SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
There having been an Associate Justice of this Court appointed since the commencement of this term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said court among the Circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz. :
For the First Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, SAMUEL BLATCHFORD, Associate Justice.
For the Third Circuit, JOSEPH P. BRADLEY, Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, MELVILLE W. FULLER, Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR, Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, JoHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, SAMUEL F. MILLER, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, STEPHEN J. FIELD, Associate Justice.
ALABAMA CLAIMS, COURT OF.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3.
Where appeals by five defendants from a final decree were allowed in open
court in October, 1885, and the amount of the supersedeas bond as to
one of them was fixed at $100, but he never gave it, and the others
perfected their appeal, and the record was filed in this court in
October, 1886, and, when the case came on for hearing in November,
1889, he asked leave to file a proper bond, it was granted nunc pro
tunc as of the day of hearing. Shepherd v. Pepper, 626.
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. It was the purpose of Congress by the 12th and 13th sections of the
army appropriation act of July 15, 1870, 16 Stat. 318, 319, to reduce
the number of officers in the army, and to that end § 11 authorized the
President to eliminate from it officers who were unfit for the discharge of
their duties by reason of a cause which had no meritorious claim upon
the consideration of the government, while § 12 made a general grant
of power to the President to make the reduction by selecting the best,
and mustering out the residue; and the President, being empowered to
proceed under either grant, could commence proceedings under § 11,
and abandon them, and then proceed under § 12. Street v. United
States, 299.
2. The 12th section of the army appropriation act of July 15, 1870, 16
Stat. 318, authorized the President to fill vacancies in the army then
existing, or which might occur prior to the 1st day of January then
next. The 1st day of January, 1871, fell on Sunday; Held, that, in
the exercise of the power thus conferred, an order made on the 2d day
of January, 1871, was valid. Ib.
3. The executive action, under the army appropriation act of July 15,
1870, reducing the army, was recognized by Congress in 18 Stat. 497,
c. 159, § 2; 20 Stat. 35, c. 50; 20 Stat. 321, c. 100; 20 Stat. 354,
c. 175; 21 Stat. 510, c. 151, and was thereby validated, even if otherwise
invalid. lb.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. It is settled law in Virginia that an assignment by a debtor for the
benefit of creditors will not be declared void, as given "with intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers" etc., unless such an
inference is so irresistible as to preclude any other; that the fact that
creditors may be delayed or hindered, is not, of itself, sufficient to
vacate the instrument; and that one creditor may be preferred over
another. Peters v. Bain, 670.
2. When an assignment for the benefit of partnership and individual
creditors includes all the property of the grantors as partners and
individually, it should be construed distributively, partnership assets
being applied to the payment of partnership debts, and individual
assets to individual liabilities. Ib.
3. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences, authorized
the trustees to "make sale of the real and other personal estate hereby
conveyed, at public auction or private sale, at such time or times, and
place or places, and after such notice as to them shall seem best, and
they may make such sale upon such terms and conditions as to them
shall seem best, except that at any sale of said property, real or per-
sonal, at public auction, any creditor secured by this deed in the
second class above enumerated shall have the right to purchase any
part or parcel of said property so sold, and pay the said trustees there-
for, at its full face value, the amount found due such purchaser secured
by this deed, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enable such
creditor to complete the payment of his purchase money, and to
enable as many creditors as possible to become bidders on these
terms, the said trustees may have the real estate hereby conveyed, or
any part thereof, laid off into lots or parcels, as they may think best;"
Held, that the deed was not void in law because of the insertion of
this provision. Ib.
4. The individual members of a private banking house, who were also the
controlling directors in a national bank, made an assignment of their
property for the benefit of creditors, which assignment was assailed
as fraudulent in several matters, among which were alleged frauds
upon the national bank, and frauds upon their own depositors previ-
ous to the assignment; Held, that violations of their fiduciary rela-
tions to the bank, or their treatment of their own depositors did not
render the assignment of all their property for the benefit of their
creditors, fraudulent for that reason. Ib.
