and meaning of that which God has revealed, for reason itself demands the belief of it.

Now divine testimony or revelation requires these following credentials:

1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed be not inconsistent with reason; for intelligent creatures can never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore we are sure the popish doctrine of transubstantiation is not a matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary to all our senses and our reason, even in their proper exercises.

God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of himself, and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfections. Now many of these perfections are discoverable by the light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent with these perfections, cannot be a divine revelation.

But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a manner contrary to what reason would direct antecedent to that command. So Abraham was commanded to offer up his son a sacrifice: The Israelites were ordered to borrow of the Egyptians without paying them, and to plunder and slay the inhabitants of Canaan : because God has a sovereign right to all things, and can with equity dispossess his creatures of life, and every thing which he has given them, and especially such sinful creatures as mankind; and he can appoint whom he pleases to be the instruments of this just dispossession or deprivation. So that these divine commands are not really inconsistent with right reason; for whatsoever is so, cannot be believed where that inconsistency

appears.

2. Upon the same account the whole doctrine of revelation must be consistent with itself; every part of it must be consistent with each other: and though in points of practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel former divine laws, yet in matters of belief, no latter revelation can be inconsistent with what has been heretofore revealed.

3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some divine and supernatural appearances, some extraordinary signs or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles wrought, or prophecies fulfilled. There must be some demonstrations of the presence and power of God, superior to all the powers of nature, or the settled connection which God as Creator has established among his creatures in this visible world.

4. If there are any such extraordinary and wonderful appearances and operations brought to contest with, or to oppose divine revelation, there must and always will be such a superiority on the side of that revelation which is truly divine, as to manifest that God is there. This was the case when the Egyp

tian sorcerers contended with Moses. But the wonders which Moses wrought did so far transcend the power of the Magicians, as made them confess, It was the finger of God.

5. These divine appearances or attestations to revelation must be either known to ourselves, by our own personal observation of them, or they must be suficiently attested by others, according to the principles and rules by which matters of human faith are to be judged in the foregoing section.

Some of those who lived in the nations and ages where miracles were wrought, were eye and ear-witnesses of the truth and divinity of the revelation; but we, who live in these distant ages must have them derived down to us by just and incontestible history and tradition. We also, even in these distant times, may see the accomplishment of some ancient predictions, and thereby obtain that advantage toward the confirmation of our faith in divine revelation, beyond what those persons enjoyed who lived when the predictions were pronounced.

6. There is another very considerable confirmation of divine testimony; and that is, when the doctrines themselves, either on the publication or the belief of them, produce supernatural effects. Such were the miraculous powers which were communicated to believers in the first ages of Christianity, the conversion of Jews or Gentiles, the amazing success of the gospel of Christ, without human aid, and in opposition to a thousand impediments; its power in changing the hearts and lives of ignorant and vicious heathens, and wicked and profane creatures in all nations, and filling them with a spirit of virtue, piety and goodness. Wheresoever persons have found this effect in their own hearts, wrought by a belief of the gospel of Christ, they have a witness in themselves of the truth of it, and abundant reason to believe it divine.

Of the difference between reason and revelation, and in what sense the latter is superior, see more in Chap. II. Sect. 9. and Chap. IV. Direct. 6.

SECT. VII.-Principles and Rules of judging, concerning Things past, present, and to come, by the mere Use of Reason.

THOUGH we attain the greatest assurance of things past, and future by divine faith, and learn many matters of fact, both past, and present, by human faith, yet reason also may in a good degree assist us to judge of matters of fact, both past, present, and to come, by the following principles:

1. There is a system of beings round about us, of which we ourselves are a part, which we call the world, and in this world there is a course of nature, or a settled order of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, consequenoes, &c. from which

the Author of nature doth not vary but upon very important oc

casions.

2. Where antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, causes, and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, we may infer the causes from the effects, and effects from causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as well as consequents from antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty certain of many things both past, present, and to come. It is by this principle that astronomers can tell what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the world shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute the sun rises or sets this day at Pequin in China, or what altitudes the dog-star had at mid-night or mid-noon in Rome, on the day when Julius Cæsar was slain. Gardeners upon the same principle can foretel the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeks of harvest: we are sure, if there be a chicken, there was an egg: if there be a rain-bow, we are certain it rains not far off: if we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it has naturally a root under ground.

