is entitled to our first attention that it do not seduce us from obedience to Him, to whose will the desires of all rulers ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their sceptres ought to submit. If they command any thing against Him, it ought not to have the least attention; nor, in this case, ought we to pay any regard to all the dignity attached to magistrates."

Milton says: "Whatever magistrate takes upon him to act contrary to what St. Paul makes the duty of those that are in authority-i. e. to what is morally lawful and good-that magistrate is not ordained of God, and, consequently, to such a magistracy no subjection is commanded, nor is any due, nor are the people forbidden to resist such authority."

Professor Stuart (I quote his words simply to show that it is not a new principle), in commenting on the very passage of the text, has these words let him reconcile them with what he has since written "The extension of the principles here enjoined, so as to make them imply implicit subjection to the magistrate in cases of a moral nature, where he enjoins what God has plainly forbidden, would be a gross violation of the true principles of Christianity, which demands of us, in all such cases, to obey God rather than man; the apostle himself was a most eminent example of exception to

such a sweeping general principle of civil obedience. It is only when magistrates keep within the bounds ofmoral prescription, that obedience is a duty."

Blackstone, who will not be suspected of theological bias, or weak sentimentalism, has said, in his Commentaries on English Law- "The law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and all times. No human laws are of any validity if contrary to this, and such of them as are valid, derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." He instances, also, offences, "which, if any human law should enjoin us to commit, we are bound to transgress that human law, else we offend both the natural and the divine."

The principle has not only been recognized, but, in all ages, has been practically maintained. Men have gone to prison and to death in their acceptance of it. Some of the noblest deeds that history records were done in view of it. It was tested, of old, in the fiery furnace, and the lions' den. Rather than disobey God at the instance of human law, rather than sacrifice their convictions to their loyalty, men have endured every suffering and wrong, committing themselves and their cause to God. It is a principle which is calling for its martyrs now, and shall not be without them.

And yet how many, in our day and community, wise and good people too, accept it not, at least in a certain application of it. It is looked upon with suspicion and fear. It is denounced as impracticable and dangerous. The doctrine of a "higher law" than that of the Constitution, in civil matters, obtains but little currency among us. Nay, it has been ridiculed in our popular assemblies; it has been reviled by our leading statesmen; it has been preached against from our pulpits. In churches standing on pilgrim ground, it has been said that we are to have no conscience in these matters, or such only as comports with obedience to the State, -no individual and private conscience, but only a sort of collective and public one, that the laws of the land are, at all events, to be obeyed; that the Union is every thing; and that the sacred sentiments of justice and humanity are to be violated for the sake of its preservation.

I confess, brethren, I stand aghast at such views — in perfect amazement that they find the adoption which they do. I respect, in many cases, the individuals who promulgate them, but I can have no respect for the views. They are to me unchristian and atheistic. A few years ago, the religious portion of our community was alive with alarm at the promulgation of what it deemed most harmful heresy, with regard to the external authority of the Bible. But here, it seems to me, is a heresy to be dreaded

with a tenfold greater dread,—a heresy which strikes, as I view it, not at the external authority, but at the very life of the Bible, the supreme authority of its eternal principles. I call in question no one's motives. I pass no judgment upon men, but only upon views and doctrines; and upon these I am bound to pass judgment, taking God's Word in my hand, and interpreting it by whatever light He may vouchsafe to me; and if I deem them false and evil, I have no option but to declare it.

I know very well that it is easier to state a principle than to apply it; and that, to many minds, there are objections to the application of this now set forth, which seem to them weighty and insuperable. It may be replied, that if the principle be a true one, it must, therefore, be a practicable one; and that we have no right to suffer the apprehension of evil, as the possible result of its application, or the certainty of it, to lead us to question its rightness, or to flinch from its application. It is a principle which rests not on the calculations of expediency, but in the fact of God's moral attributes, and our relation to him as moral beings. We have not proved its rightness by showing it to be profitable, though we might assume its profitableness in showing it to be right. Right is always practicable, and it is always profitable, — certainly in the highest sense, and in the great result. But let us look at some of the more prominent

objections which lie against the application of this principle, and the apprehended evils they assume, as we hear them continually set forth.

The principle is, that we are bound to obey the requisitions of human law, except where they conflict with the law of God, as made known in our souls and in his Word; that we are bound by an authority higher than its own, to do, in all cases and always, what is therein proclaimed to us as right. "But,” it is said, "if you allow each individual to judge for himself what is right, and obey or disobey according to his judgment, you open the door, at once, to the worst of social evils and disorders; one man may deem this law iniquitous, another that, until, in the diversities of moral judgments, there may be no law which shall command a universal obedience, and society be reduced to a state of confusion and anarchy." The answer is, that this is supposing a result which we do not know will occur, which is not likely to occur. The human conscience is not so uncertain a guide as it is thus assumed to be; the law of Right is not so indistinctly apprehended. There may be weak consciences, there may be perverted consciences, as we know there are; but these, in every community, will be the exceptions. With the great majority of men, conscience, if not allowed to be blinded and turned aside by sordid and unworthy aims, will pronounce on the great points of