SIR,

IT is fit the public should receive through your hands, what was written originally for the assistance of your younger studies, and was then presented to you.

It was by the repeated importunities of our learned friend Mr. John Eames, that I was persuaded to revise the Rudiments of Logic, and when I had once suffered myself to begin the work, I was drawn still onward, far beyond my first design, even to the neglect, or too long delay, of other pressing and important demands that were upon me.

It has been my endeavour to form every part of this Treatise both for the instruction of students, to open their way into the sciences, and for the more extensive and general service of mankind, that the Gentleman and the Christian might find their account in the perusal, as well as the Scholar. I have therefore collected and proposed the chief principles and rules of right judg-. ment in matters of common and sacred importance, and pointed out our most frequent mistakes and prejudices in the concerns of life and religion, that wẹ might better guard against the springs of error, guilt and sorrow, which surround us in our state of mortality.

You know, Sir, the great design of this noble science is to rescue our reasoning powers from their unhappy slavery and darkness; and thus, with all due submission and deference, it offers an humble assistance to divine reveJation. Its chief business is to relieve the natural weakenesses of the mind, by some better efforts of nature: It is to diffuse a light over the understanding in our enquiries after truth, and not to furnish the tongue with debate and controversy. True Logic is not that noisy thing that deals all in dispute and wrangling, to which former ages had debased and confined it; yet its disciples must acknowledge also, that they are taught to vindicate and defend the truth, as well as to search it out. True Logic doth not require a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to puff up the mind with empty sounds, and a pride of false learning; yet some distinctions and terms of art are necessary to range every idea in its proper class, and to keep our thoughts from confusion. The world is now grown so wise, as not to suffer this valua ble art to be engrossed by the schools. In so polite and knowing an age, every man of reason will covet some acquaintance with Logic, since it renders its daily service to wisdom and virtue, and to the affairs of common life, as well as to the sciences.

I will not presume, Sir, that this little Book is improved since its first composure in proportion to the improvements of your manly age. But when you shall please to review it in your retired hours, perhaps you may refresh your own memory in some of the early parts of learning. And if you find all the additional Remarks and Rules made so familiar to you already by your own observation, that there is nothing new among them, it will be no unpleasing reflection that you have so far anticipated the present zeal and labour of,

SIR,

Your most faithful

London, Aug. 24, 1724.

And obedient Servant,

I. WATTS.

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SCHEME.

LOGIC is the art of using REASON* well in our enquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others,

REASON* is the glory of human nature, and one of the chief emi· nences whereby we are raised above our fellow-creatures, the brutes, in this lower world.

Reason, as to the power and principles of it, is the common gift of God to all men ; though all are not favoured with it by nature in an equal degree: but the acquired improvements of it in different men, make a much greater distinction between them than nature had made. I could even venture to say, that the "improvement of reason" hath raised the learned and the prudent in the European world, almost as much above the Hottentots, and other savages of Africa, as those savages are by nature superior to the birds, the beasts, and the fishes.

Now the design of Logic is to teach us the right use of our reason, or intellectual powers, and the improvement of them in ourselves and others: this is not only necessary in order to attain any competent knowledge in the sciences, or the affairs of learning, but to govern both the greater and the meaner actions of life. It is the cultivation of our reason by which we are better enabled to distinguish good from evil, as well as truth from falsehood: and both these are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard this life, or the life to come.

The pursuit and acquisition of truth is of infinite concernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted with the nature of things both in heaven and earth, and their various relations to each other. It is by this means we discover our duty to God and our fellow-creatures: by this we ar rive at the knowledge of "natural religion," and learn to confirm our faith in "divine revelation," as well as to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom, prudence and piety, our present conduct and our future hope, are all influenced by the use of our rational powers in the search after truth.

There are several things that make it very necessary that our reason should have some assistance in the exercise or use of it.

This first is, the depth and difficulty of many truths, and the weakncss of our reason to see far into things at once, and penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a saying among the ancients, Veritas in puteo, " Truth lies in a well;" and, to carry on this metaphor, we may very justly say, that Logie does as it were, supply us with steps whereby we may go down to reach the water; or it frames the links of a chain, whereby we may draw the water up from the bottom. Thus, by the means of many reasonings well connected together, philosophers in our age have drawn a thousand truths out of the depths of darkness, which our fathers were utterly unacquainted with.

Another thing that makes it necessary for our reason to have some assist

*The word "reason" in this place is not confined to the mere faculty of reasoning, or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the intellectual powers of man,

ance given it, is the disguise and false colours in which many things appear to us in this present imperfect state. There are a thousand things which are not in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the natural and the moral world: so the sun appears to be flat as a plate of silver, and to be less than twelve inches in diameter: the moon appears to be as big as the sun, and the rainbow appears to be a large substantial arch in the sky; all which are in reality gross falsehoods. So knavery puts on the face of justice, hypocrisy and superstition wear the vizard of piety, deceit and evil are often clothed in the shapes and appearances of truth and goodness. Now Logic helps to strip off the outward disguise of things, and to behold them, and judge of them in their own nature.

