Per Lord Chancellor. Where there is an incomplete agreement for a mortgage, the court, after the death of the party, has given a fpecific lien. 2 Vef. jun. 582. Burn v. Burn. 1798.

A

Libel.

(A) What is a Libel.

Libellous letter addreffed to the party himself, though it may be the object of an indictment, as tending to incite the plaintiff to a breach of the peace, is not actionable. To entitle the party to an action it must be addreffed to a third perfon. 2 Efp. Rep. 625.

2. It is not a libel for the editor of a public newspaper to comment fairly on any place of public entertainment, or on any public performer. Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. Rep. 28. Aliter if done falfely and malicioufly. Ib.

3. If a member of parliament publifh his fpeech in the newfpapers, and it contain charges of a flanderous nature against any individual, an information will lie against him for a libel. Rex v. Lord Abingdon, 1 Esp. Rep. 226.

4. A paragraph in one newspaper charging another with being vulgar or fcurrilous, is not a libel. But if it affert of fuch other newspaper that it is low in circulation, as addreffed to perfons who may be difpofed to advertise in it, it is a libel. Heriot v. Stuart, 1 Efp. Rep. 437.

5. A report in a newspaper of what paffed in court in a cause, is not a libel. Curry v. Walter, 1 E/p. Rep. 456.

6. An obfcene book is punishable as a libel. Rex v. Curl, 2 Stra. 789. 4 Burr. 2527.

7. To infert a paragraph in a newspaper of a tradesman, tending to difcredit him in his bufinefs, is a libel for which he may maintain an action. Harman v. Delany, 2 Stra. 898.

8. If the contents of a libel are true, the court will not grant an information, but will leave it to the ordinary course of justice before a grand jury. Rex v. Bickerton, 1 Stra. 498.

9. Though a libel tend to a breach of the peace, yet it is not an actual breach of the peace; and therefore a member of parliament writing a feditious libel, is entitled to his privilege from being arrested for the fame. Rex v. Wilkes, 2 Wilf. 149.

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15 Vin. 84.

As to when the profecuvate liber

tor for a pri

mut deny the charge

made in it upon oath, to induce the court to grant an information, and when he need not, vide Res v. Miles, Dug. 284. Rex v. Hafwell, ib. 387. and the cafes there cited. Rex v. Pearce, ib. 39o n. Rex v. Webster, 3 T. R. 388.

10. To print of any perfon taa, he is a fwindler, is a libel and

actionable. 1 T. R. 748.

11. Whatever tends to make a man ridiculous, or to hinder men from affociating with him, is a libel. Villers v. Monfley, 2 Wilf. 403. Rex v. Benfield, 2 Burr. 980. 12. Though the perfon upon whom the libel is written be dead, it is still a libel, and punishable as fuch. Rex v. Topham, 4 T. R. 126.

15 Vin. 89. (D) What is the diftinct Power of the Court, and of the Jury, as to Libels.

15 Vin.co.

I.

1. UPON information for printing and publishing a feditious libel, the jury found the defendant guilty of printing and publishing ONLY; whereupon a ven. fac. de novo was ordered. Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661.

2. By 32 Geo. 3. c. 60. on the trial of an indictment for a libel, the jury may give a general verdict upon the whole matter in iflue, and thall not be required by the court to find the defendant guilty, merely on proof of the publication, and of the fenfe afcribed to it in the information; but the court fhall give their opinion and direction on the matter in iffue, as in other criminal cafes; and the jury may find a special verdict; but defendants may move in arreft of judgment, as before paffing this act.

3. On the trial of an indictment for a libel, the only questions for the confideration of the jury are the fact of the publishing, and the truth of the innuendoes, Whether the subject matter be or be not a libel is a question of law for the confideration of the court. R. v. the Dean of St. Afaph, M. 25 G. 3. 3 T. R. 428. n., and R. v. Withers, 3 T. R. 428. (But fee ftat. 32 G. 3. c. 60. above cited, and the opinion of Kenyon Ch. J. in R. v. Holt, 5 T. R, 436.

