pay attention; it would compel clear statements, better attention, and quick comprehension; it would enable the casebook to cover a broader field and give a truer idea of the scope and relations of different subjects; it would give free range to the powers and originality of the different students. Difficulties will arise in evolving a new method, which study and experience alone can solve. Will the beginner have sufficient knowledge of legal principles to enable him to look up the law for himself? No doubt the beginner would have to go slowly and receive much assistance from the instructor, as well as actual demonstration from the law librarian and his assistants, as to the use of the law library. A more serious problem is time. Impossible, it may be objected, that the student should find his own cases, the straw with which to make his bricks! It may be replied that it does not take the initiated long to determine the law on a problem for one's own state, or even the weight of authority, with modern appliances. Sufficient aids, such as notes and citations, could be given. Collections of cases might still be useful adjuncts for reference, combining with the new the merits of the old pre-selected system. Concrete problems and skeleton cases would not require exhaustive examination of all the authorities on a given point in every instance. There is no reason why one should repeat, day after day, case after case, the same process; why all case-books should be mechanically constructed along the same lines, or why all topics should be treated alike and with the same emphasis. In conclusion, it may be noted that science, the systematic knowledge of the law, is not the aim and end of most law graduates. Theirs is not the academical attitude which looks upon knowledge as something existing in and for itself, without regard to its usefulness to man, its correlation to real life. The worth of the science to them consists in its power to guide action and the conduct of legal business. The scientific side, ascertaining and forecasting the law, is but one feature of the lawyer's work. If the proper aim of the law school is to turn out lawyers well equipped for practice, or who will become so on brief apprenticeship, is the law school doing its duty in the matter of imparting the practitioner's art? Why are there practically no attempts to provide any courses whatsoever in applied law, in the handicraft of practice? The answer, given by Prof. Chas. F. Carusi, Dean of the National University Law School (2 Am. Law School Review, p. 92), is that the nonpracticing faculty of our "Schools of Jurisprudence” believe that the knowledge of the science in which they are skilled is of more fundamental importance to the student than a training in an art of which they are ignorant. Since there is no time for both elaborating all their theories and also for teaching the application of law, training in the "soulless unsatisfying handicraft" of practice, is entirely relegated to a postgraduate apprenticeship in the law office. The result is that the graduate enters practice entirely untrained and unfitted for the actual work of his profession, either on its scientific or operative side, either for knowing or doing law. Is there not, then, an unreasonable burden thrown by the law school on the law office? Practicing lawyers are too busy to teach students nowadays. It is entirely a matter of favor or chance whether the post-graduate obtains any systematic training, except such crumbs of the practitioner's art as he is capable of picking up for himself. In view of the fact that the office is so essential a department of legal education, will not some philanthropist establish subsidized law offices throughout the country, where graduates of our "schools of jurisprudence," by right and not merely by good luck and favor, may find a clinic or laboratory for operations in the subject-matter of law practice and become as completely equipped for their work as the graduates of engineering and medical schools? If not, let professors of law consider well what is to be the next step in the evolution of their case-books. The Second Hague Peace Conference.* By JAMES BROWN SCOTT, LL. D., Solicitor of the Department of State and Technical Delegate of the United States to the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague. THE HE Acte Final of the recent Hague Conference states the calling of the Conference in a single, happy paragraph: "The Second International Peace Conference, first proposed by the President of the United States of America, having been, upon the invitation of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, convoked by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, met the 15th of June, 1907, at The Hague, in the Hall of Knights, charged with the mission to give a further development to those humanitarian principles which served as a basis for the work of the First Conference of 1899." From this preamble it appears that the Second Peace Conference was initiated by President Roosevelt, although the idea of a conference as an international institution is due to the Czar of Russia. It is, therefore, not too much to say that the United States and Russia were jointly interested in the Conference in a personal and a peculiar way beyond all others, and in the success of the Conference they undoubtedly have just cause for satisfaction. *An address delivered by Dr. Scott at a dinner tendered him under the auspices of the George Washington University December 21, 1907. But what is the nature of this Peace Conference proposed by the President of the United States and assembled through the co-operation of Russia and the Netherlands? It is an assembly composed of representatives of the States accepting and applying in their intercourse the principles of international law, and in this assembly each nation represented is considered a unit. and votes as a unit, although its delegates may be many or few. While it is, in one sense of the word, a deliberative body, it is not a parliament. Majorities show undoubtedly the trend of international