to ask wisdom of him who giveth liberally to them that ask it, and upbraideth us not with our own follies.

Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparative for the best improvement of all the directions and rules proposed in the two following chapters.

CHAP. IV.-General Directions to assist us in judging aright.

THE chief design of the art of Logic is to assist us in forming a true judgment of things; a few proper observations for this end have been dropt occasionally in some of the foregoing chapters: yet it is necessary to mention them again in this place, that we may have a more complete and simultaneous view of the general directions, which are necessary in order to judge aright. A multitude of advices may be framed for this purpose; the chief of them may, for order sake, be reduced to the following heads.

I. Direction. When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or searchers after truth, we should examine all our old opinions afresh, and enquire what was the ground of them, and whether our assent were built on just evidence; and then we should cast off all those judgments which were formed heretofore without due examination. A man in pursuit of knowledge, should throw off all those prejudices which he had imbibed in times past, and guard against all the springs of error, mentioned in the preceding chapter, with the utmost watchfulness for time to come.

Observe here. That this rule of casting away all our former prejudicate opinions and sentiments, is not proposed to any of us to be practised at once, considered as men of business or religion, as friends or neighbours, as fathers or sons, as magistrates, subjects, or christians, but merely as philosophers and searchers after truth; and though it may be well presumed that many of our judgments, both true and false, together with the practices built thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious life, were formed without sufficient evidence; yet an universal rejection of all these might destroy at once our present sense and practice of duty with regard to God, ourselves, and our fellowcreatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown into such a state of doubting and indifference, that it would be too long ere they recovered any principles of virtue or religion by a train of reasonings.

Besides, the common affairs of human life often demand a much speedier determination, and we must many times act upon present probabilities: the bulk of mankind have not time and leisure, and advantages sufficient to begin all their knowledge anew, and to build up every single opinion and practice afresh, upon the justest grounds of evidence.

Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is capable of forming and correcting his notions, and his rules of conduct in the natural, civil and religious life, by the strict rules. of Logic; and so far as he hath time and capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine all those which are any ways doubtful, and to determine nothing without just evidence, he is likely to become so much the wiser and the happier man, and if divine grace assist him, so much the better christian. And though this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent steps and degrees till our whole set of opinions and principles be in time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon juster foundations.

II. Direct. "Endeavour that all your ideas of those objects, concerning which you pass any judgment, be clear and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive and orderly, as far as you have occasion to judge concerning them." This is the substance of the last chapter of the first part of Logic. The rules which direct our conceptions must be reviewed, if we would form our judgments aright. But if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while our ideas are dark and confused, and very imperfect, we shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This is like a person who would pretend to give the sum total of a large account in arithmetic, without surveying all the particulars; or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair and distinct landscape in the twilight, when he can hardly distinguish a house from a tree.

Observe here, That this direction does not require us to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all their parts, powers and qualities, in an absolute sense for this belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain but it is expressed in a relative or limited sense; that is, our ideas should be clear, distinct, and comprehensive, &c. at least so far as we have occasion at that time to judge concerning them. We may form many true and certain judgments concerning God, angels, animals, men, heaven, hell, &c. by those partial and very imperfect conceptions of them to which we have attained, if we judge no farther concerning them than our conceptions reach.

We may have a clear and distinct idea of the existence of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, their relations and manners of actions, are very confused and obscure. We may judge well concerning several properties of any being, though other properties are unknown; for perhaps we know not all the properties of any being whatsoever.

Sometimes we have clear ideas of the absolute properties of an object and we may judge of them with certainty, while the relative properties are very obscure and unknown to us.

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So we

may have a clear and just idea of the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what relation it bears to the area of a tri angle or a polygon; I may know the length of a diameter of a eircle; without knowing what proportion it has to the circumference.

There are other things, whose external relative properties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to us, we know better than their own inward and absolute properties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We perceive clearly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate water; and that water will allay our thirst, or quench the fire, though we know not the inward distinguishing particles, or prime essential properties of fire or water. We may know the King and Lord Chancellor, and affirm many things of them in their legal characters, though we can have but a confused idea of their persons or natural features, if we have never seen their faces. So the scripture has revealed God himself to us, as our Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and as the object of our worship, in clearer ideas than it has revealed many other abstruse questions which may be raised about his own divine essence or substance, his immensity or omnipresence.

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This therefore is the general observation in order to guide our judgments, that "we should not allow ourselves to form a judgment concerning things farther than our clear and distinct ideas reach," and then we are not in danger of error.

But there is one considerable objection against this rule, which is necessary to be answered; and there is one just and reasonable exception, which is as needful to be mentioned.

