plunged, cannot be meliorated without the operation that would refult from an Union. For my part, I incline to a middle plan, and am warranted in afferting that if the prefent fyftem was altered as it ought, there would be no neceffity of chufing between the two mifchievous alternatives, either of effecting an Union against the will of the country, or permitting its connection with Great Britain to be endangered, and Ireland itself to remain a prey to all the miseries and diftreffes under which it is now confeffed to labour.But if Ireland is unable to correct her defects, and improve her condition by her own councils and endeavours, where lies the fault? The fault is evidently with those who make the Irish Government one general corrupt job. For is not the Irish Peerage, are not the Irith bifhopricks, and every place of emolument and diftinction, all English jobs? It will not furely be faid that the fault rifes out of the innate depravity of the country, and that it can be governed only by corruption and profligacy. No other means have hitherto indeed been employed. We have never feen the remedy tried of what might be done by an honeft Government and an honeft Irish Parliament, who fhould not be obliged to look only to St. James's for approbation and reward, but who would make the real happinefs of their country the great object of their attention, and the gratitude of their countrymen the most defired and moft welcome remuneration of their labours. Why decline making this experi ment? Surely fuch a remedy can have no tendancy to loosen the connection between the two countries; on the contrary, it would draw it clofer and rivet it more strongly; while in the attempts that are now made to link the two countries clofer, I can discover nothing but what muft difpofe them to feparate. For in what pofition are they placed? If Ireland fees that the Right Hon. Gentleman may be enabled to realize his threats (for the will of the British Parliament, a will which he appears to wield at pleasure can easily realize them); if Ireland feels that her trade may be taken from her, that the English protecting force may be withdrawn which now fhields her from foreign invafion and interpal infurrection; when Ireland obferves how much in those refpects the depends upon the will of England, and when fhe is told that, in order to continue in the enjoyment of thefe favours from her powerful neighbour, the must submit to the terms dictated to her by the Right Hon. Gentleman, what will the not then hazard to guard against the feducements of the corruption and the effects of intimida

tion? A correct copy of the Right Honourable Gentleman's fpeech is now widely circulated through the hands of the public; but in it no attempt is made to fhew why not all the advantages that are fo proudly promifed to refult from this forced Union, might not be fecured to an equal degree by the wisdom and activity of an honeft Irish Parliament and an honeft Irish Government. Why not indulge Ireland in this much wanted and much wifhed for bleffing? No; this would not answer the objects of English influence and English corruption. Though if a good refiding government, a visible oftenfible government was ever neceffary to the falvation of Ireland, it is at the prefent moment indif penfibly fo. But the Right Hon. Gentleman will have it, that many of the advantages that would refult from the Union can never be derived from any fuch government. Some of these advantages he is pleafed to enumerate, fuch as further privileges to the Catholics and to the Proteftant Diffenters, and fome provifion for their clergy. Thefe, it would appear, it is impoffible to grant unless Ireland affents to an Union. If this be really the cafe, then I say that England feems determined to treat Ireland merely as a conquered country-and if fo, in my opinion, the question is at an end. But why may not an Irish Parliament equally fucceed in bringing about thefe improvements? Could it not as effectually remove the wretchednefs, the ignorance, and the incivilization of that country? It has been objected to the propofed Union, that it would increase the number of abfentees, and that confequently it muft aggravate the above mentioned miseries of the country. But this objection has been boldly anfwered by a Noble Lord (Hawkerbury.) He fays, it is impoffible that the circumftance of men of property from Ireland fitting in Parliament in this country fhould decrease the number of opulent persons in Ireland; on the contrary, he maintains it would increase them; that it would make the Irish Gentlemen ftay more on their eftates. They are told, that if they obtain a feat in the Imperial Parliament, they are to be fo dazzled with its fplendor, in comparison with that of their own country, that their pride would be fo raised, that of neceffity they will be induced to act differently from what they had done before They are told, that they are to become better neighbours in confequence of their being abfent from the country best part of the year; that they will become better landlords, because they are principally to refide at a distance from their eftates; that they will be better mafters, because No. 20.

