BOOK

V.

1521. May 10.

Mexicans

attack the

As Alvarado and Olid proceeded towards the pofts affigned them, they broke down the aqueducts which the ingenuity of the Mexicans had erected for conveying water into the capital, and by the distress to which this reduced the inhabitants, gave a beginning to the calamities which they were deftined to fuffer. Alvarado and Olid found the towns of which they were ordered to take poffeffion deferted by their inhabitants, who had fled for fafety to the capital, where Guatimozin had collected the chief force of his empire, as there alone he could hope to make a fuccessful stand against the formidable enemies who were approaching to affault him.

THE firft effort of the Mexicans was to destroy brigantines. the fleet of brigantines, the fatal effects of whose operations they forefaw and dreaded. Though the brigantines, after all the labour and merit of Cortes in forming them, were of inconfiderable bulk, rudely constructed, and manned chiefly with landmen, hardly poffeffed of skill enough to conduct them, they must have been objects of terror to a people unacquainted with any navigation but that of their lake, and pos feffed of no veffel larger than a canoe. Neceffity,

Cortes Relat. 267. B. B. Diaz. c. 150. Herrera, dec. 3. lib. i. c. 13.

however,

V.

1521.

however, urged Guatimozin to hazard the at- BOOK tack; and hoping to fupply by numbers what he wanted in force, he affembled fuch a multitude of canoes as covered the face of the lake. They rowed on boldly to the charge, while the brigantines, retarded by a dead calm, could Scarcely advance to meet them.

But as the Repulfed.

enemy drew near, a breeze fuddenly sprung up; in a moment the fails were fpread, the brigantines, with the utmost ease, broke through their feeble opponents, overset many canoes, and diffipated the whole armament with fuch flaughter, as convinced the Mexicans, that the progress of the Europeans in knowledge and arts rendered their fuperiority greater on this new element, than they had hitherto found it by land".

plan of con

FROM that time Cortes remained mafter of Singular the lake, and the brigantines not only preferved ducting the a communication between the Spaniards in their fiege. different stations, though at confiderable distance from each other, but were employed to cover the causeways on each fide, and keep off the canoes, when they attempted to annoy the troops as they advanced towards the city. Cortes formed the brigantines in three divifions, ap

h Cortes Relat. 267. C. B. Diaz. c. 150. Gomara Cron. c. 131. Herrera, dec. 3. lib. i. c. 17.

pointing

V.

1521.

BOOK pointing one to cover each of the ftations from which an attack was to be carried on against the city, with orders to second the operations of the officer who commanded there. From all the three stations he pushed on the attack against the city with equal vigour; but in a manner fo very different from the conduct of fieges in regular war, that he himself seems afraid it would appear no lefs improper than fingular, to perfons unacquainted with his fituation. Each morning his troops affaulted the barricades which the enemy had erected on the causeways, forced their way over the trenches which they had dug and through the canals where the bridges were broken down, and endeavoured to penetrate into the heart of the city, in hopes of obtaining fome decifive advantage, which might force the enemy to furrender, and terminate the war at once; but when the obftinate valour of the Mexicans rendered the efforts of the day ineffectual, the Spaniards retired in the evening to their former quarters. Thus their toil and danger were, in fome measure, continually renewed; the Mexicans repairing in the night what the Spaniards had deftroyed through the day, and recovering the pofts from which they had driven them. But neceffity prescribed this

i Cortes Relat. 270. F.

flow

V.

1521.

flow and untoward mode of operation. The BOOK number of his troops was fo fmall, that Cortes durft not, with a handful of men, attempt to make a lodgment in a city where he might be furrounded and annoyed by fuch a multitude of enemies. The remembrance of what he had already fuffered by the ill-judged confidence with which he had ventured into fuch a dangerous a fituation, was ftill fresh in his mind. The Spaniards, exhaufted with fatigue, were unable to guard the various pofts which they daily gained; and though their camp was filled with Indian auxiliaries, they durft not devolve this charge upon them, because they were fo little accustomed to discipline, that no confidence could be placed in their vigilance. Befides this, Cortes was extremely folicitous to preserve the city as much as poffible from being destroyed, both because he deftined it to be the capital of his conquefts, and wished that it might remain as a monument of his glory. From all these confiderations, he adhered obftinately, for a month after the fiege was opened, to the system which he had adopted. The Mexicans, in their own defence, displayed valour which was hardly inferior to that with which the Spaniards attacked them. On land, on water, by night and by day, one furious conflict fucceeded to another. Several Spaniards were killed, more wounded, and all

were

V.

BOOK were ready to fink under the toils of unintermit ting fervice, which were rendered more intolerable by the injuries of the season, the periodical rains being now fet in with their ufual violence *.

1521.

Endeavours

to take the

city by form.

July 3.

ASTONISHED and difconcerted with the length and difficulties of the fiege, Cortes determined to make one great effort to get poffeffion of the city, before he relinquished the plan which he had hitherto followed, and had recourfe to any other mode of attack. With this view, he fent inftructions to Alvarado and Sandoval to advance with their divifions to a general affault, and took the command in perfon of that pofted on the causeway of Cuyocan. Animated by his prefence, and the expectation of fome decifive event, the Spaniards pushed forward with irrefiftible impetuofity. They broke through one barricade after another, forced their way over the ditches and canals, and having entered the city, gained ground inceffantly, in fpite of the multitude and ferocity of their opponents. Cortes, though delighted with the rapidity of his progrefs, did not forget that he might still find it neceffary to retreat; and in order to fecure it, appointed Julien de Alderete, a captain of chief note in the troops which he had received from

* B. Diaz. c. 151.

Hifpaniola,