feeling; but, each nation, being independent and charged with the preservation of its own existence, must judge for itself whether the conclusion of the majority is advantageous or detrimental either to its existence or le gitimate interests. The majority may give pause and cause a State in the minority to reconsider its position in order to see whether what the many desire is not also desirable for the few. Majorities, therefore, exist; but they exercise a moral influence. They do not coerce. At most the decree or resolution of a majority binds the majority. It does not, and, under existing conditions, it cannot well, preclude an individual State. A conference, then, is a diplomatic assembly, and the members of the conference represent diplomatically their respective nations. It is the nation that speaks, not the individual who expresses an opinion; albeit, this individual, by reason of his experience and ability, as well as the confidence which his character inspires, may exert a great personal influence, not only in the deliberations, but in the conclusions ultimately reached. As international law is based upon the legal equality of States, it necessarily follows that each State has a vote, and but one vote. But, while States are, legally speaking, equal, we know that in the world of affairs they do not possess equal influence. It is an axiom that men are created equal; but we interpret this equality, and properly, as an equality of legal right, as equality before the law. We do not mean that there is not and cannot be a difference in the individual caliber and ability of the man, and just as this man develops himself and acquires influence and standing, so the nation, by husbanding its resources and making a wise use of them, acquires standing and leadership in the family of nations. While, therefore, the conference admits the equality of nations, and while each nation thus responds to the roll-call, Montenegro influencing the vote as profoundly as Russia, the conference, nevertheless, admits that the support of the larger nations is necessary in order to give international force and effect to a proposition before it. For example: The attitude of Great Britain in matters of maritime law is controlling, and the view of Germany on the rights and duties of neutrals in time of war must carry great weight. The purpose of a conference is to reconcile divergent views, and, by conciliation and renunciation, if necessary, to produce substantial agreement. This often means that progressive measures are discarded for more moderate formulæ, just as the advanced guard of army halts that the laggard may catch up; for the purpose is not to secure the assent of the few, but to bind the many, and it is better to make haste slowly than by an excessive zeal to make no progress. The result of a conference, therefore, is often strangely at variance with the program. The sweeping reforms of the enthusiast are brushed aside, and in their place tentative measures, timid measures, perhaps, appear; but we must not forget that a step in advance is still a step in advance, and that the failure of to-day is the measure of the morrow. In order that a conference may be a success, nations should not only be willing to accept compromises and act in the spirit of compromise, but they should in advance of the conference decide what interests they may safely renounce in the interest of all, rather than, by a rigid attitude, endeavor to secure international recognition of national interests. The general interests of humanity exceed the interest of any one nation, however powerful, and just as society strips man of his absolute rights as an individual, so the members. of the family of nations must be prepared to renounce absolute rights in the interest of international harmony. As our Secretary of State said in his instructions to the American Delegation: "In the discussions upon every question it is important to remember that the object of the Conference is agreement, and not compulsion. If such conferences are to be made occasions for trying to force nations into positions which they consider against their interests, the Powers cannot be expected to send representatives to them. It is important, also, that the agree ments reached shall be genuine and not reluc tant. Otherwise they will inevitably fail to receive approval when submitted for the ratification of the Powers represented. Comparison of views and frank and considerate explanation and discussion may frequently resolve doubts, obviate difficulties, and lead to real agreement upon matters which at the outset have appeared insurmountable. It is not wise, however, to carry this process to the point of irritation. After reasonable discussion, if no agreement is reached, it is better to lay the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference, in the hope that intermediate consideration may dispose of the objections. Upon some questions where an agreement by only a part of the Powers represented would in itself be useful, such an agreement may be made, but it should always be with the most unreserved recognition that the other Powers withhold their concurrence with equal propriety and right. "The immediate results of such a conference must always be limited to a small part of the field which the more sanguine have hoped to see covered; but each successive conference will make the positions reached in the preceding conference its point of departure, and will bring to the consideration of further advances towards international agreement opinions affected by the acceptance and application of the previous agreements. Each conference will inevitably make further progress, and by successive steps results may be accomplished which have formerly appeared impossible." ly a peace conference, notwithstanding the fact that two of its three conventions dealt with war, for it sought to ameliorate the hardships and sufferings of warfare on land, as well as to apply to naval warfare the generous principles of the Geneva Convention. It did not attempt what would have been impossible to abolish warfare. It