is a sensation of some special commotion in animal nature; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirst, pain, &c. The essential difference of it is, that this commotion arises from thought or perception of the mind, and hereby it is distinguished from hunger, thirst, or pain.

2dly, We must conceive of it completely, or survey the several parts that compose it. These are (1.) The mind's percep tion of some object. (2.) The consequent ruffle, or special commotion of the nerves, and blood, and animal spirits. And (8.) The sensation of this inward commotion.

3dly, We must consider it compréhensively, in its various properties. The most essential attributes that make up its nature have been already mentioned under the foregoing heads. Some of the most considerable properties that remain are these, namely, That passion belongs to all mankind, in greater or lesser degrees; it is not constantly present with us, but upon some certa'n occasion; it is appointed by our Creator for various useful ends and purposes, namely, to give us vigour in the pursuit of what is good and agreeable to us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful; it is very proper for our state of trial in this world; it is not utterly to be rooted out of our nature, but to be moderated and governed according to the rules of virtue and religion, &c.

4thly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds of it, which is called an extensive conception of it. If the object which the mind perceives be very uncommon it excites the passion of admiration: If the object appear agreeable, it raises love; if the agreeable object be absent and attainable it is desire; if likeJy to be attained it excites hope; if unattainable despair; if it be present and possessed, it is the passion of joy; if lost, it excites sorrow; if the object be disagreeable, it causes in general hatred, or aversion; if it be absent and yet we are in danger of it, it raises our fear; if it be present, it is sorrow, and sadness, &c.

5thly, All these things, and many more which go to compose a treatise on this subject must be placed in their proper order; a slight specimen of which is exhibited in this short account of pas sion, and which that admirable author Descartes has treated of at large; though for want of sufficient experiments and observations in natural philosophy, there are some few mistakes in his account of animal nature.

SECT. XIII.-An Illustration of these Five Rules by Similitudes.

THUS we have brought the first part of Logic to a conclusion; and it may not be improper here to represent its excellencies (so far as we have gone) by general hints of its chief design and use, as well as by a various comparison of it to those in truments which mankind have invented for their several convenienees and improvements.

The design of Logic is not to furnish us with the perceiving faculty, but only to direct and assist us in the use of it; it doth not give us the objects of our ideas, but only casts such a light on those objects which nature furnishes us with, that they may be the more clearly and distinctly known; it doth not add new parts or properties, to things, but it discovers the various parts, properties, relations and dependencies of one thing upon another, and by ranking all things under general and special heads, it renders the nature, or any of the properties, powers and uses of a thing, more easy to be found out, when we seek in what rank of beings it lies, and wherein it agrees with, and wherein it differs from others.

If any comparisons would illustrate this, it may be thus represented:

I. When Logic assists us to attain a clear and distinct conception of the nature of things by definition, it is like those glasses whereby we behold such objects distinctly, as by reason of their smallness, or their great distance, appear in confusion to the naked eye; so the telescope discovers to us distant wonders in the heavens, and shews the milky way, and the bright cloudy spots in a very dark sky, to be a collection of little stars, which the eye unassisted beholds in mingled confusion. So when bodies are too small for our sight to survey them distinctly, then the microscope is at hand for our assistance, to shew us all the limbs and features of the most minute animals, with great clearness and distinction.

II. When we are taught by Logic to view a thing completely in all its parts, by the help of division, it has the use of an anatomical knife which dissects an animal body, and separates the veins, arteries, nerves, muscles, membranes, &c. and shews us the several parts which go to the composition of a complete animal.

III. When Logic instructs us to survey an object comprehensively in all the modes, properties, relations, faces, and appearances of it, it is of the same use as a terrestrial globe, which turning round on its axis, represents to us all the variety of lands and seas, kingdoms and nations on the surface of the earth, in a very short succession of time shews the situations and various relations of them to each other, and gives a comprehrensive view of them in miniature.

IV. When this art teaches us to distribute any extensive idea into its different kinds of species, it may be compared to the prismatic glass, that receives the sun-beams or rays of light, which seem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it separates and distributes them into their different kinds and colours, and ranks them in their proper succession,

Or if we descend to subdivisions and subordinate ranks of being, then distribution may also be said to form the resemblance

of a natural tree, wherein the genus or general ideas stands for the root or stock, and the several kinds, or species, and individuals, are distributed abroad, and represented in their dependence and connection, like the several boughs, branches, and lesser shoots. For instance, let animal be the root of a logical tree the resemblance is seen by mere inspection though the root be not placed at the bottom of the page.

