appeared an equally indifpenfable measure of precaution to refume, without delay, the power of meeting that vindictive and reftlefs prince in the field. I was not therefore difcouraged, either by the fuggeftions to which I have referred, or by fubfequent representations of a fimilar character and tendency, from infifting on the immediate execution of my orders for affembling the army; and adverting to the fatal confequences which have formerly been experienced in the Carnatic, by neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of hoftile equipments in Myfore, I refolved to intruft the protection of your poffeffions on the coaft of Coromandel to no other fecurity than a complete and early state of preparation for war.

39. At Bombay, my orders for affembling the army were executed with great promptitude and alacrity, unaccompanied by any fymptoms of indifpofition to thofe united and zealous efforts, which the exigency of the crisis demanded from every branch of your civil and military fervice.

40. The unavoidable delay which obftructed the affembling your army in the Carnatic, having compelled me to relinquith my first intention of ftriking an immediate blow against the power and refources of Tippoo Sultaun, I applied myself to the formation of fuch a permanent fyftem of preparation and defence, as, while it tended to restore to the government of Fort St. George, with all practicable dispatch, the power of repelling any act of aggreffion on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, might ultimately enable me to demand both a juft indemnification for the expenfe which the Sul

taun's violation of treaty had occafioned to your government, and a feasonable fecurity against the con fequences of his accent alliance with the enemy.

41. With this view, while the army was aflembling on the coafts of Coromandel and Malabar, my early attention was directed to ftrengthen and improve the defenfive alliance concluded between the honourable company, and their highnelles the Nizam and Peshwah, under the treaties of Paangul, Ponnah, and Seringapatam, for the purpose of establishing a barrier gainft the ambition and revenge of Tippoo Sultaun.

a

42. The ftate of this alliance afforded abundant matter of painful anxiety; I found both the Pefhwah and the Nizam (whofe refpective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to maintain) in fuch a ftate of efficiency as might render them ufeful allies in the event of a war with Myfore, reduced to the lowest condition of depreffion and weaknefs, the former by the intrufion of Doulet Row Sindia, and the latter by the threatened hoftilities of the fame chieftan, by the establishment of a numerous and active French faction, in the centre of the Decan; and while the internal convulfions of each state had diminished the refources of both, their co-operation against Tippoo Sultaun had become impracticable, by the progrefs of their mutual animofities and dif fenfions..

43. In this fcene of general con fufion, the power of Tippoo Sultain alone, (which it had been the policy of all our alliances and treaties to reduce) had remained undifturbed and unimpaired, if it

had not been augmented and improved.

44. The final refult to the British government appeared to me to be, firft, the entire lofs of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, by the utter inability of our allies to fulfil their defenfive engagements with the company; and, fecondly, the eftablifhment of a French army of . 14,000 men, in the dominions of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of our irreconcilable enemy, and on the confines of the Carnatic and of the northern circars. 45. In this ftate of our political relations, the company was expofed, without the aid of a fingle ally, to the hazard of a contest with the united force of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the French.

46. My feparate difpatch, under date the 21ft of November, forwarded by the Eurydice, will have apprized your honourable court of the meatures which I took for the purpofe of refloring to his highnefs the Nizam, the power of fulfilling his defenfive engagements with the

company.

47. At the fame time my endeavours were employed, with equal affiduity, to give vigour and effect to the treaties fubfifling with his highnefs the Pefhwah. The return of Nana Furnaveefs to the adminiftration, afforded, for fome time, a just expectation that our alliance with the Mahrattahs would fpeedily be reftored with additional vigour and advantage; but the increafing diftractions of the Mahratta empire unfortunately frustrated the wife counfels of that experienced and able flatefman, and difappointed my views at the court of Poonah ; I had, however, the fatisfaction to

afcertain, that the difpofition of that court, under the adminiftration of Nana, continued perfectly favourable to the British interests; and that want of power would be the fole caufe of its inaction, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

48. Towards the commencement of the month of August, 1798, I learnt the preparations making by the French, in the Mediterranean. Various circumstances attending the equipment of that armament, inclined me to apprehend, that at leaft a part of it might be destined for an expedition to India, although I could not believe that the attempt would be made through Egypt. Under thefe impreffions, I took the earlieft opportunity of directing the attention of rear-admiral Rainier to the coaft of Malabar; and at the fame time I propofed to ftrengthen his majefty's fquadron in thofe feas, according to any arrangement which his excellency might fuggeft; and I iffued orders to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to attend to his excellency's fuggef tions on this important fubject. I am happy to inform your honourable court, that his excellency, with the utmoft readinefs, acceded to the propofition which I had fuggefted to him, with refpect to the defence of the coaft of Malabar, although his original intention had been to proceed, in the first instance,

to the ftraits of Malacca.

49. On the 18th of September, I ratified the new fubfidiary treaty with the Nizam, of which I have ftated the fubftance in my feparate difpatch, of the 21ft of November, by the Eurydice.

50. On the 18th of October, I received the firft authentic informa

tion of the invafion of Egypt, by the French, and of the progrels of their arms in that country.

