violent operation of the new system, and the difficulty of exporting them-while on the return of peace, another change equally violent and sudden would drive part of the same manufacture into foreign countries.—To imagine that the orders will prevent raw cotton from reaching France, is very absurd: They. do not even profess any such thing. If they did, the merchants of this country would be the first to pray that so enormous a load of cotton might be taken off their hands, and a chance afforded them of sending it to the continent.

. So much for the blockade as it is to affect the enemy. Now as to the relief of our West India body-it must be observed that cotton, cochineal, and indigo may still be imported through America, and every care is taken in the orders that the cotton once imported shall remain as a dead weight in the British market. But passing over this part of the regulations, what can our planters gain by the stoppage of French colonial trade, if at the same time France stops all imports of British West India produce into the continent? We grow more sugar in our own settlements by one half than we can consume at home. Can it be expected that all this quantity, or nearly the whole, will find its way

over in spite of the enemy's restraints upon our trade? Then, will no prizes be taken? Will no vessels attempting to elude our decrees be brought into British ports? The cargoes of these must be imported, and subjected both to the restrictions of our own Orders, and to the prohibitions of the enemy's Decrees. They will augment still farther the glut of the home market. Of those which try to escape our vigilance, some will succeed, and thus supplying in part the demand of the continent, diminish our chance of forcing the enemy to receive our produce. But the trade of Brazil too will now be laid open, and all the sugar which used to supply Portugal, part of the Mediterranean, and even to find its way into the north of Europe, will now be brought direct to England. The smuggling between the enemy's colonies and Brazil will increase this quantity, in proportion as the interruption of the American trade with the enemy is effectually enforced; and it will be no easy matter to prevent such a contraband on coasts so extensive. Indeed, by the present orders, the whole produce of the enemy's islands may be carried first to North America and thence to Brazil, from whence, as there is no possibi

lity of distinguishing it from Brazil produce, it must come to this country; and no conceivable restrictions can prevent this, unless we chuse to decree that our allies in Brazil shall have no trade with America, and none with ourselves, or the rest of Europe*.

Supposing, however, that these, insuperable obstacles did not stand in the way of an immediate relief to the British planters, this relief can only be temporary; for the produce which we prevent the enemy's colonies from exporting, must be heaped up there, and come over to Europe, at a peace, to the final destruction of our planters. We allow them to receive supplies of provisions; we know that rather than throw sugar lands out of cultivation, planters will bear years of clear loss on their estates: can we expect then any other effect from the most compleat success of our plan, than a temporary rise of rise of sugars, and a subsequent glut of the market increased

By the strict letter of the Orders, hostile colonial pro duce may be carried through America, to the ports of allied powers in Europe, and from thence to the restricted countries; so that the blockade of the enemy's colonies is, strictly speaking, not at all enforced. But as this is the clear intent of the Order, December, 18, the question is argued as if some supplementary restrictions had been made.

in the same proportion, as soon as peace comes, or the blockade is raised? Nó measure could be devised more effectual for per petuating the evils that now oppress the planters, and preventing them from applying the only possible remedy, viz. diminishing the cultivation of the great West Indian staples,

The interruption of the trade which the Americans carry on with the Spanish colonies is somewhat greater than may at first appear. They are not only prevented from importing more of the consumable produce of those settlements, than is sufficient for the home market: they are also, though indirectly, prevented from employing the greater part of the bullion which they obtain from thence. This bullion is carried by them to the East Indies and China, and purchases the manufactures of those countries, with which the Americans supply the greater part of Europe. The monopoly of our East India company prevents them from importing those goods into this country, and the Orders in Council, of course, neither do nor can permit such an importation. The Americans, therefore, can no longer supply the continent with India goods. But it is the sale of those goods

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which enables them to pay for our commodities; so that by checking their carrying trade to the Spanish main and the East Indies, we in fact destroy a great part of our own market. The same operation, cannot fail to injure exceedingly our Asiatic possessions. While the company's monopoly prevents the capital of this country from finding its way thither, the Americans have, as a matter of necessity, not of choice, been allowed to supply its place, to the incalculable benefit of those fine settlements. Are the same men who cut off this necessary resource, prepared to throw open the East India tradę? If not, (and surely no one would recommend such a step as a temporary expedient—a war measure adopted on the spur of the occasion) then the Orders in Council, here as every where else, though pointed against neutrals, and professing to aim at the enemy, in fact hit only ourselves.

In arguing this part of the question, care has purposely been taken to put the case as much as possible, on the plainest and narrowest views of national advantage, that no one might impute to the adversaries of the new system any disposition to refinement, or suppose that the proofs of its impolicy rested upon spe