It remains to trace this principle in the various modifications which it has subsequently undergone, and to show that it was not finally obliterated, nor consequently the CONDITION CANCELLED, till the recent changes which have taken place in our constitution.

On referring, then, to Gibson's Summary of "Temporal Laws against Separation," we find that the act above cited, made in the 35th year of Elizabeth, was pronounced to be in force by subsequent acts in the 39th and 43rd years of her reign, and also in the 1st and 7th years of James I.; that in the subsequent parliament, ending in the 18th year of James I., no provision was made for its continuance, through oversight; but that it was again continued in the 21st of James I., and in the 3rd of Charles I. Then a long interval occurs till 1663, which is called the 16th of Charles II., when in the famous act "to prevent and suppress seditious conventicles," we find-" Whereas an act made in the 35th year of the reign of our Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth, entitled, &c......hath not been put in due execution, by reason of some doubt of late made, whether the said act be still in force, although it be very clear and evident; it is hereby declared that the said act is still in force, and ought to be put in due execution." The history of the act winds up in the year 1688.-1 William and Mary," In an act entitled, An Act exempting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects, Dissenting, &c.....[Dissenters] shall not be liable to any pains,

penalties, or forfeitures, mentioned in an act made in the 35th year of the reign of the late Queen Elizabeth, entitled, &c."

But though this act was finally repealed in 1688, still the principle on which it was founded was allowed to survive it. Three other acts which had been founded on the same principle were allowed to continue in force: viz. (1.) An act made in the 13th year of Charles II., "for the well-governing and regulation of corporations." (2.) An act made in the 25th year of Charles II., "for preventing dangers which may happen from Popish recusants." (3.) An act made in the 30th year of Charles II., "for the more effectual preserving of the King's person and government by disabling Papists from sitting in either house of parliament." And till these acts were repealed, repealed, the CONDITION on which Hooker insists was not thoroughly CANCELLED...... His argument was indeed in some respects weakened by the Act of Toleration, in 1688, but still it was not entirely overthrown. From that time the Commonwealth did indeed cease to be identical with the Church; but parliament did not cease, at least, did not entirely cease, to represent the Church; it was still, by virtue of the foregoing acts, in some sense at least, a lay synod of the Church. By the 13th of Charles II. the government of all corporations had been consigned into the hands, not merely of churchmen, but of Communicants; by the 25th, the crown was procected from all dissenting influences by the exclu

sion of all except communicants from every office held directly or indirectly by royal appointment; and by the 30th, the most influential body of dissenters, i. e. the Roman Catholics, were shut out from either house of parliament. And, till the repeal of these acts, it is clear that vigilance on the part of the Church might have secured for itself at least a very strong party in the House of Commons.

The Church, however, was not vigilant, and two, at least, of these important acts were allowed to fall into disuse. In the 5th year of George I it was enacted, by a House of Commons in which the Church ought to have retained an ascendancy, "that elections into corporate offices shall not be void on account of the person elected having omitted to communicate within a year of the election, unless he shall be removed within six months of the election, or unless a prosecution shall be commenced within that time and be carried on without delay." In the 9th year of George II. a further act was passed, “indemnifying all those who, though not communicants, held offices which were restricted to communicants." And subsequently it became a regular practice to pass an act of "indemnity" every session of parliament. At length, in 1828, men had so completely forgotten the principles on which Church and State were anciently united, that the 13th and 25th of Charles II., viz. the test and corporation acts, were repealed, almost without opposition; and the year following, the Roman Catholics were admitted to seats in parliament. In 1832,

the extinction of the Irish Protestant boroughs, and the great power accidentally given to dissenters by the Reform Act, gave a concluding blow to the ancient system. And in 1833, we have witnessed the assembling of a parliament in which few perhaps can detect the traces of a LAY SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. To revert, then, to the original proposition, it does appear that, according to Hooker, our civil legislature is no longer qualified, as it formerly was, to be our ecclesiastical legislature; that the CONDITIONS on which our predecessors consented to parliamentary interference in matters spiritual are Cancelled'.

1 [The following remarks on the foregoing Section occur in a letter written in July or August, 1833, by the Author, to at friend who seems to have observed upon it:] I have thought a great deal of your last letter, and quite admit that Hooker's argument has no especial reference to the appointment of Bishops, but goes to any kind of State Interference as well. You seem to think indeed that I stretched it unfairly in applying it to the case of Bishops at all, but this is Hooker's fault, not mine. I have some misgiving myself that it [Hooker's theory of State Interference] is a quibble, but it is the quibble of a great man; and really, if it is a bad argument, I can find no other justification for either our ancestors or ourselves, for having so long tolerated the King's usurpation. However, if one looks only at the common sense of the matter, is it not this? As long as the Church had preponderating influence in Parliament, so long it was the interest of the Minister, cæteris paribus, to prefer a Churchman to a Latitudinarian; if the latter obtained preference, it would be not because of his opinions, but in spite of them. The short Whig Dynasties have been an exception to this statement; and it is because they were an exception that they were short. The country, such as it was

§ 3. [Interference of the Crown considered under its
existing disabilities.]

I have already shown on the principles of the great Hooker, that our Civil Legislature is no longer competent to act as our Ecclesiastical Legislature. I now throw out for enquiry, whether the same principles may not affect the competence of the head of Civil Legislature, as head of the Ecclesiastical Legislature.

The two cases are certainly in one respect very different, for after all the changes that have taken place in the constitutional relations of Church and State, it still remains a law that the King of England must be in communion with the Church of England. Yet it may be questionable whether any great stress should be laid on this difference, as

then, did not like their principles, and turned them out. Now we shall have long Whig Dynasties, because the country, as it is now, does like their principles: and we shall have Latitudinarians appointed because they are such; which is what I meant when I said we had no guarantee against the systematic appointment of Latitudinarian Bishops. Indeed this is what you say in the latter part of your letter, viz. that such appointments will be more a matter of course than formerly. Now it appears to me, that (whether Hooker was refining or not) this is enough for us, and practically settles the point. I wish Bishops had never been appointed by the King; but it seems to me that the impropriety of allowing it now is in degree so vastly greater than it was till within this last year or two, that I see no great use in the enquiry whether it is new in kind. However, it is no use to trouble you on paper, as I mean to accept your kind invitation, &c.