necessary for the payment of debts, or not. Mason v. Pewabic Mining
Co., 50.
7. Directors of a corporation, conducting its business and receiving moneys
belonging to it after the expiration of the term for which it was in-
corporated, will be held to an account on the dissolution and the
final liquidation of the affairs of the corporation in a court of equity.
Ib.
8. When a legislature has full power to create corporations, its act recog-
nizing as valid a de facto corporation, whether private or municipal,
operates to cure all defects in steps leading up to an organization,
and makes a de jure out of what was before only a de facto corpora-
tion. Comanche County v. Lewis, 198.
See NATIONAL BANK, 1;
PLEDGE.
COSTS.
At the last term of court motions to dismiss Nelson v. Green and Nelson
et al. v. Green were argued at the same time with a motion to dismiss
this case, and the motion was granted as to those cases, and denied as
to this case. After the entry of judgment counsel in those cases
moved on behalf of the appellants that the sum of $450 which had
been deposited with the clerk for copies of the record should be re-
funded; Held, (the judgment being announced in delivering the opin-
ion and announcing the judgment in this case,) that $200 of that
amount should be refunded. Richardson's Executor v. Green, 30.
COUNSEL FEES.
See DISTRICT ATTORNEY;
RECEIVER.
COURT AND JURY.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 4.
CRIMINAL LAW.
1. Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of the United States, by
the laws of Idaho, and by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries; and to call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend
the common sense of mankind. Davis v. Beason, 333.
2. A crime is none the less so, nor less odious, because sanctioned by what
any particular sect may designate as religion. Ib.
3. The second subdivision of § 504, Rev. Stats. Idaho, requiring every
person desiring to have his name registered as a voter to take an oath
that he does not belong to an order that advises a disregard of the
criminal law of the Territory, is not open to any valid legal objec-
tion. Ib.
4. The act of Congress of March 22, 1882, 22 Stat. 31, c. 47, "to amend
section fifty-three hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,"
does not restrict the legislation of the Territories over kindred offences
or over the means for their ascertainment and prevention. Ib.
DAMAGES.
DEED.
1. In a deed of real estate, "subject, however, to certain incumbrances
now resting thereon, payment of which is assumed by the grantee,"
and containing a covenant of special warranty by the grantor against
all persons claiming under him, the clause assuming payment of the
incumbrances includes existing mortgages made by the grantor, as
well as unpaid taxes assessed against him. Keller v. Ashford, 610.
2. The grantee named in a deed of real estate, by the terms of which he
assumes the payment of a mortgage thereon, is liable to the grantor
for a breach of that agreement, although he is not shown to have had
any knowledge of the deed at the time of its execution, if after being
informed of its terms he collects the rents and sells and conveys part of
the land. Ib.
3. An agreement in a deed of real estate, by which the grantee assumes
the payment of a mortgage made by the grantor, is a contract between
the grantee and the mortgagor only; and does not, unless assented to
by the mortgagee, create any direct obligation, at law or in equity,
from the grantee to the mortgagee. But the mortgagee may avail
himself in equity of the right of the mortgagor against the grantee.
And if the mortgagee, after the land has been sold under a prior
mortgage for a sum insufficient to pay that mortgage, and after he has
recovered a personal judgment against the mortgagor, execution upon
which has been returned unsatisfied, brings a suit in equity against
the grantee alone, and the omission to make the mortgagor a party is
not objected to at the hearing, it affords no ground for refusing
relief. lb.
DESCENT.
A citizen of France can take land in the District of Columbia by descent
from a citizen of the United States. Geofroy v. Riggs, 258.
DICTUM.
A mere dictum in an opinion, not essential to the decision, is not authori-
tative and binding. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price, 496.
DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.
See SALARY.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
The amount of counsel fee to be allowed to a district attorney, under Rev.
Stat. § 824, for trial before a jury of a person indicted for crime, is
discretionary with the court, within the limits of the statute; and the
action of the court in this respect is not subject to review by the At-
torney General, or by the accounting officers of the treasury. United
States v. Waters, 208.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
The District of Columbia, as a political community, is one of "the States
of the Union," within the meaning of that term as used in article 7 of
the Consular Convention of February 23, 1853, with France. Geofroy
v. Riggs, 258.
EJECTMENT.
See BETTERMENTS.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
In exercising the right of eminent domain for the acquisition of private
property for public use, the compensation to be awarded must not
only be just to the owner, but also just to the public which is to pay
for it. Searl v. School District No. 2, 553.
EQUITY.
1. A bill in equity for the foreclosure of a mortgage of a railroad for non-
payment of overdue interest, the principal being payable at a future
day, was taken pro confesso, the company appearing but not answering.
