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vaez, more folicitous to gratify the refentment BOOK of Velafquez, than attentive to the honour or intereft of his country, had begun his intercourse with the natives, by representing him and his followers as fugitives and outlaws, guilty of rebellion against their own fovereign, and of injustice in invading the Mexican empire; and had declared that his chief object in vifiting the country was to punish the Spaniards who had committed these crimes, and to rescue the Mexicans from oppreffion. He foon perceived that the fame unfavourable representations of his character and actions had been conveyed to Montezuma, and that Narvaez had found means to affure him, that as the conduct of those who kept him under restraint was highly displeasing to the king his master, he had it in charge not only to rescue an injured monarch from confinement, but to reinftate him in the poffeffion of his ancient power and independence. Animated with this prospect of being fet free from fubjection to strangers, the Mexicans in feveral provinces began openly to revolt from Cortes, and to regard Narvaez as a deliverer no lefs able than willing to fave them. Montezuma himfelf kept up a fecret intercourse with the new commander, and feemed to court him as a perfon fuperior in power and dignity to those Spaniards

B 2

BOOK Spaniards whom he had hitherto revered as the first of men'.

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1520.

His delibe

rations con

cwn con

duc.

SUCH were the various afpects of danger and cerning his difficulty which prefented themselves to the view of Cortes. No fituation can be conceived more trying to the capacity and firmness of a general, or where the choice of the plan which ought to be adopted was more difficult. If he fhould wait the approach of Narvaez in Mexico, deftruction feemed to be unavoidable; for while the Spaniards preffed him from without, the inhabitants, whofe turbulent spirit he could hardly reftrain with all his authority and attention, would eagerly lay hold on fuch a favourable opportunity of avenging all their wrongs. If he fhould abandon the capital, fet the captive monarch at liberty, and march out to meet the enemy; he must at once forego the fruits of all his toils and victories, and relinquish advantages which could not be recovered without extraordinary efforts, and infinite danger. If, inftead of employing force, he fhould have recourfe to conciliating measures, and attempt an accommodation with Narvaez; the natural haughtiness of that officer, augmented by con

a See NOTE I,

sciousness

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sciousness of his present fuperiority, forbad him в OOK to cherish any fanguine hope of fuccefs. After revolving every scheme with deep attention, Cortes fixed upon that which in execution was most hazardous, but, if fuccefsful, would prove moft beneficial to himself and to his country; and with the decifive intrepidity fuited to defperate fituations, determined to make one bold effort for victory under every disadvantage, rather than facrifice his own conquefts and the Spanish intereft in Mexico.

ations with

ers of Nar

vaez.

BUT though he forefaw that the conteft muft His negoci. be terminated finally by arms, it would have the followbeen not only indecent, but criminal, to have marched against his countrymen, without attempting to adjust matters by an amicable negociation. In this fervice he employed Olmedo, his chaplain, to whose character the function was well fuited, and who poffeffed, befides, fuch prudence and addrefs as qualified him to carry on the fecret intrigues in which Cortes placed his chief confidence. Narvaez rejected, with fcorn, every scheme of accommodation that Olmedo propofed, and was with difficulty reftrained from laying violent hands on him and his attendants. He met, however, with a more favourable reception among the followers of Narvaez, to many of whom he delivered letters,

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BOOK either from Cortes or his officers, their ancient friends and companions, Cortes artfully accompanied these with presents of rings, chains of gold, and other trinkets of value, which inspired those needy adventurers with high ideas of the wealth that he had acquired, and with envy of their good fortune who were engaged in his service. Some, from hopes of becoming sharers in those rich spoils, declared for an immediate accommodation with Cortes. Others, from public fpirit, laboured to prevent a civil war, which, whatever party fhould prevail, must shake, and perhaps fubvert the Spanish power, in a country where it was fo imperfectly established. Narvaez difregarded both, and by a public proclamation denounced Cortes and his adherents rebels and enemies to their country. Cortes, it is probable, was not much furprised at the untractable arrogance of Narvaez; and, after having given fuch a proof of his own paci fic difpofition as might justify his recourse to other means, he determined to advance towards an enemy whom he had laboured in vain to appease.

Marches against him. May.

He left a hundred and fifty men in the capital, under the command of Pedro de Alvarado, an officer of distinguished courage, for whom the Mexicans had conceived a fingular degree of

respect,

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refpect. To the custody of this flender garrifon BOOK he committed a great city, with all the wealth he had amaffed, and, what was still of greater importance, the person of the imprisoned monarch. His utmost art was employed in con cealing from Montezuma the real caufe of his march. He laboured to perfuade him, that the trangers who had lately arrived were his friends and fellow-fubjects; and that, after a fhort interview with them, they would depart together, and return to their own country. The captive prince, unable to comprehend the designs of the Spaniards, or to reconcile what he now heard with the declarations of Narvaez, and afraid to discover any symptom of fufpicion or distrust of Cortes, promised to remain quietly in the Spanish quarters, and to cultivate the fame friendship with Alvarado which he had uniformly maintained with him. Cortes, with feeming confidence in this promife, but relying principally upon the injunctions which he had given Alvarado to guard his prifoner with the most scrupulous vigilance, fet out for Mexico. :

his troops.

His ftrength, even after it was reinforced by Number of the junction of Sandoval and the garrison of Vera Cruz, did not exceed two hundred and fifty men. As he hoped for success chiefly from the rapidity of his motions, his troops were not