51. It is unneceffary to call the attention of your honourable court to the evident connection of the invafion of Egypt, with the joint defigns of the French, and of Tippoo Sultaun, against the British power in India; and I truft it is now equally fuperfluous to enter into any detailed reafoning for the purpose of fatisfying you of the fecurity which, at that period of time, would have refulted to your interefts in India, if my original intention of anticipating the hoftile projeas of Tippoo Sultaun could have been carried into immediate effect, according to my anxious wifh. The neceffity, however, of either compelling Tippoo Sultaun to detach himfelf from the interefts of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French, if they fhould be enabled to reach India, now became too evident to admit of any doubt. My opinion had long been decided, that no negociation with Tippoo Sultaun could be fuccefsful, unlefs accompanied by fuch a difpofition of our force as fhould alarm him for the fafety of his capital, and that no military operation could effect an adequate or fpeedy reduction of his power, unlels directed immediately to the fiege of that city.

52. On the 20th of October, therefore, I gave peremptory orders to the government of Fort St. George, for completing the equipment of their battering train, and for advancing it with all practicable dilpatch to the most eligible station on the frontier of the Carnatic, with a view of proceeding towards VOL. XLI.

Seringapatam at the earlieft poffible period, if fuch a movement into Myfore fhould become neceffary. At the fame time I fignified, to the government of Fort St. George, my intention of reinforcing their army with 3000 volunteers from the native infantry, on the establishment of Bengal, who had offered their fervices with the utmost alacrity and zeal.

53. To the government of Bombay, I iffued farther orders for the collection not only of their troops, but of the largeft poffible fupplies on the coaft of Malabar.

54. On the 22d of October, (as I have already informed your houourable court,) the difmiffion of the French faction in the Nizam's army was happily accomplished at Hydrabad.

55. On the 31st of October, I received the intelligence of the glorious victory obtained by his majefty's fquadron, under the command of fir Horatio Nelfon; but being ftill uncertain of the fate of the French army in Egypt, and ignorant whether an additional force might not have been intended to co-operate with it in India, by the ordinary paffage round the Cape of Good Hope, I did not relax any part of the naval or military preparations which had been commenced under my orders. The opportunity now appeared favourable for opening a negociation with Tippoo Sultaun. I had already communicated to the allies, the Nizam, and the Peshwah, a circumftantial detail of the conduct of that prince, and had received from both the most unequi vocal affurances of their entire concurrence in my fentiments and views, as well as of their determi Q

nation

nation to fupport my juft claims of fatisfaction for the infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

56. On the 8th of November, therefore, I addreffed to Tippoo Sultaun a letter, of which a copy, (No. 2, A. and B.) accompanies this dispatch.

57. Your honourable court will perceive, that in this letter I have carefully avoided every hoftile expreffion, merely apprizing the fultaun of my knowledge of the nature of his intercourfe with the French nation, and propofing to him to receive major Doveton on the part of the allies, for the purpose of proceeding to an amicable arrangement of all fubfifting differences

58. My expectation was, that the neceffary impreffion of the fuccefs of his majefty's fleet against the French in Egypt; the revival of our defenfive alliance with the Nizam; the destruction of the French influence in the Decan; the declared difpofition of the Peshawh to fulfil his defenfive engagements to the utmost extent of his power; the prefence of his majefty's fquadron on the coaft of Malabar, reinforced by fuch of the honourable company's fhips as had been equipped for the purpofe; and, finally, the progrefs of our military preparations on both coafts, might have induced the fultaun to accede to my propofals for opening the channels of pacific negociation; and, under thefe circumitances, I trufted that the terror of the British arms might have rendered their actual employment unneceffary.

59. With fuch expectations I refolved to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpose of conducting the expected negociation with the ful

taun, which I flattered myself my prefence on the coaft of Coromandel might enable me to bring to an iffue, before the feafon fhould be fo far advanced as to relieve Tippoo Sultaun from thofe alarms for the fafety of his capital, on which I founded my fole hope of obtaining any fatisfactory adjustment with him.

60. On the 10th of December, I addreffed the letter, marked No. 3, to the fultaun, informing him of my intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging him to receive major Doveton. On the 25th of December, I embarked on board his majefty's fhip the Sybille, captain E. Cooke, and arrived at this prefidency on the 31ft of the fame month.

61. A few days previous to my arrival, the corps of native volunteers. from Bengal had landed in perfect fafety, and in the higheft fpirits, and foon after a corps of artillery arrived from Fort William, under the command of colonel Montague.

62. The letter marked No. 4. was delivered to ine on my arrival at Fort St. George.

63. In this letter, your honourable court will obferve the prevarication and falfehood which mark the fultaun's ftatement of his late intercourfe with the French, and you will perceive the evafion by which he eludes the moderate and amicable propofition of the allies for opening a negociation.

64. To this letter, from the fultaun, I returned the answer dated 9th of January, and marked No. 5, in which, I renewed the propofition of opening a negociation, and urged the fultaun not to delay his reply beyond the period of one day after my letter fhould reach him; inti