Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy
Oxford University Press, 03.08.1995 - 288 Seiten
This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not.
Was andere dazu sagen - Rezension schreiben
Es wurden keine Rezensionen gefunden.
Nature and Function
A Motivational Problem
SelfControl Akrasia and SecondOrder Desires
SelfControl and Belief
SelfControl Akrasia and Emotion
The Upper Reaches of SelfControl and the Ideally SelfControlled Person
From SelfControl to Autonomy
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
A-ing ability able accept accordance agent akratic action argued argument attempt attitude autonomous basis behavior believe best judgment Beth better judgment capacity causally chapter choice claim commitment compatibilist compelled conception concern connection Consider continent course decide decisive decisive better deliberation deliberative desire determinism deterministic developed difference doxastic effect effort evaluative evidence example exercise experience explain feelings freedom Further given grounds hold human identified Imagine indeterminism instances intention intentional action intentionally internal issue judges judges it best kind lacks least less libertarian matter means Mele mind moral responsibility motivational nature notion one's person perspective philosophical position possessed possible powers practical preferences present principle pro-attitudes problem produced proximal psychological question reasons regarding relevant requires respect scenario self-control sense smoke sometimes sort sufficient suggestion Suppose things thought tion true values wants