3. Where there is a necessary connection between causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and things sig nified, we know also that like causes will have like effects, and proportionable causes will have proportionable effects, contrary causes will have contrary effects; and observing men may form many judgments by the rules of similitude and proportion, where the causes, effects, &c. are not entirely the same.

4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain connection between antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, we can give but a conjecture, or a probable determination. If the clouds gather, or the weather-glass sinks, we suppose it will rain: if a man spit blood frequently with coughing, we suppose his lungs are hurt if very dangerous symptoms appear, we expect his death.

5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of indifference to this or the contrary, there we cannot certainly know what the effects will be: for it seems to be contingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only to God. This is the case in the greatest part of human actions.

6. Yet wise men, by a just observation of human nature, will give very probable conjectures in this matter, also concerning things past, or things future, because human nature in all ages and nations has such a conformity to itself. By a knowledge of the tempers of men, and their present circumstances, we may, be able to give a happy guess what their conduct will be, and what will be the event by an observation of the like cases in

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former times. This made the Emperor Marcus Antonius to say, "By looking back into history, and considering the fate and revolutions of governments, you will be able to form a guess, and almost prophesy upon the future. For things past, present, and to come, are strangely uniform, and of a colour, and are commonly cast in the same mould. So that upon the matter, forty years of human life may serve for a sample of ten thousand." Collier's Antonius, Book VII. sect. 50.

7. There are also some other principles of judging concerning the past actions of men in former ages, besides books, histories and traditions, which are the mediums of conveying human testimony; as we may infer the skill and magnificence of the ancients by some fraginents of their statues, and ruins of their buildings. We know what Roman legions came into Great Britain, by numbers of bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of the island, with the marks of some particular legion upon them, which must have been employed there in brickmaking. We rectify some mistakes in history by statues, coins, old altars, utensils of war, &c. We confirm or disprove some pretended traditions and historical writings, by medals, images, pictures, urns, &c.

Thus I have gone through all those particular objects of our judgment which I first proposed, and have laid down principles and rules by which we may safely conduct ourselves therein. There is a variety of other objects, concerning which we are occasionally called to pass a judgment, namely, the characters of persons, the value and worth of things, the sense and meaning of particular writers, matters of wit, oratory, poesy, matters of equity in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce between man and man, which would be endless to enumerate. But if the general and special rules of judgment, which have been mentioned in these two last chapters, are treasured up in the mind, and wrought into the very temper of our souls in our younger years, they will lay a foundation for just and regular judgment concerning a thousand special occurrences in the religious, civil, and learned life.

THE THIRD PART OF LOGIC.

Of Reasoning and Syllogism.

AS the first work of the mind is perception, whereby our ideas are framed, and the second is judgment, which joins or disjoins our ideas, and forms a proposition, so the third operation of the mind is reasoning, which joins several propositions together, and makes a syllogism, that is, "an argument whereby we are wont to infer something that is less known, from truths which are more evident."

In treating of this subject, let us consider more particularly,

1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which it is composed. 2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules relating to them. 3. The doctrine of sophisms, or false reasoning, together with the means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or answering them. 4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning.

CHAP. I.—Of the Nature of a Syllogism, and the Parts of which it is composed.

IF the mere perception and comparison of two ideas would always shew us whether they agree or disagree; then all rational propositions would be matters of intelligence, or first principles, and there would be no use of reasoning, or drawing any consequences. It is the narrowness of the human mind which introduces the necessity of reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are then constrained to use a medium, and to compare each of them with some third idea, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree among themselves: as, if there are two lines, A and B, and I know not whether they are equal or no, I take a third line C, or an inch, and apply it to each of them; if it agree with them both, then I infer that A and B are equal; but if it agree with one and not with the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal: if it agree with neither of them, there can be no comparison.

So, if the question be, whether God must be worshipped, we seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator, and say,