UPON

(E) Pleadings.

an information for writing and publishing a libel, of and concerning the king's government, and the employment of his troops, (fetting forth the libel verbatim), the words "of and concerning" are a fufficient introduction of the matter contained in the libel, and a fufficient averment that it was written "of and concerning the king's government and the employment of his troops." Rex v. Horne, 2 Corp. 672.

2. The gift of every charge of every libel, confifts in the perfon or matter, of and concerning whom or which, the words are averred to be faid or written.

Ib.

3. All circumstances neceffary to constitute the crime must be fet out. Ib.

4. Where the writing is fo clear as to amount of itself to a libel, all foreign circumftances introduced upon the record are unneceffary. 16.

5. Where

5. Where the libel does not in itself contain the crime without extrinfic aid, fuch extrinfic matter must be put upon the record by averments. If new matter, by way of introduction; if matter of explanation, only by way of innuendo. Ib.

6. After verdict, in an action for a libel, the judgment was arrested, because it was not laid that the libel was of or concerning the plaintiff. Lowfield v. Bancroft, 2 Stra. 934.

7. The publication must be ftated in the declaration; but it may be collected from the whole of it, and requires no technical form of words. 2 Bl. Rep. 1037.

8. In an action for a libel, written in a foreign language, the plaintiff must fet forth the libel in the original; and if he only fet out a tranflation of it, the court will arreft the judgment. Zenobio v. Axtell, 6 T. R. 162.

9. An indictment or information for a libel need not charge the offence to have been committed vi et armis, or allege that the libellous matter is falfe. Rex v. Burks, 7 T. R. 4.

10. An indictment for publishing libellous matter, reflecting on the memory of a dead perfon, not alleging that it was done with a defign to bring contempt on the family of the deceased, to ftir up the hatred of the king's fubjects against them, cannot be Supported. Rex v. Topham, 4 T. R. 126.

(F) Publication. What.

1. EVIDENCE of buying a libel, in the shop of a known common bookfeller and publisher, (especially when it imports to be printed for him) is fufficient prima facie evidence (if believed, and not contradicted) to convict him of publishing it. Rex v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2687 to 2690.

2. Proof that the defendant gave a bond to the stamp-office for the duties on the advertisements in a newspaper, under the ftat, 29 G. 3. c. 50. f. 1o., and had occafionally applied at the ftampoffice refpecting the duties, is evidence that he is a publisher. Rex v. Topham, 4 T. R. 126.

Licence.

(E) Countermandable.

IN general the fame person who gives may revoke a licence; therefore where an incumbent is bound by deed to refide, abfence by leave of the obligee ceases to excufe when the licence is countermanded. It is like a neral licence to enter another's grounds, which may be countermanded at any time. Baghaw v. Bojsley, 4 Term Rep. 82.

15 Vin. 91.

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15 Vin. 94.

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15 Vin. 99.

I.

Timitation.

(A) Time of Limitation.

IN ejectment for mines, plaintiff proving himself lord of the manor, and in poffeffion of it, does not avoid the statute of limitations, if the defendant has been in poffeffion of the mines 20 years; for they are diftinét poffeffions, and may be different inheritances. Rich v. Johnfon, M. 14 G. 2. 2 Stra. 1142.

2. By the ftat. 4 Ann. 16. no entry or claim fhall be fufficient unless an action be profecuted within a year after.

3. To make length of poffeffion a bar under thefe ftatutes, it must be a poffeffion adverse to the title of the true owner, and not length of poffeffion during a particular eftate. Cowp. 28.

4. Particular times of limitation are frequently appointed by ftatute, different from those in common cafes; as, in actions against juftices of the peace, conftables, headboroughs, &c. which, by 24 Geo. 2. c. 44. f. 8., must be commenced within fix months; and in actions againft officers of the excife or customs, &c. which, by 23 Geo. 3. c. 70. 34., must be commenced within three months after the act committed.

