Having enumerated fome of the difficulties, which the convention were obliged to encounter in the courfe of their proceedings, let us view the end, which they proposed to accomplish.

In forming this fyftem, it was proper to give minute attention to the intereft of all the parts; but there was a duty of ftill higher importto feel and to fhew a predominating regard to the fuperior interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance.

The aim of the convention, was to form a fyftem of good and efficient government on the more extenfive fcale of the United States. In this, and in every other inftance, the work fhould be judged with the fame fpirit, with which it was performed. A principle of duty as well as candour demands this.

It has been remarked, that civil government is neceffary to the perfection of fociety: We remark that civil liberty is neceffary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested only of that part, which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community, than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows, that civil liberty, while it refigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercife of all the human faculties, fo far as it is compatible with the public welfare. In confidering and developing the nature and end of the system before us, it is necessary to mention another kind of liberty, which may be distinguished by the appellation of federal liberty. When a fingle government is instituted, the individuals, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their natural independence, which they be fore enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is inftituted, the communities, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as states. The principles, which directed, in the former cafe, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give fimilar directions in the latter cafe. The states fhould refign, to the national government, that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which placed in that government, will produrce more good to the whole, than if it had remained in the feveral ftates. While they refign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercife of all their other faculties as ftates, fo far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and fuperintending confederacy.

Since ftates as well as citizens are reprefented in the conftitution before us, and form the objects on which that conftitution is propofed to

operate,

operate, it was neceffary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty.

We now fee the great end which they propofed to accomplish. It was to frame, for their conftituents, one federal and national conftitution-a conftitution, that would produce the advantages of good, and prevent the inconveniencies of bad government -a conftitution, whofe beneficence and energy would pervade the whole union; an.. bind and embrace the interefts of every part-a conftitution, that would enfure peace, freedom and happiness, to the states and people of America.

We are now naturally led to examine the means, by which they propofed to accomplish this end. But previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper to ftate fome general and leading principles of government, which will receive particular application in the course of our investigations.

There neceffarily exifts in every governn ent, a power from which there is no appeal; and which, for that reafon, may be termed fupreme, abfolute and uncontrollable. Where does this power refide? To this queftion, writers on different governments will give different answers. According to Blackftone, in this country, this power is lodged in the British parliament, and the parliament may alter the form of governand its power is abfolute without control. The idea of a confitution, limiting and fuperintending the operations of legislative authority, feems not to have been accurately understood in this kingdom. There are, at leaft no traces of practice, conformable to fuch a principle. To control the power and conduct of the legislature by an over-ruling conftitution, was an improvement in the fcience and practice of government, referved to the American ftates.

ment;

Perhaps fome politician, who has not confidered, with fufficient accuracy, their political fyflems, would anfwer, that in their governments, the fupreme power was vefted in the conftitutions. This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth; but does not reach it. The truth' is, that, in the American governments, the fupreme, abfolute and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As their conftitutions are fuperior to their legislatures; fo the people are fuperior to their conftitutions. Indeed the fuperiority, in this laft inftance, is much greater; for the people poffefs, over their conftitutions, control in act, as well as in right. The confequence is, that the people may change the conftitutions, whenever, and however they pleafe. This is a right, of which no poitive inftitution can ever deprive them,

These important truths, are far from being merely fpeculative: To their operation, we are to afcribe the scene, hitherto unparallelled, which

3

America

America now exhibits to the world—a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary and a deliberate tranfition from one conftitution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in government is, by a mournful and indiffoluble affociation, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view fuch revolutions in a very different lightto confider them only as progreffive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and increafing the happiness of fociety and mankind.

With filent pleasure and admiration we view the force and prevalence› of this fentiment throughout the United States, that the fupreme power refides in the people; and that they never can part with it. It may be called the Panacea in politics. There can be no diforder in the commu nity but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legiflature, it may be corrected by the conftitution: If in the conftitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, therefore, for every diftemper in government; if the people are not wanting to themfelves. For a people wanting to themselves, there is no remedy: From their power, there is no appeal: To their error, there is no fuperio principle of correction.

The leading principle in politics, and that which pervades the American conftitutions, is, that the fupreme power refides in the people; their constitution opens with a folemn and practical recognition of this principle; "WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, in order to form a more perfect union, establish juftice, &c. DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH this conftitution, for the United States of America.” is announced in their name, it receives its political existence from their authority-they ordain and establish: What is the necessary consequence? -those who ordain and establish, have the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul.-A proper attention to this principle may fatisfy the minds of fome, who contend for the neceffity of a bill of rights.

