BETTERMENTS.

1. A tract of land in Leadville, Colorado, was deemed by the municipal
authorities as the most convenient and proper situation for the erec-
tion of a school-house, which had become a necessity in that part of
the town. The person in possession claimed under what was known
as a squatter title. Another person laid claim to it under a placer
patent from the United States. Both claims of title were known to
the authorities, and were submitted by them in good faith to counsel
for advice. The counsel advised them that the squatter title was good,
and on the faith of that advice they purchased the lot from the per-
son in possession, and built a school-house upon it, at a cost of $10,000.
The claimant under the placer title brought an action of ejectment
to recover possession. The municipal authorities, being satisfied that
he must prevail, filed their bill in equity to enjoin him from proceed-
ing to judgment in his action at law, and commenced proceedings
under a statute of the State for condemnation of the tract for public
use. The plaintiff in the ejectment suit appeared in the condemna-
tion proceedings, and claimed to recover from the municipality the
value of the improvements as well as the value of the land as it was
when acquired by the municipality; and, being a citizen of Kansas,
had the cause removed, on the ground of diverse citizenship, into the
Circuit Court of the United States. It was there agreed that the
value of the property, without the improvements, was $3000; and the
court instructed the jury that they should find "that the value of
said property at this date is $3000;" Held, that this instruction was
correct. Searle v. School District No. 2, 553.

2. No vested right is impaired by giving to an occupant of land, claiming
title and believing himself to be the owner, the value of improve-
ments made by him under that belief, when ousted by the legal owner
under an adverse title. Ib.

See TRUSTEE.

BIGAMY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4.

BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. On June 14, 1887, the Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati drew a
draft for $100,000 on the Chemical National Bank of New York City,
payable to the order of the American Exchange National Bank of
Chicago, and put it into the hands of one W., who delivered it for
value to K. & Co. They endorsed it for deposit to their account in
the Chicago Bank, which credited its amount to them and paid their
checks against it. It was not paid; Held, that the draft was a foreign
bill of exchange; that W. did not act as the agent of the Cincinnati
Bank; and that in a suit by the Chicago Bank against the receiver of the
Cincinnati Bank, which had failed, to recover the amount of the draft,

the Chicago Bank was a bona fide holder and owner of it for value,
and want of consideration could not be shown by the receiver. Arm-
strong v. American Exchange Bank, 433.

2. The fact that the draft was payable to the order of the plaintiff was
not notice to it that W. was not its purchaser or remitter; and the
Cincinnati Bank had represented to the plaintiff that W. was a bona
fide holder of the draft, for his use in making good trades of his with
K. & Co. Ib.

3. An instrument signed by the Cincinnati Bank, dated June 14, 1887,
addressed to the Chicago Bank, stating that W. & Co. had deposited
$200,000 to the credit of the latter bank, for the use of K. & Co. was
put by the former bank into the hands of W. & Co., who delivered it
to K. & Co., who deposited it with the Chicago Bank, which gave
credit for its amount to K. & Co. as cash, and paid with a part of it
an overdraft of K. & Co. and honored their checks against the rest of
it. In a suit by the Chicago Bank against the said receiver to recover
the $200,000; Held, that the instrument was in its legal character a
certificate of deposit; that the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of
it, for value; that, as the Cincinnati Bank had represented to the
plaintiff that it had received from W. & Co. consideration for the
paper, it was estopped from setting up the falsity of such representa-
tion; that the plaintiff did not take the paper under such circumstances
as would put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry; and that there
was nothing to lead the plaintiff to suspect that the money represented
by the paper was that of the Cincinnati Bank. Ib.

4. A defence set up to the suit on the certificate of deposit was, that H.,
(the vice-president of the Cincinnati Bank,) its assistant cashier, and
W., of W. & Co., conspired to defraud that bank by using its funds in
speculating in wheat in Chicago, through K. & Co., so as to make a
corner" in wheat; Held, that rumors on the board of trade and in
the public press that II. was the real principal for whom W. was act-
ing, could not affect the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff could not
refuse to honor the checks of K. & Co. against the deposit, on the
ground that K. & Co. intended to use the money to pay antecedent
losses in the gambling wheat transactions. Ib.

5. The statute of Illinois, 1 Starr & Curtis Stat. 1885, pp. 791, 792, §§ 130,
131, and the case of Pearce v. Foote, 113 Illinois, 228, do not apply to
the present case. lb.

See BANK.

CASES AFFIRMED, APPLIED OR APPROVED.

1. Harshman v. Knox County. Knox County v. Harshman, 152.

2. Phænix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312. California
Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 387.

3. All the questions presented and argued in this case have been often
considered and decided by this court, and the court adheres to the

decisions in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147; Bernards Township
v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341; and New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S.
336. Bernards Township v. Morrison, 523.

4. Cotton v. New Providence, 47 N. J. Law, 401; and Mutual Benefit Life
Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 N. J. Law, 235, approved. Bernards Township v.
Morrison, 523.

5. County of Greene v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187, followed. Lincoln County v.
Luning, 529.

6. This case differs in no material fact from Delano v. Butler, 118 U. S.
634, and is governed by it. Aspinwall v. Butler, 595.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

The case distinguished from that of United States v. Langston, 118 U. S.
389. Wallace v. United States, 180.

CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

1. An instrument signed by the Cincinnati Bank, dated June 14, 1887,
addressed to the Chicago Bank, stating that W. & Co. had deposited
$200,000 to the credit of the latter bank, for the use of K. & Co., was
put by the former bank into the hands of W. & Co., who delivered it
to K. & Co., who deposited it with the Chicago Bank, which gave credit
for its amount to K. & Co. as cash, and paid with a part of it an over-
draft of K. & Co. and honored their checks against the rest of it. In a
suit by the Chicago Bank against the said receiver to recover the $200,-
000; Held, that the instrument was in its legal character a certificate
of deposit; that the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of it, for
value; that, as the Cincinnati Bank had represented to the plaintiff
that it had received from W. & Co. consideration for the paper, it was
estopped from setting up the falsity of such representation; that the
plaintiff did not take the paper under such circumstances as would put
a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry; and that there was nothing to
lead the plaintiff to suspect that the money represented by the paper
was that of the Cincinnati Bank. Armstrong v. American Exchange
Bank, 433.

2. A defence set up to the suit on the certificate of deposit was, that II.
(the vice-president of the Cincinnati Bank), its assistant cashier, and
W. of W. & Co., conspired to defraud that bank by using its funds in
speculating in wheat in Chicago, through K. & Co., so as to make a
"corner" in wheat; Held, that rumors on the board of trade and in
the public press that H. was the real principal for whom W. was act-
ing, could not affect the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff could not
refuse to honor the checks of K. & Co. against the deposit, on the
ground that K. & Co. intended to use the money to pay antecedent
losses in the gambling wheat transactions. Ib.

3. The statute of Illinois, 1 Starr & Curtis, Stat. 1885, pp. 791, 792, §§ 130,

131, and the case of Pearce v. Foote, 113 Illinois, 228, do not apply to
the present case. Ib.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

The property of a subject of the Emperor of the French in Louisiana was
occupied by the army of the United States during the war of the rebel-
lion. A claim for the injury caused thereby was adjusted by the com-
manding general, but payment was refused in consequence of the
passage of the act of February 21, 1867, 14 Stat. 397, c. 57. After the
organization of the commission under the Claims Convention of 1880
with France, 21 Stat. 673, his executor (he having meantime died in
Paris leaving a will distributing his estate) presented this claim against
the United States to the commissioners, and an allowance was made
which was paid to the executor. In settling the executor's accounts in
the courts of Louisiana two of the legatees, who were citizens of France,
laid claim to the whole of the award. The other legatees, who were
citizens of the United States, claimed the right to participate in the
division of this sum. The award of the commission being silent on
the subject, the briefs of counsel on both sides before the commission
together with letters from the claimants' counsel, and a letter from
one of the commissioners, were offered to show that only the claims
on the part of the French legatees were considered by the commission,
and the evidence was admitted. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
ordered the award to be distributed among all the legatees, French
and American; Held, (1) That this court had jurisdiction to review
the judgment of the state court; (2) That the French legatees only
were entitled to be represented before the commission, and they only
were entitled to participate in the distribution; (3) That the briefs
of counsel were properly admitted in evidence; (4) That the letters
of counsel and of the commissioner should have been rejected; but,
(5) That it was immaterial whether the evidence was or was not re-
ceived, as the decision of the question depended upon considerations
which such evidence could in no way affect. Burthe v. Denis, 514.

COMPTROLLER IN TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
A comptroller in the Treasury Department has no power to review, revise
or alter items in accounts expressly allowed by statute, or items of
expenditures or allowances made upon the judgment or discretion of
officers charged by law with the duty of expending the money or
making the allowances. United States v. Waters, 208.

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.
See NATIONAL BANK, 3.

CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 6.

CONFISCATION.

A condemnation under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589,
of real estate owned in fee by a person who had participated in the
rebellion, and a sale under the decree, left the remainder, after the
expiration of the confiscated life-estate, so vested in him that he could
dispose of it after receiving a full pardon from the President. Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, 92.

1. The Constitution of the United States, in proper cases, permits equity
courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from
prosecuting suits in another State. Cole v. Cunningham, 107.

2. It is no violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United
States which requires that full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, if a court in
one State, (in which proceedings have been begun, under a general
insolvent law of the State, to distribute the estate of an insolvent
debtor among his creditors,) enjoins a creditor of the insolvent, (who
is a citizen of the same State, and subject to the jurisdiction of the
court,) from proceeding to judgment and execution in a suit against
the insolvent in another State, begun by an attachment of his prop-
erty there, after knowledge of his embarrassment and actual insolvency,
which property the insolvent law of the State of the debtor's residence
requires him to convey to his assignee in insolvency, for distribution
with his other assets - there being nothing in the law or policy of the
State in which the attachment is made, opposed to those of the State
of the creditor and of the insolvent debtor. Ib.

3. In an action brought in a state court against the judges of the Court of
Commissioners of the Alabama Claims, by one who had been an
attorney of that court, to recover damages caused by an order of the
court disbarring him, the plaintiff averred and contended that the
court had not been legally organized, and that it did not act judicially
in making the order complained of; Held, that a decision by the state
court that the Court of Alabama Claims was legally organized and did
act judicially in that matter, denied to the plaintiff no title, right,
privilege or immunity claimed by him under the Constitution, or
under a treaty or statute of the United States, or under a commission
held or authority exercised under the United States. Manning v.
French, 186.

4. The provision in § 501, Rev. Stat. Idaho, that "no person who is a
bigamist or polygamist, or who teaches, advises, counsels or encourages
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