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Coronation of King Frederick I

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last Spanish Habsburg reached Vienna. The negotiations had been interrupted by ministerial changes at the Imperial Court, and their resumption was due to general political reasons, not to the intervention of Father Wolff, the importance of which has been much exaggerated. The Crown Treaty assured to the Elector Frederick the Imperial recognition of his title and status as King in Prussia, in return for his entering into certain engagements. First, he promised to furnish in the expected war with France troops to the number of 8000 men. figure appears to have been taken from the secret treaty concluded between the Emperor Leopold and the Great Elector in 1686; but in that case the Emperor promised subsidies in return. In both cases the number was of course in excess of the scanty contingent of 1200 men required (according to the estimate of 1688, the year of the "Magdeburg Concert") from an Estate of the Empire whose fighting power was loosely reckoned at 50,000. Secondly, the Elector of Brandenburg was in all future Imperial elections to give the preference to princes of the House of Austria; and, thirdly, he was, in all important questions arising at the Diet, to vote on the side of that House, in so far as the interests of his own permitted. When the Imperial Elective Capitulations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are remembered, it seems preposterous to stigmatise this "Crown Treaty " as "humiliating" to the aspirant, who actually gained what he desired and what was in truth an indispensable condition for the future progress of his State.

Frederick now had the wish of his heart; and at Königsberg, on January 18, 1701, he placed on his head the royal crown, and then a second on the head of his consort, Sophia Charlotte, who would not have been herself or her mother's daughter, had she been so greatly impressed as he was by the solemnity of the occasion. After the King had assumed the crown, the ceremony of unction was performed by two clerics, a Lutheran and a Calvinist, who, as if to exemplify the maxim "No bishop, no king," had been "episcopated" for the purpose. In point of fact, Frederick I, as he was henceforth called, assumed and wore his Crown in absolute independence of any ecclesiastical authority on earth; and it has been justly observed that, unless it were the self-coronation of the excommunicated Emperor Frederick II at Jerusalem in the year 1229, history has to tell of few coronations so frankly "unspiritual" as that of his Prussian namesake. For the rest, it is on record that thirty thousand horses had dragged to Königsberg what was thought requisite in the way of material for the display. The obsequious Count Kolbe von Wartenberg was, immediately after the royal princes, decorated by the King with the new Order of the Black Eagle. The virtually defunct German Order, the badge of whose High Master had undergone this last adaptation, was galvanised into giving its solitary support to the action of Pope Clement XI, who issued a brief admonishing the Catholic Powers from recognising the

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Frederick I and the Grand Alliance [1699–1704

new monarchy. The papal brief might, in other circumstances, have had some effect in the Rhinelands, where, however (at Cologne), a retort was published against it by the Halle Professor von Ludewig, under a title which Luther himself might have inspired.1

Frederick I had well chosen the time for his coronation, more especially as the festivities accompanying it were prolonged for months instead of weeks. In May, 1702, the Empire together with the other members of the now consummated Grand Alliance, declared war against France; and the new "King in Prussia" put into the field a force of 14,000 men. This still left him free to use the larger part of his military resources as he thought best in influencing the course of the Northern War, in which the interests of his monarchy were even more closely concerned than in that of the Spanish Succession. Whatever side the Great Elector might have espoused in a conflict between Sweden on one side, and Poland and Denmark on the other, it is a tolerably safe assertion that he would not have left the occasion of such a conflict unutilised. At the opening of the Northern War in 1699, the Elector Frederick III had rendered to Sweden the great service of refusing to allow transit through his territory to 8000 Saxon troops, intended to hold Hanover and Celle in check; and in 1700 the Maritime Powers continued their efforts to keep Brandenburg out of the war. The Suedo-Danish conflict having been brought to a conclusion, the question was whether Frederick would, consistently with his previous refusal to Poland, prohibit the march through his dominions of the Swedish army moving upon Saxony. To keep Frederick William firm, Augustus II had, at an interview with him in Oranienbaum (January, 1700), promised not only to recognise the royal dignity which he had in view, but also to aid him towards the "better support of that dignity" by the acquisition of Swedish Pomerania. Frederick IV of Denmark having agreed to these undertakings, a Prussian force actu ally advanced to Leuzen, in the north-western corner of the Mark, in his support. The outbreak of the war with Russia (September, 1700) gave a new turn to the struggle. After the rout of the Russians at Narva (November), Frederick III would have played the part of mediator between Sweden and Poland, had this suited the plans and the temper of Charles XII, who declined to recognise the royal dignity soon afterwards assumed by the Elector, till he should have given convincing proofs of his friendly intentions. The Prussian efforts at mediation were renewed after the Swedish occupation of Courland in 1701; but the Swedish occupation of Poland continued through 1702, and the War continued to run its course without his official intervention.