It

Its establishment, I apprehend, has more force, than a volume written on the subject—it renders this truth evident, that the people have a right to do what they pleafe, with regard to the government.

Therefore, even in a fingle government, if the powers of the people reft on the same establishment, as is expreffed in this conftitution, a bill of rights is by no means a neceffary measure. In a government poffeffed of enumerated powers, fuch a measure would be not only unneceffary, but prepofterous and dangerous: whence come this notion, that in the United States there is no fecurity without a bill of rights? Have the citizens of South Carolina no fecurity for their liberties? they have no bill of rights. Are the citizens on the eastern fide of the Delaware lefs free, or lefs fecured in their liberties, than thofe on the western side?

The

The ftate of New-Jersey has no bill of rights.-The ftate of New-York has no bill of rights.-The ftates of Connecticut and Rhode-Ifland have no bill of rights. I know not whether I have exactly enumerated the ftates who have thought it unneceffary to add a bill of rights to their conftitutions: but this enumeration will ferve to fhew by experience, as well as principle, that even in fingle governments, a bill of rights is not an effential or neceffary measure. But in a government, confifting of enumerated powers, fuch as is adopted by the United States, a bill of rights would not only be unneceffary, but, in my humble judgment, highly imprudent. In all focieties, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution, is an enumeration of the powers referved. If we attempt an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated, is prefumed to be given. The confequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the fcale of the government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. On the other hand; an imperfect enumeration of the powers of government, referves all implied power to the people; and, by that means the conftitution becomes incomplete; but of the two, it is much fafer to run the risk on the fide of the conftitution; for an omiffion in the enumeration of the powers of government, is neither fo dangerous, nor important, as an omiffion in the enumeration of the rights of the people.

In this conftitution, the citizens of the United States appear difpenfing a part of their original power, in what manner and in what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of re-calling what they part with. When, therefore, they possefs, the fee-fimple of authority, why fhould they have recourfe to the minute and fubordinate remedies, which can be neceffary only to thofe, who pafs the fee, and referve only a rent-charge?

To every suggestion concerning a bill of rights, the citizens of the United States may always fay, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO DO WHAT

WE PLEASE.

This obfervation naturally leads to a more particular confideration of the government before us. In order to give permanency, ftability and fecurity to any government, it is of effential importance, that its legiflature fhould be reftrained; that there fhould not only be, what we call a paffive, but an active power over it; for of all kinds of defpotifm, this is the most dreadful, and the most difficult to be corrected.

It is therefore proper to have efficient restraints upon the legislative body. Thefe reftraints arife from different fources; In the American conftitution they are produced in a very confideráble degree, by a diviVOL. I.

Hh

fion

fion of the power in the legislative body itself. Under this fyftem, they may arife likewife from the interference of thofe officers, who are introduced into the executive and judicial departments. They may fpring alfo from another fource; the election by the people; and finally, under this conftitution, they may proceed from the great and laft refort-from the PEOPLE themselves.

In order to fecure the prefident from any dependence upon the legiflature, as to his falary, it is provided, that he thall, at ftated times, receive for his fervices, a compenfation that fhall neither be increased nor diminished, during the period for which he shall have been elected, and that he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the United States, or any of them individually.

To fecure to the judges independence, it is ordered rhat they shall receive for their services, a compenfation which fhall not be diminished during their continuance in office, The congrefs may be restrained, by the election of its conftituent parts, If a legislature shall make a law contrary to the conftitution, or oppreffive to the people, they have it in their power, every fecond year, in one branch, and every fixth year in the other, to difplace the men, who act thus inconfiftent with their duty; and if this is not fufficient, they have ftill a farther power; they may affume into their own hands, the alteration of the conftitution itselfthey may revoke the leafe, when the conditions are broken by the

tenant.

There is still a further reftraint upon the legislature-the qualified negative of the prefident. This will be attended with very impor tant advantages, for the fecurity and happinefs of the people of the United States. The prefident, will not be a ftranger to the country, to its laws, or its wishes. He will, under this conftitution, be placed in office as the prefident of the whole union, and be chosen in fuch a manner that he may justly be ftiled THE MAN OF THE PEOPLE; being elected by the different parts of the United States, he will confider himself as not particularly interested for any one of them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and affection. This will be his natural conduct, to recommend himself to those who placed him in that high chair, and it is a very important advantage, that fuch a man must have every law prefented to him, before it can become binding upon the United States. He will have before him the fulleft information of their fitua tion, he will avail himself not only of records and official communica tions, foreign and domeftic, but he will have alfo the advice of the executive officers in the different departments of the general government. If in confequence of this information and advice, he exercise the

authority