first duty and interest would have been to secure the tranquillity of the capital by a series of measures, which it was no arduous task to carry into execution. But in undertaking this, he had presumed too much on his own energy to hold the reins of government was precisely by far too much for his capacity. In the course of a few months, Rome became the scene of the most scandalous anarchy, which reminds us more than once of certain days in the Paris of 1848. Clodius reigned supreme over the mob, whilst Pompey endeavoured to outvie him with his bands of freedmen, gladiators, and slaves, whom he let loose against the mob-king. Naturally enough, the arch-ruler soon became helpless and ridiculous, and this feeling, which rankled within his own breast, soon turned into anger and hatred. His very helplessness drove him into desperate measures.

In the mean time Cæsar had pushed on from conquest to conquest until he reached the Rhine and the British Channel. The report of these victories, flying one after another to Rome, like so many claps of thunder, could no longer be ignored nor pooh-poohed by the aristocracy. The effeminate and long-derided Sybarite had, all of a sudden, become the idol of the people, so that Pompey's laurels were completely thrown into the shade by those of his youthful rival. For a rival indeed now he was: no more an obscure adjutant. To be sure, both triumvirs were bound by closer ties than those of a political character; but yet what a difference already in their mutual relations! Now was Pompey obliged to seek for support against his ally, in order to match his power. To apply to the people was a sheer impossibility, for he had irritated the mob by his late quarrel with Clodius. His only hope was therefore in the Senate. "Besides," observes very properly M. Mommsen, "even a man of Cæsar's genial stamp had learned to know that a democratical policy was utterly worn out, and that mob-tendencies would by no means lead to the throne. During the present interval between the republic and monarchy, to set up for a prophet and doff the mantle which Cæsar himself had long ago cast off; to mimic the great ideal of Caius Gracchus would have amounted to downright folly. The very party which, at a later period, took its name from the democratical agitation, did not even weigh a feather in the issue of the forthcoming contest."* It is hardly possible to draw a more correct picture of the crisis; at the same time, the above words flatly contradict Napoleon's

* Mommsen's Romische Geschichte, 3ter Band, S. 295. Berlin, 1866, 4te Auflage.

theory, which makes Cæsar a constant representative of popular opinions and feelings.

So Pompey took his stand with the Senate, whose importance now began once more to rise in proportion. Nay, as soon as it became apparent that Cæsar did not so much aim at reforming as at overthrowing the Republican constitution, the ablest men of the popular party went over to Pompey's side. Perhaps at this very last moment, had these men been endowed with any degree of public virtue, energy, and talent, they might still have preserved from imminent destruction the long-revered institutions of their forefathers. With the help of the Senate, and the support of numberless republicans scattered throughout Italy, they might have withstood the power of the two arch-triumvirs. But Cæsar knew well with whom he had to deal. His gold poured in full streams towards Rome; and from Rome another stream of high-born, but necessitous ladies, of thriftless young nobles, of speculating, half-bankrupt adventurers, flowed towards Gaul, there to draw from the source itself, whilst those who were obliged to stay at home had recourse to Cæsar's agents, who were generous and open-handed to every man of any influence. They had strict orders, on the other hand, not to compromise that exalted name by intriguing with any demagogue of the mob-party. The very edifices which Cæsar built at his own expense in the city -edifices wherein the jobbing capitalists of the time found more than one source of profit, were in themselves a speculation. The same may be said of his splendid games and festivities. All this was making political stock for Cæsar, or for the future monarch, but had nothing to do with Messiahs, or ideas of reform.

Let us hurry on through the internal events of these years, which forced Pompey to throw himself once more, much against his own will, into the arms of Cæsar, and renew a second confederacy at Luca. The Imperial biographer makes much of this famous meeting, as a set-off in favour of his hero. Let us endeavour to see the matter as it stood, in its naked reality. Although Cæsar was informed day by day of every incident of importance which took place in Rome; although he watched the events, from the southern limits of his province, with intense anxiety, as far, at least, as the conduct of the Gallic War would allow, he was not yet ready to throw down the gauntlet. However, it was necessary to act at once with firmness and decision. The aristocracy was daily gaining ground, and almost denounced war against him, no less than against his two helpless colleagues. According to all probabilities, his return to Gaul would become the signal of decided

The

hostilities. So in April of the year 56 B.C., Crassus left the city to meet Cæsar at Ravenna; shortly after, they both repaired to Luca, where they were joined by Pompey. The latter had alleged, as a pretext for his departure, the necessity of superintending in person the arrival of corn from Sardinia and Africa. The most distinguished adherents of the triumvirs flocked to the provincial town, whilst a whole procession of noblemen soon set in from Rome, to the amount of two hundred senators alone, without reckoning other persons of distinction. Evidently, Cæsar held, at this critical moment, the very existence of the commonwealth within his own grasp. But that was a strong reason for not jeopardizing his position by any act of rashness on his part. So he used the opportunity to establish the tripartite alliance on a stronger basis. most important commands after that of Gaul were awarded to his two colleagues, and their possession made sure of both by financial and military measures. Cæsar reserved for himself the prolongation of his own command until the year 49 B.C., that is to say, for five years longer. At the same time, he was authorized to raise his forces to ten legions, to be paid out of the public treasury. Now, all this was setting at defiance the authority of the Senate. But indeed this was not all. The future consulships, together with a body of troops, to be located in Southern Italy, for the purpose of awing the Opposition into obedience, such were the different precautions adopted by Cæsar for the future. All questions of importance being thus settled, he treated in a light, off-hand way every other secondary difference, and we may presume that his winning manners did the rest. Even Clodius was persuaded to send back to their kennels his political bloodhounds—not the least feat, by the bye, of the all-powerful charmer.

