evading the French decrees, no Americans will trade to Europe through Man, Guernsey, and Jersey. The American cannot pursue. her voyage to or from the south of Europe, by touching at Malta and Gibraltar; but must go first to a British or Irish port, and afterwards return thither. This illustration comprehends the only material features of the new system, viz. its forcing all the neutral commerce to run through the ports of the United Kingdom; its giving the English Government a command of the supply of cotton, and some smaller articles, as brandies, wines, European snuff and tobacco; and its stopping the exportation of all enemy's West India produce, except cotton, cochineal, and Indigo, either to this Country or to any restricted part of Europe. It is upon these points that the policy of the measure must be tried. Supposing, therefore, that the Americans remain neutral, and obey our orders in council, what do we gain? We do not destroy the enemy's trade, unless he chuses to enforce his decree against us; and in that case we destroy our whole trade at once, except only the trade with America and our allies-in other words, the same circumstances which enable us to destroy the trade of the restricted countries, must destroy our whole foreign European commerce. Which party will suffer most by such an event? Surely the party which depends most on commerce-not France and Spain, of whose resources trade forms so trifling a part, and which have the whole internal commerce of the Continent secure from all our Orders of Council; but England, whose trade is the great support of her wealth, and which exists as a powerful nation by selling to and buying from the states of the Continent. Admitting that we can enforce our decrees most rigorously, Holland, France, Denmark, and Prussia, will no longer trade with each other by sea; nor with America and England at all. will lose their trade with us, and retain their trade by land with each other; we shall at once lose our whole trade with each of them, and consequently suffer seven times more' than any one of them. We shall retain our American trade; but that must be diminished in a great degree by the loss of her European trade which America will have sustained. Surely the wit of man could not have invented a contest more favourable to the enemy than this. It is laying down our weapons and fighting him with his own; it is putting the dispute between us upon the very . They ground which he must chuse; it is like a dwarf agreeing to strive with a giant, standon the same level: it is as if we should consent to burn our whole navy, provided France burned all her's; whereby we should give up a thousand ships to deprive her of fifty. But can we enforce even this bad bargain? France may with much greater certainty prevent ships from entering her ports than we can stop them on their voyage. She may cut off the trade from England to the Continent by means of neutrals; but we shall find it impossible to suspend all direct intercourse between those neutrals and the Continent. While, therefore, the part of the new system most hurtful to us is sure of being established if the enemy pleases, the prohibitions which we impose on his foreign trade cannot with equal certainty be enforced. We shall destroy his trade with ourselves, in order to cut off his direct trade with neutrals; but he will retain a part of this trade in spite of all we can do; and unless he feels it for his advantage will not trade with neutrals through us. A strict and general blockade of the enemy's ports, is at least an intelligible and consistent measure. It cuts off his foreign trade entirely, although it deprives us of our trade with him; and if commercial distress can ruin him, such a proceeding gives us some chance of effecting his downfall. But the new system is only a blockade of the enemy, if the enemy himself chuses that it shall be so. It can never, by possibility ruin him, or even materially injure his commerce: For the moment he is pinched, he can relieve himself. He can allow neutrals to enter his own ports, from those of Great Britain; and thus obtain as large a share of foreign commerce as he desires*. These neutral carriers, it is true, must land and re-ship in England certain cargoes; and many, (but not by any means all) of these voyages will be somewhat more circuitious than formerly. An American bound to Bordeaux, must touch at Cork, Falmouth, &c. which is somewhat out of her course; if bound to Dunkirk, Amsterdam, &c. she would probably touch at Cowes from choice, to receive advices respecting the market from London correspendents. Admitting that some considerable inconvenience arises from hence, in all cases on an average; the whole ef * It is confidently reported that some relaxation of the French [Decree, has already been allowed in Holland, though this does not appear very likely. fect is to raise the prices of the neutral goods a little to the enemy, and to lower somewhat the profits of the neutral, without any gain whatever to ourselves. Our friends and our enemies lose each a little, and we gain nothing at all. The obligation to land certain cargoes can do us no more real good. It increases some→ what the loss of the neutral and the enemy, and may enable us to keep a few more customhouse officers. If indeed, the orders in council are followed up by an act of Parliament, imposing duties on the goods so landed, then we clearly shall propose to ourselves, not certainly to distress the enemy's trade, but to profit both by his commerce and that of our friends. Would it not be a much simpler expedient, and answer the very same purpose, to propose that America should pay us a yearly tribute, and to raise it as she best can, either upon her own citizens, or her French customers? If the duty which we mean to lay on is not the merest trifle, we may be well assured that America will not submit to it. It may be said that France left us no choice. in this matter; that she began by interdicting all trade between England and the continent, through neutrals; and that had no Orders in Council been issued by us, we should still have |