70. No intelligence had been received from the Red Sea refpecting the arrival of any of his majesty's fhips on that ftation; nor had I been able to afcertain, with any degree of accuracy, what means the French might either have provided, or might find on the fpot, to en able them to reach the fultaun's do minions. 71. In addition to these circumftances, I knew that while Tippoo Sultaun had declined to receive an ambaffador, from the honourable company, and had omitted to anfwer my late letters, he had dif patched native vakeels from Seringapatam, who, together with M. Dubuc (one of the leaders of the French force raifed in the Ifle of France, under M. Malartie's proclamation), were on the point of embarking at Tranquebar, with an avowed miffion from the fultaun to the executive directory of France. 72. On the 3d of February I had received no answer from the fultaun to my letter of the 9th of January, although the communication between Seringa patam and Fort St. George does not require, at the moft, a longer time than eight, and is fometimes effected in four days. 73. In order, therefore, to defeat the object of the fultaun's filence, and to avail myself of the actual fuperiority of our force, and of the advantages of the prefent feafon, before the French could effect any junction with him, I determined to commence hoftilities without delay, and to fufpend all negociation, until the united forces of the company, and of their allies, fhould have made fuch an imprefiion on the territories of Myfore, as might give full effect to our juft reprefentations. 74. With thefe views, on the 3d of February, I directed lieutenantgeneral Harris to enter the territory of Myfore with the army aflembled under his command. On the fame day, I'iffued orders to lieutenantgeneral Stuart to be prepared to co-operate from Malabar; and I fignified to rear-admiral Rainier, and to the feveral allies of the company, that I now confidered the British government in `India to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun. 75. At length, on the 13th of February, I received, from Tippoo Sultaun, the letter marked No. 7, informing me, that, being frequently difpofed "to make excurfions and hunt," he was, accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excurfion," and defiring" that I would" difpatch major Doveton “ flightly attended." 79. But the feafon for negocia tion through the pacific channels, fo often offered by me, was now elapsed. After mature deliberation on the grounds already stated I had directed the advance of the army into the territory of the fultaun; and I had fignified to the allies my determination to proceed to hoftilities. To have delayed the advance of the army, would at once have thrown the advantages which I then poffeffed into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, and have rendered the fiege of his capital impracticable, during the prefent feafon. On the other hand, an embaffy, combined with the hoftilè irruption of any army into Myfore, would have been liable to the imputation of infincerity towards Tippoo Sultaun; and while it bore the appearance of indecifion in the eyes eyes of the allies, would have promoted, and perhaps warranted, a fimilar degree of inftability in their councils and operations. 77. The defign of this tardy, reluctant, and infidious, affent to the admiffion of an embaffy from the British government could be confidered in no other light than that of a new artifice for the purpofe of gaining time, until a change of circumftances and of feafon might enable the fultaun to avail himself of the affiftance of France. This conclufion was now confirmed by my knowledge of the actual embarkation of M. Dubuc and two native vakeels, on an embasly from Tippoo to the executive directory of France; an event which took place at Tranquebar, on the 7th of February. 78. I therefore replied to the letter of Tippoo Sultaun in the terms of the enclosure, No. 8; in which I have declared lieutenant-general Harris to be the only perfon now authorized by me to receive and to answer whatever communications the fultaun may think fit to make, with a view to the refloration of peace, on fuch conditions as appear to the allies to be indifpenfably neceflary to their common fecurity. This letter I directed general Harris to forward to the fultaun on the day on which the army under his command fhould pafs the frontier, and, at the fame time, I inftructed him to iffue, in the name of the allies, the accompanying declaration, marked No. 9. 79. The Nizam's contingent consists of above 6,000 of the honourable company's troops, fubfidized by his highnefs, of about the fame number of his own infantry (including a portion of Mr. Peron's Se poys, now commanded by British officers) and a large body of cavalry. 