lock may, if poffible, be kept dry, Trees long enough to reach from one bank to the other are preferable to a rope. In that cafe you must cut down a good many, and throw them across at different places. If the river, though fordable, fhould be rapid, and the foldiers should be up to their necks in water, you must make the good swimmers go firft, and then order a whole rank to pass at once, each foldier holding faft with his left hand by the coat of the man who is before him, and carrying his musket in his right. In this manner the foldier who reaches the oppofite bank, pulls along his comrade and helps him out of the water, and fo on fucceffively. The horfes may thus pass alfo, but it is not much to be trufted to. Cornwall and Devonshire form a peninfula, in which it would be defirable that you fhould be able to maintain yourselves, and this you might accomplish with a little skill. If, however, you fhould be compelled by urgent motives, and after having made every effort in your power, to quit this diftrict, it would then be expedient for you to make an irruption into the counties of Somerfet, Wilts, and Gloucefter, in order to ftrike terror into the heart of England, and even into London itself. In this laft county you will pafs the Severn, in order to reach the principality of Wales, a mountainous and woody country, where you would find a fecure retreat, and where you would be better enabled to receive fuccour through Ireland. There is another manner in which you might pafs the Severn or the Briftol canal, that is, by taking poffeffion of Bristol or Berkley, and croffing the canal in the boats which you would meet with on the spot. By means of a fum of money advanced in England, and the promife of a farther reward in France, you might induce plenty of fishermen to convey thither an officer intrufted with your difpatches. It would be difficult for you to correfpond through any other medium. APPENDIX (No. 28.)) Tranflation of Inftructions to Brigadier-General Humbert, commanding the Secret Expedition entrusted to the Legion" des Francs." As foon as the formation of the legion and the weather will permit, General Humbert, who will have made the neceffary arrangements refpecting the tranfports with Vice-Admiral Cornie, is to 8 A 2 conduct conduct his troops to St. Malo, there to caufe them to be embarked, and immediately to fet fail for the county of Cornwall, in the kingdom of England. The garrifon which, in purfuance of my orders, General Humbert is to take away from Chateauneuf, is to be replaced by General Virges; and General Humbert, on the eve of his departure, is to apprize General Virges thereof. The expedition muft, if poffible, depart, in the night time; and during the paffage the fhips are to make all the fail poffible. General Humbert is to take care that the most perfect order be preferved on board. The troops are to receive their ufual allowances; but when they are ready to difembark, they are to be furnished with four days provifions, and a double ration of brandy is to be allowed them; this they are to drink immediately, in order to refresh themselves after the fatigues of the voyage. The difembarkation must be effected with all poffible expedition. The powder and ammunition must be carried by the foldiers, until fuch time as they fhall have advanced far enough into the country to procure bât horfes, which are then to be employed in that fervice. The ammunition must not, on any occafion whatever, be left behind; and fresh fupplies of it must be procured whenever an op portunity occurs. During the two firft days march the legion muft remain undivided; and care must be taken to prevent any of the men from ftraggling. General Humbert will of courfe feel the propriety of speedily advancing to a woody and mountainous fituation before he attempts any act of hoftility. He muft take care to avoid fwampy ground, not only because it is unwholefome, but becaufe he might expofe himfelf to the danger of being furrounded by troops, who would certainly not fail to make ufe of the advantages which fuch fitua tions always afford. The expedition of General Humbert has three principal objects in view: The firft is, to put the couatry into a flate of insurrection; The third is, to prepare and facilitate the means of making a defcent, by giving the greateft perplexity to the English Go vernment. The clafs of people the moft eafily to be moved to infurrection, as in all countries, is the pooreft clafs. This may be effected by diftributing money or drink among them; by afcribing to the Government the public wretchednefs; by inftigating them, and facilitating their means to revolt, to pillage the public granaries, and to plunder the property of the rich, whom they always regard with an eye of envy. It is, however, neceffary to obferve, that how regardless foever the the English people may be of morality, they are attached to their laws and refpect their magiftrates, even during the infurrections which have fometimes taken place; it will therefore be expedient to fpare the property belonging to, or in any wife connected with the civil and municipal magiftracy. It will alfo be advifeable to pursue the fame line of policy with refpect to the country landholders and merchants. The expences must then be borne by the great, the lords, (those who belong to the oppofition party are to be fpared, whenever they are known) the minifters, the naval and military officers, especially thofe of the militia. The houses, the granaries, the cattle, the forefts, and every thing belonging to any of thefe, must be diftributed among the people, or pillaged by them. Thefe calamities, which thofe of the republic compel us to inflict, and to which a ferocious nation conftrains us to expose it, will induce many of the labouring people and the rabble of the country to efpoufe our caufe: but they must on no account be incorporated with our own troops; they must be formed into new corps, and placed under the command of French officers belonging to the legion, in order that no native of the country may become acquainted with the state of our force. These fhould also be kept feparate, and as much in ignorance in this refpect as circumstances will permit, It is principally by means of the new companies that the infurrection will be fomented. With refpect to the embarraffing of commerce, this may be best effected by breaking down bridges, dikes, and caufeways, (which is, indeed, neceffary for the purpose of felf-prefervation); by plundering convoys of provifions, and private and public carriages; by cutting off the fupplies destined for towns; by burning merchant veffels, boats, &c. by fetting fire to dock-yards, rope-works, and the fail-cloth manufactories. It is alfo to be obferved, that in confequence of thefe operations a number of work men will be deprived of employment, and will attach themfelves to the party which fupplies them with the means of fubfiftence; a mode of livelihood fo much the more captivating, as the individual himfelf contributes nothing towards it. The object of the defcent may be facilitated by difarming the militia; by burning the public arfenals and harbours; by intercepting meffengers in the fervice of government; as well as by the declension of the troops, through desertion and infubordination; and by the terror which the operations of the legion, and the progrefs of the infurrection, will infpire into the minds of those who might be inclined to defend the country. The most favourable part of the country is, that in which forges and manufactories are to be found. Provifions must be taken wherever they can be found; and if any town or village refufe immediately to afford a neceffary fupply of provifions, it must be given up to pillage. The better to ftrike terror into the country, the legion fhould be difperfed into dif ferent columns, and affemble again at a general rendezvous. This |