There is yet a further proof that our intellectual or rational powers need some assistance, and that is, because they are so frail and fallible in the present state; we are imposed upon at home as well as abroad; we are deceived by our senses, by our imaginations, by our passions and appetites, by the authority of men, by education and custom, &c. and we are led into frequent errors, by judging according to these false and flattering principles, rather than according to the nature of things. Something of this frailty is owing to our very constitution, man being compounded of flesh and spirit; some. thing of it arises from our infant state, and our growing up by small degrees to manhood, so that we form a thousand judgments before our reason is mature. But there is still more of it owing to our original defection from God, and the foolish and evil dispositions that are found in fallen man so that one great part of the design of Logic is to guard us against the delusive influences of our meaner powers, to cure the mistakes of immature judgment, and to raise us in some measure from the ruins of our fall.

It is evident enough from all these things, that our reason needs the assistance of art in our enquiries after truth or duty; and without some skill and diligence in forming our judgments aright, we shall be led into frequent mistakes, both in matters of science and in matters of practice, and some of these mistakes may prove fatal too.

The art of Logic, even as it assists us to gain the knowledge of the sciences, leads us on toward virtue and happiness: for all our speculative acquaintance with things should be made subservient to our better conduct in the civil and religious life. This is infinitely more valuable than all speculations ; and a wise man will use them chiefly for this better purpose.

All the good judgment and prudence that any man exerts in his common concerns of life, without the advantage of learning, is called natural logic : and it is but a higher advancement, and a farther assistance of our rational powers, that is designed by and expected from this artificial Logic.

In order to attain this, we must enquire what are the principal operations of the mind, which are put forth in the exercise of our reason; and we shall find them to be these four, namely, perception, judgment, argumentation, and disposition.

Now the art of Logic is composed of those observations and rules, which men have made about these four operations of the mind, perception, judg ment, reasoning, and disposition, in order to assist and improve them.

1. Perception, conception, or apprehension, is the mere simple contemplation of things offered to our minds, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So we conceive or think of a horse, a tree, high, swift, slow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, &c. The form

under which these things appear to the mind, or the result of our conception or apprehension is called an idea.

II. Judgment is that operation of the mind, whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation or negation; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So this tree is high; that horse is not swift; the mind of man is a thinking being; mere matter has no thought belonging to it; God is just; good men are often miserable in this world; a righteous governor will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good; which sentences are the effect of judgment, and are called propositions.

III. Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one proposition, from two or more propositions premised. Or it is the drawing a conclusion, which before was either unknown or dark, or doubtful, from some propositions which are more known and evident. So when we have judged that matter cannot think, we then infer and conclude, that therefore the mind of man is not matter.

r

So we judge that a just governor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge also that God is a just governor; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference between the evil and the good.

This argumentation may be carried on farther, thus, "God will one time or another make a difference betwen the good and the evil;" but "there is little or no difference made in this world;" therefore "there must be another world wherein this difference shall be made."

These inferences or conclusions are the effects of reasoning, and the three propositions taken all together are called a syllogism or argument.

IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, whereby we put the ideas, propositions and arguments, which we have formed concerning one subject, into such an order as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner: Or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such order, as is best for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method. This very description of the four operations of the mind and their effects, in this order, is an instance or example of method.

Now as the art of Logic assists our conceptions, so it gives us a large and comprehensive view of the subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reasoning, so it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of things; and as it furnishes us with method, so it makes our knowledge of things both easy and regular, and guards our thoughts from confusion.

Logie is divided into four parts, according to these four operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we shall treat of it in this order.

LOGIC.

THE FIRST PART.

Of Perception and Ideas.

THE first part of Logic contains observations and precepto about the first operation of the mind, perception or conception: and since all our knowledge, how wide and large soever it grows, is founded upon our conceptions and ideas, here we shall consider,

1. The general nature of them.

2. The objects of our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of these ideas.

3. The several divisions of them.

4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed.. 5. General directions about our ideas.

6. Special rules to direct our conceptions,

CHAPTER I.-Of the Nature of Ideas.

FIRST, the nature of conception or perception shall just be mentioned, though this may seem to belong to another science rather than Logic.

Perception is that act of the mind (or, as some philosophers call it, rather a passion or impression) whereby the mind becomes conscious of any thing. As when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat; when I see a horse, a tree, or a man; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am conscious of these things; this is called perception. If I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.

An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in the mind; it is a representation of something that we have seen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious of. That notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind is called the idea of a horse, a tree, or a man.

*Note, The words conception and perception are often used promiscuously, as I have done here, because I could not embarrass a learner with too many dis tinctions; but if I were to distinguish them, I could say, perception is the consciousness of an object when present; conception is the forming an idea of the object Whether present or absent.