The objection is this: May we not judge safely concerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a clear perception only of some parts or properties of them? May we not affirm that all that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity and infinity? Again, may we not safely judge of particular objects, whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the general? May I not affirm, that every unknown species of animals has inward springs of motion, because I have a clear idea that these inward springs belong to an animal in general.

Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, properties or species, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be connected with, or contained in the known parts, properties, or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and distinct as far as we judge of them and as we have no particular idea of those unknown divine attributes, or unknown species of animals; so there is nothing particular affirmed concerning them beyond what belongs VOL. VII. Fr

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to the general idea of divine attributes or animals, with which I clearly and distinctly perceive them to be connected.

It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron rings, and I see them fastened to a post near me, but the most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight, so that I know not whether they are oval or round, brass or iron: now I may boldly affirm, the whole length of this chain is fastened to the post, for I have a clear idea that the nearest links are thus fastened, and a clear idea that the distant links are connected with the nearest, if I can draw the whole chain by one link.

Or thus: If two known ideas, A and B, are evidently joined, or agree, and if C unknown be included in A, and also D unknown be included in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined and agree: for I have a clear perception of the union of the two known ideas A and B; and also a clear perception of the connection of the unknown idea with the known. the clear and distinct ideas must still abide as a general necessary qualification, in order to form a right judgment; and indeed it is upon this foot that all ratiocination is built, and the conclusions are thus formed, which deduce things unknown from things known.

So

Yet it seems to me, that there is one just limitation or exception to this general rule of judgment, as built on clear and distinct ideas, and it is this:

Exception." In matters of mere testimony, whether human or divine, there is not always a necessity of clear and distinct ideas of the things which are believed." Though the evidence of propositions, which are entirely formed by ourselves, depends on the clearness and distinctness of those ideas of which they are composed, and on our own clear perception of their agreement or disagreement, yet we may justly assent to propositions formed by others, when we have neither a very clear couception in ourselves of the two ideas contained in the words, nor how they agree or disagree; provided always that we have a clear and sufficient evidence of the credibility of the persons who inform us.

Thus when we read in scripture the great doctrines of the Deity of Christ, of the unity of the divine and human natures in him, of the divine agency of the blessed Spirit, that "The Son is the brightness of his Father's glory, that all things were created by him and for him, that the Son shall give up his kingdom to the Father, and that God shall be all in all;" we may safely believe thein: for though our ideas of these objects themselves are not sufficiently clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds to form these judgments or propositions concerning them, yet we have a clear and distinct perception of

God's revealing them, or that they are contained in scripture; and this is sufficient evidence to determine our assent.

The same thing holds true in some measure, where credible human testimony assures us of some propositions. while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and predicate or them to determine our assent. So when an honest and learned mathematician assures a ploughman that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides; the ploughman who has but confused ideas of these things, may firmly and safely believe these propositions, upon the same ground, because he has evidence of the skill and faithfulness of his informer*.

* Perhaps some may object against this representation of things, and say, that "We cannot properly be said to believe a proposition any farther than we ourselves have ideas under the term; therefore if we have no ideas under the terms, we believe nothing but the connexion of words or sounds; and if we bave but obscure and inadequate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a connexion of things, and partly a connexion of sounds. But that we cannot properly be said to believe the proposition, for our faith can never go beyond our ideas."

Now to set this matter in a clear light. I suppose that every proposition which is proposed to my assent, is a sentence made up of terms which have some ideas under them known or unknown to me. I confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms, and there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard to me, it is the mere "joining of sounds;" but if, for instance, a ploughman has credible information from an honest and skilful mathemetician, that an "elipsis is made by the section of a cone," he believes the proposition, or he believes the sentence is true, as it is made up of terms which his informant understands, though the ideas be unknown to him; that is, he believes there are some ideas which his informant has under these words which are really connected. And I think, this may justly be called believing the proposition, for it is a be lief of something more than the mere joining of sounds; it is a belief of the real connection of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds, and in this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a proposition, which he doth not understand at all.

With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposition upon credible testimony, if we have some sort of ideas under the terms, though they are but partial, or inadequate and obscure; such as "divine answers were given by Urim and Thummim;" for since it is purely upon testimony, we believe the "known parts" of the ideas signified by those words to be connected, upon the same testimony we may also believe all the "unknown parts" of the ideas signified by those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is koowing and faithful. And in this sense we may justly be said to believe a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but very imperfectly, because God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in perfection.

And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be allowed, there are but very few propositions in the world, even in human things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we may be said either to know or to believe, because there is scarce any thing on earth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea. And it is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we could either know or believe without this allowance for though reason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy," how exceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness? Yet I may boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since 1 am sure that every known and unknown idea signified by the term "God," is connected with the ideas of the term "holiness,”