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they are feldom to be on the fpot with their fervants and dependants; that they would act in a very different manner from what they had been accustomed to do; they, in a word, would be metamorphofed into beings of a far fuperior nature, and perform offices of bounty and generofity which never could have been won from them; the mean and mercenary ambition of obtaining in their own little Parliament. Thus the Noble Lord founded his arguments, not upon the performance of thofe duties attached to large property, but upon the narrow, partial views of felf-intereft. This moft unquestionably was a mode of reasoning that broadly told every Irifhman how abject and degraded their conduct had hitherto been. But that when they are permitted to afpire to the honour of a feat in the Imperial Parliament, they will then become good refiding fubjects, and more generous landlords. To witness this aftonishing change, the Noble Lord would no doubt attend and obferve how these hundred Irish Members would advance to take poffeffion of their new honours: how they would tremble with awe at contemplating the fplendors of this auguft affembly; how, inftead of walking calmly forward, and making you, Sir, the ufual falutation, they would either fall proftrate on the ground, or creep upon all fours, Mr. Sheridan continued fome time to ridicule this argument in a happy vein of humour, and then afked; do the House believe that the Irish have not fenfe nor fenfibility enough to fee and feel the infult offered them by fuch observations? I fhall not perhaps be told, that the Irish are too ftupid and fenfelefs not to understand their tendency, unless it be pointed out to them. But on fuch topics I do not feel difpofed further to dwell. I fhall therefore only observe, that there is no Member of this House who may not, and who ought not, to vote in favour of the refolutions I am now about to move-even thofe who are most friendly to an Union, as it never could be fafely attempted, or honourably accomplished, unless from the motives and on the grounds which thefe refolutions were intended to exprefs. Indeed the first of them might be faid to amount to nothing more than a truifm, and the fecond fhould be the natural confequence of adopting the firft. I know it has been the practice of Parliament, when it has been apprehensive of an attempt on the part of a Minifter, likely to be injurious to the conftitution, to mark that apprehenfion by a preliminary refolution; I therefore move, Sir,

"That no measures can have a tendency to improve and

perpetuate

perpetuate the ties of amity and connexion now exifting be-. tween Great Britain and Ireland, which have not for their bafis the manifeft, fair, and free confent and approbation of the Parliaments of the two countries:—and, that whoever shall endeavour to obtain the appearance of fuch confent and approbation in either kingdom, by employing the influence of government for the purpofes of corruption or intimidation, is an enemy to his Majesty, and to the conftitution of his country."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer faid, that as the question of Union was not now ftrictly before the Houfe, he would not trouble them with replying to the arguments which the Hon. Gentleman who had juft fat down had introduced upon that fubject. He would fatisfy himself with offering a very few words on the motion itself. It confifted of two parts, of which the first went to declare, "that no measures can have tendency to improve and perpetuate the ties of amity and connexion now exifting between Great-Britain and Ireland, which have not for their bafis the manifeft, fair, and free consent and approbation of the Parliaments of the two countries." This the Hon. Gentleman stated to be one of those fimple and obvious truths which no perfon could have any hefitation to admit. But when the Hon. Gentleman recommended it upon that ground, he ought to have remembered that frequently the shortest way in which an objection could be stated, was in the shape of a propofition true in itself, but which in its developement and application to times and circumftances, might lead to conclufions the most false and inadmiffible. That it was merely what was denominated by a cant term truifm, fo far from being a recommendation, would in his eftimation be a fufficient argument against it. But this propofition was not a truifm in that fimple fenfe of the word. Its bearing and tendency were too obvious to allow it to pafs intirely under that denomination. It ought to be recollected, that there were occafions when literal truth became practical falfhood, and when it was not only not innocent, but in an eminent degree mifchievous. Such a truth was that contained in this propofition. It implied, that the House were proceeding to the difcuffion of fomething oppofite to its tenor. Its obvious inference was, that the propofed measure was not to be effected by the fair, free, and manifest consent of both Parliaments, and therefore it contained a propofition of evident mischief, and went befides to make a propofal that must degrade the dignity and infult the good fenfe of the House. 5 G2

He

He therefore thought that it was unneceffary to waste any more words in fhewing, that involving fuch an implication it was a truism which the House ought not to adopt. The fecond part of the propofition, which mentioned the employment of the influence of government for the purpofes of corruption or intimidation, was equally objectionable from the view with which it was introduced. It evidently referred to what had been talked of in a former debate, the difmiffal or refignation of several official characters, in confequence of a difference of opinion on the queftion of Union. If the Hon. Gentleman meant, that as often as a difference of opinion took place among the fervants of the Crown, which was followed by the refignation or difmiffal of feveral of them, the influence of corruption or intimidation must have been neceffarily exercifed, he would flatly deny the pofition; and it was one which the Hon. Gentleman would not urge fo much with a grave face in any other place as within that Houfe. He would moreover affert, that there never occurred an occafion, where either the fincerity of the perfons holding places of high truft, or the fecurity of government, would permit them to act together, when a notorious divifion of opinion took place among them, refpecting the general nature of the meafures which the public good required to be adopted. Certain he was, that it was a principle upon which that Hon. Gentleman himself would never act; for he never knew an occafion which he had not embraced to expofe the weakness of a government, compofed of fuch jarring and difcordant parts as would neceffarily arise from the retention in office of men who differed with the majority of the individuals holding the reins of ftate, in queftions of great national importance. It was in the recollection of every one, how many complaints had proceeded from that Hon. Gentleman, that a Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had not been allowed to difmifs feveral great officers of the Crown, not because they had expreffed their disapprobation of any measures actually in a train of execution, but because it was likely that he should not be fupported by their concurrence, in propofitions to be brought forward at fome future indefinite period. He knew the conduct of the Hon. Gentleman to be too fair and manly, to fuppofe that he meant to ftate any doctrine as applicable to that occafion, which was not equally applicable to this. This propofition, therefore, was alfo a truifm, which might be innocent enough, taken by itfelf, but which if coupled with recent circumftances would be falfe and flanderous in

the