80. This force, under 'the general command of Mur Allum, formed a junction with the British army on the 19th of February; and it is with the greatest fatisfaction that I remark to your honourable court, the beneficial effects which the company have already derived from the recent improvement of our alliance with the court of Hydrabad. The Nizam's contingent actually arrived in the vicinity of Chittoor, in a state of preparation for the field, before general Harris was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore. 81. I have annexed to this dif patch, No. 10, the laft return of lieutenant-general Harris's army, previous to his paffing the frontier, an army more completely appoint-, ed, more amply and liberally fupplied in every department, or more perfect in its difcipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal, of its officers, never took the field in India. The army, on the coaft of Malabar, (of which I alfo enclofe a return, No. 11.) is in an equally efficient and refpectable condition; and the extraordinary efforts which have been made by lieutenant-general Stuart and major-general Hartley, feconded by the cordial attachment and unremitting affiduity of the rajah of Coorga, have collected, within a very fhort period of time, a supply fo abundant, that I am induced to tranfmit the particnlars of it to your honourable court, as a teftimony of the diftinguished merits of those valuable officers, and of the loyalty and active exertions of that faithful tributary of the honourable company. (No. 12.) Q 3 82. A 82. A confiderable force, under any permanent impreffion on your empire in India; and no native power (excepting Tippoo Sultaun) is fo infatuated as to be difpofed to affift or receive a French army. the command of lieutenant-colonels Read and Brown, will co-operate with lieutenant-general Harris in the fouthern diftricts of the Carnatic and Myfore. 83. Under thefe cireumftances, general Harris entered the territory of Myfore, on the 5th of March, with orders to proceed directly to Seringapátam. 84. Having thus fubmitted to your honourable court, according to the order of dates, a detailed relation of the events which have led to the war in which we are actually engaged, and having declared to you the motives and objects of my conduct, in every stage of this important tranfaction, I must request your permiffion to conclude this difpatch with fuch reflections as arife in my mind from the review of my paft meafures, and from the profpect of their ultimate confequences and permanent effect. 85. From the first disclosure of the nature and object of Tippoo Sultaun's embally to the Ife of France, every principle of justice and policy demanded from your government in India, that an inftantaneous effort fhould be made to reduce his power and refources, before he could avail himself of the advantages of the alliance which he had concluded. The defect of means is the fole confideration which can juftify me for not having made that effort at the early period when its fuccefs would have placed the fecurity of your poffeffions on a foundation, which the invafion of India by a French force could not have impaired. 86. For, without the aid of fome native power, it is fcarcely poffible that the French fhould ever make 87. The progress of events, fince the date of my orders of the 20th of June, 1798, has not only confirmed the principles of juftice and policy, by which an attack upon the fultaun was, at that time, demanded, but has manifefted that the defigns of France, as well as of the fultaun, were of a much more extenfive and formidable nature, than any which have ever been attempted against the British empire in India fince the hour of its first foundation. 88. While the magnitude and danger of thefe defigns were gradually difclofed, I had the fatisfaction to feel that the means of averting them were augmenting in a proportion nearly equal, by the fuccels of the negociations at Hydrabad, and by the advance of the military preparations, which I had ordered, throughout your poffeffions. 89. At the commencement of the month of February, the crifis arrived in which I was called upon to form my ultimate decifion on the important queftion at iffue with Tippoo Sultaun, and to determine the final refult of the whole fyftem of my measures, 90. On the one hand, the apparent establishment of the French army in Egypt, and the uncertainty of the fate of our naval power in the Red Sea, rendered the danger ftill urgent from that quarter; while Tippoo Sultaun's repeated evasions of my propofals for negociation, combined with his embally to the executive directory of France, under the conduct of M. Dubuc, appear ed ed to preclude all hope of detaching the fultaun from his recent alliance with the enemy. On the other hand, I now poffeffed ample means of fruftrating the most dangerous effects of that alliance, by a feafon able application of the powerful force, which the treachery and aggreffion of the fultaun had compelled me to collect at a heavy expenfe to your finances. 91. Your honourable court will determine, whether, in this ftate of affairs, my orders of the 3d of February, were premature, and whether Ifhould have been juftified, on the 13th of February, in recalling thofe orders, for the purpofe of admitting, at that late period, a negociation, which would have enabled Tippoo Sultaun to defeat every object of the armament of the allies for the prefent feason, and would have afforded him ample time to reap the full benefit of his connection with France, before the season for befieging his capital should return. 