The legislature intended only to relax the navigation law, where the circumstances of the war obliged them; and to allow the only intercourse which could be devised with the enemy; leaving all other trade under the monopoly of the British ship owner. The Second Order of November 11, is founded upon this statute, and although the preamble mis-states the law, the Order itself only give power to import from hostile countries. So far the mistake is not very material, and the proceeding is sufficiently legal in substance, however slovenly in its form. But by the First Order of November 11, especially when coupled with the Second additional Order, November 25, although no permission whatever is given, or could be given, in any of the orders, to import from neutral or friendly ports in foreign vessels of a different country, yet the most express directions are issued for bringing into British ports, vessels so trading, and in certain cases, for entering and landing their whole cargoes. The Second Order of November 11, gives, indeed, the option to all neutrals warned into our ports, of importing their cargoes if they please, but adds, "under the conditions prescribed by law," and as the law positively prohibits the importation now in question, the most fa

vorable interpretation of the clause is, to suppose that it is not meant to reach this case. If it is, the permission is utterly illegal, and whether it is intended to be given or not, the other orders compelling such importations to be made, are directly and grossly unlawful. The navigation law says, Americans shall not import goods from Prussia into England. The crown has no power by 43 Geo. III. c. 153, to suspend this law by any Order in Council. Yet Orders and Instructions are issued forcing all Americans laden with Prussian goods whithersoever they may be sailing, to come into some English port, to enter and land their cargoes. Upon this act of violent usurpation over the laws, which the crown has been advised to attempt, all further commentary is superfluous.

The illegality of the new system of Or ders being quite manifest, a Bill of Indemnity will be necessary; and Parliament may then determine whether this illegal act is justified by any such urgency, in point of time, as prevented a delay until Parliament should assemble. In this view of the case, it may be worth while to remember that a further prorogation took place about a month after the first Orders were issued.

D

There are, indeed, various reasons for refusing such an Act of Indemnity as soon as the King's Ministers may apply for it. If a temporary pressure of circumstances had rendered some deviation from a particular law, or even some infringement upon the general spirit of the Constitution absolutely necessary, and Government had, for the mean while, and as if sensible of the illegality of their proceedings, issued orders upon the face of them temporary like the emergency; the Parliament in its justice might have granted them that indemnity which they respectfully asked. But here is a new system of Royal enactment of executive legislation-a Privy council Code promulgated by some half dozen individuals (for as such only the law knows them) upon principles utterly repugnant to the whole theory and practice of the Constitution—a full grown Cabinet Satute book, not authorising any single and temporary proceeding, but prescribing general rules for a length of time; dispensing with the laws of the land in some points; adding to them in others; in not a few instances annulling them. It is an entire new Law-merchant for England during war, proclaimed by the court, not of Parliament, but of St. James's,

with as much regard to the competent autho rities, or to the rightful laws of the realm, as the Rescripts of the latter Roman Empe-. ror. It is not such a daring attempt as this that should be sanctioned by the Parliament, against whose authority it is levelled.

But the Ministers, should they obtain an Indemnity, may now come forward, and propose to carry their new system into effect by a regular act of the legislature. It will then be for Parliament to consider whether they can by one deed of theirs overthrow the most ancient and best established principles of the British Constitution. The statute may indeed have all the formalities of law-it may supply the solemnity which the illegal orders now want. But repugnant as it must be to the genuine spirit of our Government, men may perhaps look for the substance of the English law rather in those fundamental maxims of our jurisprudence which it will have supplanted. All the proofs formerly adduced to illustrate the unconstitutional nature of the late Orders, form in truth insurmountable objections to any measure which may be proposed for erecting them into laws, unless indeed some paramount and permanent reasons of expediency

can be urged, for enterprizing so mighty an innovation upon the constitution of the state. These reasons we shall now have occasion to discuss, in examining the policy of the new system.

III. Are the late Orders in Council consistent with sound policy?

The late Orders are so exceedingly confused, they deliver the regulations intended to be established with so little arrangement, and in some instances prescribe rules so manifestly contradictory to each other, that it is not very easy to collect from them the precise nature of the new system. As an example of direct contradictions may be cited the Second order Nov. 11, and the Second order Nov. 25. In the former, sugar, coffee, wine, brandy, snuff and tobacco, are mentioned as among the articles which neutrals may import into the United Kingdom from enemy's ports; but must re-export under certain regulations. The latter order lays down these regulations, but substitutes cotton for tobacco; so that it remained a doubt how tobacco could be re-exported, although it was still re-exportable and then in the Order Dec. 18. a general prohibition of all imports, direct from