recognized it as an existing evil and wisely. attempted to lessen the evil which it could not eradicate. While recognizing, however, the possibility of war, the conference set itself seriously to devise measures whereby international difficulties might be settled before nations rush into war, led astray by passion and temporary interest, or drift slowly, but surely, into a state of actual hostility. The monument of the conference and its secure title to glory is the convention for the pacific solution of international conflicts, whereby it was provided that nations should use their best efforts to promote and to assure the pacific solution of international difficulties; that they might offer and exercise their good offices and mediation, either before or during war; and that the offer of good offices and of mediation should not be considered an unfriendly act. The conference, however, did not stop here. It created two institutions. in which facts involved in an international controversy might be found and in which the controversy itself might be determined as between litigant and litigant in a court of justice. But we must not judge a conference by its failures, even although we feel that the very failures open a vista of hope. A conference must be judged by its actual accomplishments. Tried by this criterion, the First Peace Conference justified its calling. It is true that the subject of disarmament met with little encouragement and no success. It is also true that attempts to limit the expenditures for military and naval establishments failed miserably, although these two subjects moved the Czar to call the conference. But this conference, which sat from the 18th day of May to the 29th day of July, 1899, marks the beginning of an era in the world's progress. The first conference was pre-eminent- contending countries under the guid The first institution was the International Commission of Inquiry, to be established by contending parties in order to substitute for passion and prejudice the impartial and conscientious examination of the facts in controversy by commissioners appointed by each of the ance of an umpire chosen by the commissioners or by a third power designated by the parties to the litigation. I need only call your attention in passing to the findings of the International Commission of Inquiry in the Dogger Bank incident, which at one time threatened to embroil Great Britain and Russia in war. The second institution was the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which consists of not more than four judges, versed in international law, appointed by each signatory of the convention; and from these judges, whose names are entered upon a list and notified to the signatories, a temporary tribunal may be created to pass upon an international difficulty presented to it for consideration. Each party to the controversy chooses, unless another method is specified, two arbiters, and the four so chosen select an umpire. If the arbiters do not agree, a third power is designated by the litigant countries to select the umpire. If the parties do not agree upon this third power, each party litigant chooses a power and the two powers thus chosen select the umpire. The conference adopted a code of procedure for the guidance of the tribunal when thus constituted. But the framers of the convention were not satisfied with the simple creation of this institution. They believed in arbitration and confessed their faith in Article XVI as follows: "In questions of a judicial character, and especially in questions regarding the interpretation or application of international treaties or conventions, arbitration is recognized by the Signatory Powers as the most efficacious and at the same time the most equitable method of deciding controversies which have not been settled by diplomatic methods." The nature and importance of these two institutions are evident. The Commission of International Inquiry secured the speedy and impartial ascertain ment of facts involved in an acute controversy which might not be delayed without a fear of war. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, with its temporary tribunal, was meant to supply an international and impartial body before which nations might appear as litigants and settle their controversies by the resort to justice and reason, without the unsatisfactory and brutal appeal to the sword. Four cases have tested the institution and justified its creation. The first Hague Conference was thus a peace conference. It did its duty well and nobly. It deserved a successor, and it had it. Will the Second Conference, which labored for four months, from June 15 to October 18, 1907, be equally fortunate? Does it deserve a successor? In the last two paragraphs of the Acte Final the Conference answered this query in the affirmative as follows: "Lastly, the Conference recommends to the Powers the holding of a third Peace Conference which might take place within a period similar to that which has elapsed since the preceding Conference on a date to be set by joint agreement among the Powers, and it draws their attention to the necessity of preparing the labors of that third Conference sufficiently in advance to have its deliberations follow their course with the requisite authority and speed. "In order to achieve that object the Conference thinks it would be very desirable that a preparatory Committee be charged by the Governments, about two years before the probable date of the meeting, with the duty of collecting the various propositions to be brought before the Conference, to seek out the matters susceptible of an early international settlement, and to prepare a program which the Governments should determine upon early enough to permit of its being thoroughly examined in each country. The Committee should further be charged with the duty of proposing a mode of organization and procedure for the Conference itself." Though guarded in language, the meaning of this important recommendation is clear. A conference is to meet at an analogous period-that is to say, eight years hence; the Powers, |