15Vin. 106. (B) Prevented as to real Actions. By what Acts.

I.
1. THE
HE poffeffion of one tenant in common, eo nomine, as te-
nant in common, can never bar his companion; because
fuch poffeffion is not adverfe to the right of his companion, but
in fupport of their common title; and by paying him his fhare,
he acknowledges him co-tenant; nor, indeed, is refusal to pay
of itself fufficient, without denying his title. But if upon de-
mand by the co-tenant of his moiety, the other refuses to pay,
and denies his title, faying, he claims the whole, and will not
pay, and continues in poffeflion, fuch poffeffion is adverse and
oufter enough. And in the fame cafe it was held, that a jury
might prefume actual outer from an undisturbed and quiet pof-
feffion for a great length of time, 36 years. Per Lord Manf-
field, in Fiber v. Proffer, Cowp. 218. Vide Efpinase, 456. i Atk.
493. 1 Bl. Rep. 677. 2 ib. 690.

2. Whether the lord's right of entry for a forfeiture be not barred after 20 years by the ftatute of limitations, Qu. Ree d. Tarrant v. Hellier, 3T. R. 172.

(C) Prevented as to perfonal Actions. By what Acts. 15Vin. 106.

•IN affumpfit on a promiffory note, and non affumpfit infra fex

annos pleaded, on the trial it appeared that the defendant was furety in the note for 7. S., and that fix years were elapfed fince the note was given, but that upon demand within the fix years, the defendant faid, "You know I had not any of the money my"felf; but I am willing to pay half of it." The court were of opinion that this promife took it out of the ftatute. Buller's N. P. 149.

2. In affumpfit on a joint and several promiffory note, and the action was against one, who pleaded the ftatute of limitations; payment of intereft by another of the drawers was held a fufficient acknowledgment to take it out of the ftatute as to all, and the plaintiff recovered. Whitcomb v. Whiting, Dougl. 629.

3. Where a joint and feveral promiffory note was given by two in the year 1784, and one became bankrupt, the payee proved the note under his commission and received feveral dividends, the last of which was in the year 1793, a balance remaining unpaid, the prefent action was brought, and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. It was held that the payment of the dividend under the commiffion against one, took the debt out of the ftatute of limitations. Jackfon v. Fairbank, 2 H. Bl. 340.

4. The flightest acknowledgment of a debt has been held fufficient to take a demand out of the ftatute; as to fay, " Prove "your debt and I will pay you;" or, "I am ready to account, "but nothing is due to you." Per Lord Mansfield, Corp. 548. Qu. WheYea v. Fouraker, 2 Burr. 1099.

ther this can be fairly in

terpreted to be an acknowledgment of a debt, even in the fighteft degree.

5. Where to an action of affumpfit, and the ftatute of limitations pleaded, the plaintiff proved, that juft after the bill had been delivered, the defendant met the plaintiff and faid, "What an extravagant bill you have delivered to me." Lord Kenyon ruled this to be a fufficient acknowledgment of fome money being due. Lawrence v. Worrall, Peake's N. P. 93.

6. A latitat fued out within fix years shall be good to prevent the statute from running, though no bill of Middlefex preceding it is fhewn. So a capias is good without an original. Hollifter v. Coulson, 1 Stra. 550. Metcalf v. Burrows, Bull. N. P. 15:.

7. Though the writ fued out has been informal, it shall yet be fufficient. Leadbetter v. Markland, 2 Bl. Rep. 1131. But where the process is impoffible or a nullity, it shall not operate to take the demand out of the ftatute. Green v. Revell, 2 Salk. 421.

8. If the plaintiff has levied a plaint in affumpfit in an inferior court, it shall prevent the ftatute of limitauons from attaching against him, if he aver in his replication above that it is for the fame cause of action. Story v. Atkyns, 2 Stra. 719.