The same similitude will serve also to illustrate the division and subdivision of an integral whole, into its several parts.

When Logic directs us to place all our ideas in a proper method, most convenient both for instruction and memory, it doth the same service as the cases of well contrived shelves in a large library, wherein folios, quartos, and octavos, and lesser volumes, are disposed in such exact order under the particular heads of divinity, history, mathematics, ancient and miscella neous learning, &c. that the student knows where to find every book, and has them all as it were within his command at once, because of the exact order wherein they are placed.

The man who has such assistances as these at hand, in order to manage his conceptions and regulate his ideas, is well prepared to improve his knowledge, and to join these ideas together in a regular manner by judgment, which is the second operation of the mind, and will be the subject of the second part of Logic.

THE SECOND PART OF LOGIC.

Of Judgment and Proposition.

WHEN the mind has got acquaintance with things by framing ideas of them, it proceeds to the next operation, and that is, to compare these ideas together, and to join them by affirmation, or disjoin them by negation, according as we find them to agree or disagree. This act of the mind is called judgment; as when we have by perception obtained the ideas of Plato, a philosopher, man, innocent, we form this judgment; Plato was a philosopher; no man is innocent.

Some writers have asserted, that judgment consists in a mere perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. But I rather think there is an act of the will (at least in most cases) necessary to form a judgment; for though we do perceive or think we perceive ideas to agree or disagree, yet we may sometimes refrain from judging or assenting to the perception, for fear least the perception should not be sufficiently clear, and we should be mistaken: and I am well assured at other times, that there are multitudes of judgments formed, and a firm assent given to ideas joined or disjoined, before there is any clear perception whether they agree or disagree; and this is the reason of so many false judgments or mistakes among men. Both these practices are a proof that judgment has something of the will in in it, and does not merely consist in perception, since we some times judge (though unhappily) without perceiving, and sometimes we perceive without immediate judging.

As an idea is the result of our conception or apprehension, so a proposition is the effect of judgment. The foregoing sentences which are examples of the act of judgment are properly called propositions. Plato is a philosopher, &c.

Here let us consider: 1. The general nature of a proposition, and the parts of which it is composed. 2. The various divisions or kinds of propositions. 3. The springs of false judg ment, or the doctrine of prejudices. 4. General directions to assist us in judging aright. 5. Special rules to direct us in judging particular objects.

CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Proposition, and its several Parts.

A Proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or negation; as Plate was a philosopher: every angle is formed by two lines

meeting: no man living on earth can be completely happy. When there are ever so many ideas or terms in the sentence, yet if they are joined and disjoined merely by one single affirmation or negation, they are properly called but one proposition, though they may be resolved into several propositions which are implied therein, as will appear hereafter.

In describing a proposition, I use the word terms as well as ideas, because when mere ideas are joined in the mind without words, it is rather called a judgment; but when clothed with words, it is called a proposition, even though it be in the mind only, as well as when it is expressed by speaking or writing.

There are three things which go to the nature and constitution of a proposition, namely, the subject, the predicate, and the copula.

The subject of a proposition is that concerning which any thing is affirmed or denied. So, Plato, angle, man living on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions.

The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the subject; so philosopher is the predicate of the first proposition; formed by two lines meeting, is the predicate of the second; capable of being completely happy, the proper predicate of the third.

The subject and predicate of a proposition taken together, are called the matter of it; for these are the materials of which it is made.

The copula is the form of a proposition; it represents the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expressed by the words, am, art, is, are, &c. or am not, art not, is not, are not, &c.

It is not a thing of importance enough to create a dispute, whether the words, no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall be called a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. Sometimes perhaps they may seem most naturally to be included in one, and sometimes in another of these, though a proposition is usually denominated affirmative or negative from its copula, as hereafter;

Note 1. Where each of these parts of a proposition is not expressed distinctly in so many words, yet they are all understood, and implicitly contained therein; as Socrates disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies Socrates was disputing. So I die, signifies I am dying. I can write, that is, I am able to write. In Latin and Greek, one single word is many times a complete proposition.

2. These words, am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone without any other predicate, signifying both the act of the mind judging, which includes the copula, and signify also actual existence, which is the predicate of that proposition. So Rome is, signifies Rome is existent; there are some strange monsters,