In 1704, on the failure of the attempt, made with the aid of Marlborough (who visited Berlin in November), to induce Charles to

1 Päpstlicher Unfug wider die Krone Preussen.

1705-13]

Inaction of Prussia

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conclude peace, Frederick, as Droysen puts it, tried "another way. He offered Sweden an alliance for the common security of the two Crowns, and a suitable advantage for each of them the security consisting in the restriction of the limits of Poland by a partition of some of her territories- the King in Prussia to be, in addition, brought forward as successor to the Polish Crown. The proposal was Ilgen's, who thought that the motto "Nunc aut nunquam" had never been more

in season.

This partition project was once more urged upon Charles XII in the critical summer of 1705; and the death of Queen Sophia Charlotte on February 1 of that year, which led to a complete estrangement between Prussian and Hanoverian policy, helped to incline Prussia towards Sweden. In December Marlborough paid a second visit to Berlin, in order to keep Prussia neutral in the Northern War; but the effect of the further successes of the Swedish arms was irresistible, and in August, 1707, a "Perpetual Alliance" concluded between Sweden and Prussia guaranteed an armed aid of 6000 men on either side in the case of an attack on the other. Earlier in the year, Prussia had recognised Stanislaus as King of Poland in return for the Swedish acknowledgment of the Prussian ownership of Elbing-which however was not evacuated by the Swedish garrison. A weaker compact than this except in instances of dire necessity - it would be difficult to find in the course of Prussian history.

With "Poltawa's day" (July 8, 1709), however, the entire situation changed. A fresh partition seemed now at hand, in which Prussia, with a force of 50,000 men in readiness, might secure "Royal" (Polish) Prussia, with Warmia and a protectorate over Courland. But a meeting of the "three Fredericks," held at Potsdam before the month of July was out, was very far from leading to definite results; and even on the Tsar Peter, with whom he had an interview at Marienwerder (October), Frederick I could not prevail to accept his plan for a Polish partition (between Prussia, Russia, and Poland), which had thus early become a cardinal principle of the eastern policy of Prussia. Nor was the scheme given up on the temporary adoption (March, 1710) of Ilgen's plans of neutralising the Swedish dominions within the Empire, until the Tsar decisively rejected this expedient for securing to Prussia some of the fruits of the conflict without obliging her to take up a distinct side in it. In August, 1711, the Russian and Polish-Saxon troops (some 24,000 in all) gave proof of the resentment which the attitude of Prussia had called forth in their Governments by marching through the Mark to unite with the Danish troops in Mecklenburg; and Prussia was no nearer a choice of sides than ever. At no time had a more obvious duty lain upon her than in 1712 of insisting upon the termination of a War which was making the German north-east the cockpit of the combatants; yet she stood hesitating and facing both ways amidst the conflict of Danish, Polish, Russian and Hanoverian ambitions excited by the imminent

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The foreign policy of Frederick I

[1688-1713

collapse of the Swedish Power. In the midst of this conflict, the reign of Frederick I came to an end (February 25, 1713).

Thus the King who by his royal title professed to place the centre of gravity of his power in Prussia had failed to hold his own in this part of his monarchy, or on its north-eastern borders. On the other hand, his military resources played a prominent part in the great contest in western and central Europe, which it taxed all the diplomatic resources of the age to keep at all events in substance apart from the complications of the Northern War. In the War of the Spanish Succession, narrated in an earlier chapter, Prussian troops were engaged in large numbers, the contingent furnished by Frederick I rising to the very considerable height of 40,000 men; and they gained distinction at Blenheim, Turin, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet-at which last battle the Crown Prince Frederick William was present. Yet the Peace of Utrecht, which Frederick I did not live to see concluded, brought with it only a very imperfect compensation for the sacrifices which the new kingdom had made on one side of Europe, while undergoing humiliations on the other. Nor is it certain that even such gains as accrued to Prussia would have been secured in the settlement, had not a more energetic monarch than Frederick I occupied his throne.