A sale was made under the decree of the court, and, it appearing that
there was a surplus over and above what was necessary to pay the over-
due interest, costs and expenses, the court ordered it to be applied to
the reduction of the principal sum due upon the bonds, and entered a
decree that the balance of such principal sum, remaining after such ap-
plication, was due and payable from the company to the holders of the
bonds, and that the trustee recover it for them, with interest until
paid; Held, (1) That the application of the surplus was properly
made; (2) That decree, declaring the remainder of the principal
sum due and immediately payable, was irregular and was not war-
ranted by the pleadings. Ohio Central Railroad Co. v. Central Trust
Co., 83.
2. The defendant in a bill in equity, taken pro confesso, is not precluded
from contesting the sufficiency of the bill or from insisting that the
averments contained in it do not justify the decree. Ib.
3. A decree on a bill taken pro confesso may be attacked on appeal, if not
confined to the matter of the bill. Ib.
4. The 92d rule in equity does not authorize a decree to be entered in a
suit in equity for the foreclosure of a mortgage for a balance due to
the complainant over and above the proceeds of the sale, if, as a mat-
ter of fact, such balance has not become payable. Ib.
5. A railroad company, whose road, property and franchises have been
sold under a decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage entered on a bill
taken pro confesso, may prosecute an appeal from the final decree dis-
tributing the proceeds of the sale and adjudging a balance still due
the mortgage creditors. Ib.
6. A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law, unless the
complainant has an equitable defence of which he could not avail him-
self at law, or had a good defence at law which he was prevented from
availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of
himself or his agents. Knox County v. Harshman, 152.
7. Where by statute the summons in any action against a county may be
served upon the clerk of the county court, and the officer's return in
such an action shows such a service, the county cannot maintain a bill
in equity to restrain process of execution upon the judgment, on the
ground that service was not made upon the clerk, or that he did not
inform the county court thereof. Ib.
8. A State is an indispensable party to any proceeding in equity in which
its property is sought to be taken and subjected to the payment of its
obligations. Christian v. Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad Co., 233.
9. The State of North Carolina subscribed in 1856 for capital stock in a
railway company which had been incorporated by its legislature,
issued its bonds with thirty years to run, sold them, and with the pro-
ceeds paid its subscription, and received certificates of stock therefor,
which certificates it never parted with and still holds. In the act in-
corporating the company and authorizing the issue of the bonds it
was provided that as security for their redemption "the public faith
of the State" "is hereby pledged to the holders," "and in addition
thereto all the stock held by the State" in the railroad company
"shall be pledged for that purpose" and that "any dividend" on the
stock "shall be applied to the payment of the interest accruing on
said coupon bonds." The State being in default in the payment of
the interest due on the bonds since 1868, a bondholder, who was a
citizen of Virginia, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United
States in the Eastern District of North Carolina against the Rail-
road Company, its president and directors, the person holding the
proxy of the State upon the stock held by it, and the treasurer of the
State, praying to have the complainant's bonds decreed to be a lien
upon the stock owned by the State and upon any dividends that might
be declared thereon, and that such dividends might be paid to com-
plainant and to such bondholders as might join in the suit, and for
the sale of the stock if the dividends should prove insufficient, and for
an account, and for the appointment of a receiver, and for an injunction;
Held, that, as the State was an indispensable party to the suit, the
bill must be dismissed. lb.
10. Two attorneys representing two separate parties, delivered a promis-
sory note to a third person as bailee, and took his receipt therefor, in
which he stated that he held it subject to their joint order, and to be
dealt with as they might jointly direct. One of the separate parties
filed a bill in equity against the bailee to compel him to deliver up the
proceeds of the note (which had been paid) without making parties to
the bill the two attorneys and the other party; claiming that he was
entitled to do so by reason of an award in an arbitration that had
taken place by which it had been decided that he should become the
owner of the note on the performance of certain conditions which he
had performed; Held, that they were necessary parties to the bill and
that no decree could be made by the court in their absence. Gregory v.
Stetson, 579.
See CONTRACT, 1, (8), (9);
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 2;
CORPORATION, 3, 7;
DEED, 3;
JUDGMENT;
JURISDICTION, B, 4;
MORTGAGE;
RECEIVER.
EQUITY PLEADING.
1. In a bill in equity to quiet title, an allegation that the plaintiff is seized
in fee simple is a sufficient allegation that he has the possession as well
as the title. Gage v. Kaufman, 471.
2. In a bill in equity, an allegation that the plaintiff has no adequate rem-
edy at law is dispensed with by rule 21 in equity. Ib.
3. A bill in equity to remove a cloud created by a tax deed, alleging that
no taxes were due upon which the land could be sold, need not offer
to pay any taxes as a condition of relief. Ib.
4. By the law of Illinois a tax deed is no more than prima facie evidence
in favor of the purchaser, and may be shown to be invalid by proof
that there was no advertisement of sale, or no judgment or precept,
or no taxes unpaid, or no notice to redeem given or recorded; and a
bill to remove a cloud upon title alleging that the defendant claims
under a tax deed valid on its face, but invalid on the grounds afore-
said, is good on demurrer. Ib.
ESTOPPEL.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE, 3;
CONTRACT, 1, 4;
MORTGAGE, 3;
NATIONAL BANK, 5.
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