The whole negotiations and series of measures bear upon them the stamp of Caesar's master mind. Throughout, they offer the character of a compromise. Pompey had come to him more like a political refugee turned bankrupt than as a rival. Cæsar might have at once declared the coalition broken altogether, or taken it up again on his own terms. In either case Pompey remained, as before, a zero. If a rupture did not ensue, still he was obliged to bow before his great rival's protection. Did he, on the contrary, break with Cæsar, he could but fall back upon a hateful alliance with the Senate the most hollow of all combinations. We may pause here to inquire what reasons could induce the conqueror of Gaul to make such enormous concessions to his inferior and hostile competitors? Most probably, in the first place, he was not yet sufficiently master of his own soldiers to push them

headlong into rebellion against the lawful government of their fatherland, which they had been accustomed, from their childhood upwards, to serve. It is all very well to talk of political Messiahs, and of high-flown systems of progress; there are home-strung ties and feelings which men are not prone to break at once asunder. We firmly believe that such must have been the case with Cæsar, and the eagle eye of the statesman detected in his present situation a flaw that no other could easily discover. On the other hand, he would have been obliged to recall his army from Gaul before its final subjugation. To his credit be it said, he preferred the extension of Roman civilization and Roman power to his own immediate interest, however that interest, as a candidate for the throne, stood in the way of his brilliant victories. Finally, a Finally, a feeling of a still purer nature may have inspired his conduct on this occasion; in times not very distant he had himself been helpless and unknown, in the same position as Pompey was now to him. The great man had then proffered a saving hand, and retired to the background, in order to leave free room to the aspiring youth. And then, had ho not married, and did he not yet fondly love Cæsar's only Julia? In the soul of the statesman beat also the heart of a father. Doubtless, all these considerations, and fears, and views, swept to and fro before the great Roman's eyes when he resolved to conclude at Luca the second triumvirate.

It would be tedious to push on any further a review of Cæsar's acts and policy previous to the civil war, the period at which closes the second volume of his new historian. It would merely present the spectacle of the same ability, the same arts and tactics, displayed to serve the objects of an inordinate ambition. But as to those higher views for which Napoleon III. gives him credit, we must confess our utter incredulity on the subject, and we shall wait until he supplies us with such historical evidence as may justify these assumptions. Yet, this does not destroy our admiration for the illustrious man who was so decidedly superior to all his contemporaries, through his clemency, for instance, a virtue almost unknown to antiquity. Our object has simply been to bring down the idol to its proper level, by showing that its lower parts were not of pure gold. For that purpose, we have had recourse to the most indisputable authorities,-the same, indeed, which his Imperial Majesty had before his eyes, though he seems to have read them in a spirit somewhat different from what we understand by the word IMPARTIALITY. The modern History of Julius Cæsar, in fact, reminds one far too frequently that there once lived such a personage as Napoleon the First.

33

ART. II-CANON OAKELEY'S LYRA LITURGICA.

Lyra Liturgica. Reflections in verse for Holy Days and Seasons. London: Burns, Lambert, & Oates. 1865.

Institutiones Liturgiques. Par le R. P. DOM PROSPER GUERANGER. 8vo. Paris, 1841.

Origines et Raisons de la Liturgie Catholique, en Forme de Dictionnaire. Par l'Abbé J. B. E. Pascal. Royal 8vo. Paris: Migne. 1863.

AMONG the more obvious characteristics of the Catholic Liturgy there is none more striking, and at the same time none less realized in practice, than its division into times and seasons, and the accommodation of its services and forms to the peculiar spirit or genius of each. The Liturgy of its very essence is a public prayer; not the expression of individual intelligence or individual will, but the representation of what may be called the corporate piety of the whole Christian community. In the devotional exercises of the Liturgy, the individual feeling is merged in the common spirit of the corporate worship; and in the arrangement of its services provision is made, by the systematic adjustment of the several parts, for the adequate expression of every sentiment of love, adoration, gratitude, and supplication, which the Church as the representative of all her children, without exception, pours out before the throne of the Almighty Father, as well, or even more, for all, as for each one on his own particular behalf.

And this, although by no means the sole object of the institution of sacred times and seasons, is nevertheless one of its most important results. Not alone does it secure the completeness and harmony of public worship, but it provides in its all-embracing cycle a place for each in its turn among the manifold relations of the creature to the Creator, now bringing into prominence the mysteries of justice, and now those of and grace mercy; pouring out alternately the penitent wailings of the prodigal and the tender aspirations of the grateful child restored to a Father's love; passing in succession from Bethlehem to the Mount of Olives, from Thabor to Calvary; at one time appealing to the love of a Father, at another humbly deprecating the rigour of a Judge; but never, throughout all its alternations, losing sight of the great characteristics VOL. VII. NO. XIII. [New Series.]

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