At least, however, the foreign policy of Frederick I had in northern affairs avoided any action which might have led to the disruption of his composite monarchy; and in the great contemporaneous conflict in central and western Europe it had proved true to the best traditions of his House and to those of the last period of his father's rule. Nor had he forgone any opportunity of rounding off, or otherwise supplementing, the straggling body of territories of which the Prussian State was composed. After the prolonged negotiations on the matter of the Orange inheri tance, he cannot but have been deeply disappointed, on the death of William III (March 8, 1702, O.S.), to find that the last Prince of Orange of the old line had named as his heir John William Friso, Prince of Nassau-Dietz and Hereditary Stadholder of Friesland. The youthful heir's grandmother, Albertina Agnes, was the second surviving daughter of Prince Frederick Henry of Orange (the grandfather of William III), whereas Louisa Henrietta, the mother of Frederick of Prussia, was his eldest daughter. All that the King gained by his renunciation of the inheritance in its entirety was the possession of the countships of Lingen and Mörs, which were contiguous to the duchy of Cleves, and to which he, in 1707, added by purchase the countship of Tecklenburg. A more important series of purchases was made by him from his prodigal Saxon neighbour, at a total cost of 370,000 dollars - including, among other acquisitions immediate or on reversion, the hereditary bailiff ship (Erbvogtei) over the abbey of Quedlinburg, of which Augustus' discarded mistress, the celebrated Aurora von Königsmarck, was thus prevented from becoming Abbess, though she ultimately attained to the dignity of

1688-1713] Military & economic progress under Frederick I 669

Provost, of the foundation. On the frontier of Ducal Prussia the progressive system of extension could not be carried further by Frederick; on the other hand, he in 1707 acquired the principality of Neuchâtel, ¿ with the countship of Valengin, by his inheritance of the feudal rights of the House of Châlons. It has been suggested that the Prussian acquisition of Neuchâtel was designed as a step towards the annexation of Franche Comté. But, though in 1709 the allies did invade Franche Comté, it would be difficult to show that this operation was conducted with a view to the aggrandisement of the Prussian monarchy. Although the first Prussian King had thus not very largely augmented his territories, he had undeniably contributed to the power of his State and the prosperity of its population in ways more direct than that of the acquisition of a royal Crown. It has been seen how he steadily followed his father in fostering the growth of a standing army, which he gradually raised from a total of 30,000, or thereabouts, to one of nearly 50,000 men. Of even superior significance for the futurethough dropped by his successor, and not revived within the next two reigns was the attempt of Frederick I to form a militia, or reserve for purely defensive purposes, which he intended to consist of about 10,000 men. In any case, it is specially noticeable that the organisation of its army gave the first practical expression to the idea of a Prussian monarchy. Formally, of course, no such monarchy as yet existed; it was only in one section of his possessions, and with reference to that section (which did not form part of the Germanic Empire), that the Elector of Brandenburg bore the appellation of King. But, from 1701 onwards, his entire army was termed the royal Prussian army; and, furthermore, the several parts of the Brandenburg-Prussian State from which the levies for this army were drawn were called Prussian provincesa term of great historic import, but for a long time without legal foundation.

Hand in hand with the advance towards political independence marked by the assumption of a royal Crown and the creation of a royal army went the emancipation from Imperial control of the jurisdiction obtaining in any part of the Brandenburg-Prussian territories. In 1701, the privilegium de non appellando, in accordance with which no appeals in the Brandenburg electorate went beyond the electoral Courts, was extended to the whole of the King-Elector's dominions; in the ensuing year, a Supreme Court of Appeal was established at Berlin. Thus the only remnant of the Imperial authority which remained in Brandenburg-Prussia consisted of the relatively insignificant military obligations to which the Empire could still lay claim.

Connected alike with the needs of an enlarged territorial military system and with the increase in the general expenditure of his Government were Frederick I's sustained endeavours for the furtherance

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