SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
There having been an Associate Justice of this Court appointed since the commencement of this term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said court among the Circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz. :
For the First Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, SAMUEL BLATCHFORD, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, JOSEPH P. BRADLEY, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, MELVILLE W. FULLER, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, JoHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, SAMUEL F. MILLER, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, STEPHEN J. FIELD, Associate Justice.
ALABAMA CLAIMS, COURT OF. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3.
Where appeals by five defendants from a final decree were allowed in open court in October, 1885, and the amount of the supersedeas bond as to one of them was fixed at $100, but he never gave it, and the others perfected their appeal, and the record was filed in this court in October, 1886, and, when the case came on for hearing in November, 1889, he asked leave to file a proper bond, it was granted nunc pro tunc as of the day of hearing. Shepherd v. Pepper, 626.
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. It was the purpose of Congress by the 12th and 13th sections of the army appropriation act of July 15, 1870, 16 Stat. 318, 319, to reduce the number of officers in the army, and to that end § 11 authorized the President to eliminate from it officers who were unfit for the discharge of their duties by reason of a cause which had no meritorious claim upon the consideration of the government, while § 12 made a general grant of power to the President to make the reduction by selecting the best, and mustering out the residue; and the President, being empowered to proceed under either grant, could commence proceedings under § 11, and abandon them, and then proceed under § 12. Street v. United States, 299.
2. The 12th section of the army appropriation act of July 15, 1870, 16 Stat. 318, authorized the President to fill vacancies in the army then existing, or which might occur prior to the 1st day of January then next. The 1st day of January, 1871, fell on Sunday; Held, that, in the exercise of the power thus conferred, an order made on the 2d day of January, 1871, was valid. Ib.
3. The executive action, under the army appropriation act of July 15, 1870, reducing the army, was recognized by Congress in 18 Stat. 497, c. 159, § 2; 20 Stat. 35, c. 50; 20 Stat. 321, c. 100; 20 Stat. 354, c. 175; 21 Stat. 510, c. 151, and was thereby validated, even if otherwise invalid. lb.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. It is settled law in Virginia that an assignment by a debtor for the benefit of creditors will not be declared void, as given "with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers" etc., unless such an inference is so irresistible as to preclude any other; that the fact that creditors may be delayed or hindered, is not, of itself, sufficient to vacate the instrument; and that one creditor may be preferred over another. Peters v. Bain, 670.
2. When an assignment for the benefit of partnership and individual creditors includes all the property of the grantors as partners and individually, it should be construed distributively, partnership assets being applied to the payment of partnership debts, and individual assets to individual liabilities. Ib.
3. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences, authorized the trustees to "make sale of the real and other personal estate hereby conveyed, at public auction or private sale, at such time or times, and place or places, and after such notice as to them shall seem best, and they may make such sale upon such terms and conditions as to them shall seem best, except that at any sale of said property, real or per- sonal, at public auction, any creditor secured by this deed in the second class above enumerated shall have the right to purchase any part or parcel of said property so sold, and pay the said trustees there- for, at its full face value, the amount found due such purchaser secured by this deed, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enable such creditor to complete the payment of his purchase money, and to enable as many creditors as possible to become bidders on these terms, the said trustees may have the real estate hereby conveyed, or any part thereof, laid off into lots or parcels, as they may think best;" Held, that the deed was not void in law because of the insertion of this provision. Ib.
4. The individual members of a private banking house, who were also the controlling directors in a national bank, made an assignment of their property for the benefit of creditors, which assignment was assailed as fraudulent in several matters, among which were alleged frauds upon the national bank, and frauds upon their own depositors previ- ous to the assignment; Held, that violations of their fiduciary rela- tions to the bank, or their treatment of their own depositors did not render the assignment of all their property for the benefit of their creditors, fraudulent for that reason. Ib.
5. The knowledge by a director and stockholder in a national bank that the bank is insolvent, does not invalidate an assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors, with preferences, made with such knowledge. Ib.
6. The court below was right in finding no evidence in this case of a fraudulent intent on the part of the firm or either of its members to hinder and delay their creditors. Ib.
7. The individual partners in a private bank were also directors in a national bank, and, by reason of their position, became possessed of a large part of the means of the national bank which they used in their own business. They assigned all their property to trustees for the benefit of their creditors. The national bank also suspended and went into the hands of a receiver; Held, (1) That the receiver was entitled to the surrender of such of the property as had been actually purchased with the moneys of the bank as he might elect; but that purchases made and paid for out of the general mass could not be claimed by the receiver unless it could be shown that moneys of the bank in the general fund at the time of the purchase were appropriated for that purpose; (2) That the receiver was not estopped by such election and taking, from receiving the full benefit of the deed of trust in favor of the national bank. Ib.
8. In Virginia, trustees and beneficiaries in a deed of trust to secure bona fide debts occupy the position of purchasers for a valuable consideration. Ib.
9. When the counsel of an insolvent debtor draws an assignment of his client's property to himself as trustee for the benefit of creditors, he may be presumed to have had knowledge of the dealings of the insolvent with his creditors. Ib.
10. Under the circumstances of this case a decree directing the payment of the costs of suit out of the trust fund is correct.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3.
The supervisory powers of the Attorney General over the accounts of district attorneys, marshals, clerks and other officers of the courts of the United States under Rev. Stat. § 368, are the same which were vested in the Secretary of the Interior before the creation of the Department of Justice. United States v. Waters, 208.
AUDITOR IN TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
The powers of an Auditor in the Treasury Department are limited to the examination and auditing of accounts, to the certification of balances, and to their transmission to the comptroller; and do not extend to the allowance or disallowance of the same. United States v. Waters,
1. A customary depositor in a bank in New York deposited with it a sight draft on a railway company in Boston. It was described as a “check" on the deposit ticket, which distinguished between "checks" and "bills." He had made similar deposits before, never drawing against them, the bank always reserving the right to charge exchange and interest for the time taken in collection. The depositor's bank-book was with the bank at the time of the deposit. No entry was made in it until some days later, and then not by direction of the depositor. The receiving teller applied to the cashier for instructions on the receipt of the deposit and was directed to receive it as cash. The bank sent the draft to Boston for collection, and it was collected there. Before that was done, the bank in New York, which was insolvent when the transaction took place, suspended, closed its doors, and never resumed; Held, that the question whether the bank had become the owner of the draft, or was only acting as the agent of its customer, was one of fact, rather than of law, and that there was not enough evidence to establish that the customer understood that the bank had become the owner of the paper. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway v. Johnston, 566.
2. When a bank has become hopelessly insolvent, and its president knows that it is so, it is a fraud to receive deposits of checks from an innocent depositor, ignorant of its condition, and he can reclaim them or their proceeds; and the pleadings in this case are so framed as to give the plaintiff in error the benefit of this principle. Ib.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE; CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.
A person in failing circumstances conveyed away his equity of redemption in mortgaged real estate, and then became bankrupt. His assignee in bankruptcy recovered the tract from the grantee in an action brought for that purpose, to which the mortgagee was not made party, and then conveyed it by deed to a purchaser. The mortgagee sued in the state court to foreclose his mortgage, making the bankrupt, his assignee, and the grantee of the assignee, parties; the land was sold under a decree of foreclosure; and the purchaser under it received a deed and was put into possession. Thereupon the grantee of the assignee in bankruptcy brought ejectment against him to recover possession; Held, that the state court had jurisdiction of the fore- closure suit, and had a right to hear and determine whether the mortgage debt was still a lien, and whether the mortgagee's claim was upon the land or upon the fund in the hands of the assignee in bank- ruptcy. Adams v. Crittenden, 296.
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