BOOK rations with better hopes of fuccefs. The colony V. 1520. The mea fures ne takes. at Vera Cruz was not only fafe but had remained unmolefted. The people of Zempoalla and the adjacent diftricts had difcovered no fymptoms of defection. The Tlafcalans continued faithful to their alliance. On their martial fpirit, eafily roufed to arms, and inflamed with implacable hatred of the Mexicans, Cortes depended for powerful aid. He had ftill the command of a body of Spaniards, equal in number to that with which he had opened his way into the centre of the empire, and had taken poffeffion of the capital; fo that with the benefit of greater experience, as well as more perfect knowledge of the country, he did not despair of quickly recovering all that he had been deprived of by untoward events. FULL of this idea, he courted the Tlafcalan chiefs with fuch attention, and diftributed among them fo liberally the rich fpoils of Otumba, that he was fecure of obtaining whatever he should require of the republic. He drew a fmall fupply of ammunition, and two or three field-pieces from his ftores at Vera Cruz. He dispatched an officer of confidence with four fhips of Narvaez's fleet to Hifpaniola and Jamaica, to engage adventurers, and to purchase horses, gunpowder, and other military ftores. As he knew that it V. 1520. would be vain to attempt the reduction of BOOK Mexico, unless he could fecure the command of the lake, he gave orders to prepare, in the mountains of Tlafcala, materials for building twelve brigantines, fo as they might be carried thither in pieces ready to be put together, and launched when he ftood in need of their fervice". fpirit of his BUT while, with provident attention, he was Mutinous taking those neceffary steps towards the execu- troops. tion of his measurés, an obftacle arose in a quarter where it was leaft expected, but most formidable. The spirit of difcontent and mutiny broke out in his own army. Many of Narvaez's followers were planters rather than foldiers, and had accompanied him to New Spain with fanguine hopes of obtaining fettlements, but with little inclination to engage in the hardships and dangers of war. As the fame motives had induced them to enter into their new engagements with Cortes, they no fooner became acquainted with the nature of the fervice, than they bitterly repented of their choice. Such of them as had the good fortune to furvive the perilous adventures in which their own imprudence had involved them, happy in having made Cortes Relat. p. 253. E. D 4 Gomara Cron. c. 117. BOOK their efcape, trembled at the thoughts of being V. 1520. Means he employs to confidence. expofed a fecond time to fimilar calamities.. THAT the malcontents might have no leifure revive their to brood over the caufes of their difaffection, he refolved inftantly to call forth his troops into action. He propofed to chaftife the people of Tepeaca for the outrage which they had committed, and as the detachment which they had cut off happened to be compofed moftly of foldiers who had ferved under Narvaez, their companions, companions, from the defire of vengeance, BOOK V. 1520. engaged the more willingly in this war. He took the command in perfon, accompanied by Auguft. a numerous body of Tlafcalans, and in the space of a few weeks, after various encounters, with great flaughter of the Tepeacans, reduced that province to fubjection. During several months, while he waited for the fupplies of men and ammunition which he expected, and was carrying on his preparations for conftructing the brigantines, he kept his troops conftantly employed in various expeditions against the adjacent provinces, all of which were conducted with an uniform tenor of fuccefs. By thefe, his men became again accustomed to victory, and refumed their wonted sense of fuperiority; the Mexican power was weakened; the Tlascalan warriors acquired the habit of acting in conjunction with the Spaniards; and the chiefs of the republic de lighted to fee their country enriched with the fpoils of all the people around them, and aftonished every day with fresh discoveries of the irresistible prowess of their allies, they declined no effort requifite to support them. ed by feveral ments. ALL thofe preparatory arrangements, how, Strengthenever, though the most prudent and efficacious reinforcewhich the fituation of Cortes allowed him to make, would have been of little avail, without a reinforce V. 1520. BOOK reinforcement of Spanish foldiers. Of this he was fo deeply fenfible, that it was the chief object of his thoughts and wishes; and yet his only profpect of obtaining it from the return of the officer whom he had fent to the ifles to folicit aid, was both diftant and uncertain. But what neither his own fagacity nor power could have procured, he owed to a series of fortunate and unforeseen incidents. The governor of Cuba, to whom the fuccefs of Narvaez appeared an event of infallible certainty, having fent two fmall fhips after him with new instructions, and a supply of men and military stores, the officer whom Cortes had appointed to command on the coaft, artfully decoyed them into the harbour of Vera Cruz, feized the veffels, and eafily perfuaded the foldiers to follow the ftandard of a more able leader than him whom they were deftined to join ". Soon after, three ships of more confiderable force came into the harbour separately. Thefe belonged to an armament fitted out by Francifco de Garay, governor of Jamaica, who, being poffeffed with the rage of discovery and conqueft which animated every Spaniard fettled in America, had long aimed at intruding into some district of New Spain, and dividing with Cortes the glory and gain of n B, Diaz, c. 131. annexing |