92. In deciding thefe important queftions, you will neceffarily confider what degree of reliance was to be placed on the fincerity of the fultaun's difpofition to conclude an amicable adjustment with your government, at the very moment when he had actually dispatched, on an embafly to the executive directory of France, the commander of the French troops raised in the Mauritius, and admitted into the fultaun's fervice, for the exprefs purpose of carrying on a war of aggreffion against your poffeffions in India. 93. The admirable condition of your armies on both coafts, and the unequalled perfection of their equipment in every department, added to the extraordinary fpirit and animation with which the campaign has been opened, afford every reaon to hope, that the iffue of the war will be speedily and profperous, and that it muft terminate in a confiderable reduction of Tippo Sultaun's refources and power. 94. The wisdom of your honourable court will anticipate the extenfive benefits which must result to your interefts, from an event now become effential to the peace and fecurity of your poffeffions in India. 95. The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not to maintain Tippoo Sultaun's power in fuch a state as fhould leave him a conftant object of alarm and apprehenfion to the company: that he has been juftly fo confidered for fome years paft, cannot be doubted by any perfon acquainted with the records of any of your governments in India. The prefent is the fecond crifis within the last three years, in which the government-general has thought it necessary to affemble the army on the coaft of Coromandel, for the fole purpose of checking his motions; and the apprehenfion of his intentions has obftructed our operations against our European enemies in India during the course of our prefent war. 96. The continuance of Tippoo's power on its actual scale, and under fuch circumftances, muft have pro ved to the company a perpetual fource of folicitude, expenfe, and hazard. But the engagement which he has contracted with the French, the public proofs which he has given of his eagerness to receive in Myfore as large a force as they can furnifh, combined with the prodigious magnitude of their preparations, and the incredible progrefs of their arms, evidently directed to the deftruction of the British power in India, form Q 4 new new and prominent features in our political fituation in this quarter of the world. 97. Admitting the wifdom of that policy, which dictated the prefervation of Tippoo Sultaun's power, at the clofe of the laft war with Myfore, the fpirit of our prefent councils must be accommodated to the variation of circumstances, and to the actual pofition, character, and views of our enemies. 98. In fuch a conjuncture of affairs, I am perfuaded that your honourable court will be of opinion, that no object can be deemed fo urgent, or fo neceffary to the fafety of your poffeffions, as the effectual reduction of the only declared ally of France now exifting among the native powers of India, 99. If Tippoo Sultaun had been difpofed to content himself with the quiet poffeffion of his prefent dominions; if he could have been brought to a fenfe of his own peril in forming a connection with the French, the reprefentations which I addreffed to him would have produced an early and falutary impreffion. Whatever speculative opinions might have been entertained with refpect to his interefts, views, and power, the juftice and moderation of the British government would never have difturbed his tranquillity. But he refolved to attempt the recovery of his loft dominions, at the hazard of those which he ftill retains; and in the ardour of his paffionate purfuit, he overlooked not only the certain deftruction of his own independence, the inevitable confequence even of the moft profperous fuccefs of any alliance. with France, but also the predominant influence of the English Eaft India company, which would detect his treachery, and turn against his own empire the ruin which he had meditated against theirs. 100. The fecrecy of his councils, the promptitude of his refources, his conftant and active ftate of equip ment-for war, added to the facility of his intercourfe with the French through his remaining territories on the coaft of Malabar, form the most dangerous circumftances in the actual condition of his power and dominion, and conftitute his principal means of offence. 101. Iffuccefs fhould attend your arms in this war, I entertain a firm confidence that thofe dangers will either be wholly averted, or fo confiderably diminished, as to afford to your government in India the profpect of durable fecurity and genuine peace. 102. I cannot clofe this letter without repeating to your honourable court the cordial expreffions of my entire fatisfaction in the zealous and honourable co-operation of lord Clive, as well as of all the members of this government. The beneficial effect of their cheerful and ready concurrence, in forwarding all my views, is manifeft in the rapid pro grefs and perfect completion of the equipments of the army in the field, and furnishes a ftriking and falutary example of the ineftimable advantages of unanimity and concord among your fervants in India. I have the honour to be, honourable firs, with the greatest respect, Your most obedient Fort St. George, 20th March, 1799. Copy |