5. The knowledge by a director and stockholder in a national bank that
the bank is insolvent, does not invalidate an assignment of all his
property for the benefit of his creditors, with preferences, made with
such knowledge. Ib.
6. The court below was right in finding no evidence in this case of a
fraudulent intent on the part of the firm or either of its members to
hinder and delay their creditors. Ib.
7. The individual partners in a private bank were also directors in a
national bank, and, by reason of their position, became possessed of
a large part of the means of the national bank which they used in
their own business. They assigned all their property to trustees for
the benefit of their creditors. The national bank also suspended
and went into the hands of a receiver; Held, (1) That the receiver
was entitled to the surrender of such of the property as had been
actually purchased with the moneys of the bank as he might elect;
but that purchases made and paid for out of the general mass could
not be claimed by the receiver unless it could be shown that moneys
of the bank in the general fund at the time of the purchase were
appropriated for that purpose; (2) That the receiver was not estopped
by such election and taking, from receiving the full benefit of the
deed of trust in favor of the national bank. Ib.
8. In Virginia, trustees and beneficiaries in a deed of trust to secure
bona fide debts occupy the position of purchasers for a valuable
consideration. Ib.
9. When the counsel of an insolvent debtor draws an assignment of his
client's property to himself as trustee for the benefit of creditors,
he may be presumed to have had knowledge of the dealings of the
insolvent with his creditors. Ib.
10. Under the circumstances of this case a decree directing the payment
of the costs of suit out of the trust fund is correct.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3.
The supervisory powers of the Attorney General over the accounts of
district attorneys, marshals, clerks and other officers of the courts of the
United States under Rev. Stat. § 368, are the same which were vested in
the Secretary of the Interior before the creation of the Department of
Justice. United States v. Waters, 208.
AUDITOR IN TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
The powers of an Auditor in the Treasury Department are limited to the
examination and auditing of accounts, to the certification of balances,
and to their transmission to the comptroller; and do not extend to
the allowance or disallowance of the same. United States v. Waters,
1. A customary depositor in a bank in New York deposited with it a sight
draft on a railway company in Boston. It was described as a “check"
on the deposit ticket, which distinguished between "checks" and
"bills." He had made similar deposits before, never drawing against
them, the bank always reserving the right to charge exchange and
interest for the time taken in collection. The depositor's bank-book
was with the bank at the time of the deposit. No entry was made in
it until some days later, and then not by direction of the depositor.
The receiving teller applied to the cashier for instructions on the
receipt of the deposit and was directed to receive it as cash. The
bank sent the draft to Boston for collection, and it was collected
there. Before that was done, the bank in New York, which was
insolvent when the transaction took place, suspended, closed its doors,
and never resumed; Held, that the question whether the bank had
become the owner of the draft, or was only acting as the agent of its
customer, was one of fact, rather than of law, and that there was
not enough evidence to establish that the customer understood that
the bank had become the owner of the paper. St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway v. Johnston, 566.
2. When a bank has become hopelessly insolvent, and its president knows
that it is so, it is a fraud to receive deposits of checks from an
innocent depositor, ignorant of its condition, and he can reclaim them
or their proceeds; and the pleadings in this case are so framed as to
give the plaintiff in error the benefit of this principle. Ib.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE;
CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.
A person in failing circumstances conveyed away his equity of redemption
in mortgaged real estate, and then became bankrupt. His assignee in
bankruptcy recovered the tract from the grantee in an action brought
for that purpose, to which the mortgagee was not made party, and
then conveyed it by deed to a purchaser. The mortgagee sued in
the state court to foreclose his mortgage, making the bankrupt, his
assignee, and the grantee of the assignee, parties; the land was sold
under a decree of foreclosure; and the purchaser under it received a
deed and was put into possession. Thereupon the grantee of the
assignee in bankruptcy brought ejectment against him to recover
possession; Held, that the state court had jurisdiction of the fore-
closure suit, and had a right to hear and determine whether the
mortgage debt was still a lien, and whether the mortgagee's claim was
upon the land or upon the fund in the hands of the assignee in bank-
ruptcy. Adams v. Crittenden, 296.
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