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the word Reason, when so used, does not mean this faculty, but something quite different, viz. an assumption respecting the preference due to human experience over the literal meaning of Scripture ; and since this is not always borne in mind, but is in general left entirely out of sight, and since this new sort of Reason enjoys in consequence the full benefit of its equivocal name, it becomes necessary to expose the fallacy.

It must be borne in mind then, that, when in a vague way of speaking, Faith is ever said on any subject to be opposed to Reason, nothing more is meant than that it is opposed to Experience; that is, that on the subject in question we should be led to opposite conclusions by looking only to what Experience and the light of nature seem to suggest, and by looking only to the apparent meaning of Scripture.

In all cases, however, when this opposition occurs, or indeed wherever any other difficulty seems to hang over the interpretation of Scripture, it must be remembered, that Reason is the sole arbiter to which reasonable creatures can appeal'. In such cases to insist on the duty of Faith, though true indeed, is perfectly irrelevant, since it is not our duty to believe, unless the apparent meaning of

1 [It is not here asserted that we must ever be consciously acting on Reason, but that when we come to analyse our opinions and views, when we come to argue and infer, the "appeal" lies to that which is the "sole" ultimate "arbiter" of truth which has been given us. is.]

Scripture is shown by Reason to be the real meaning, and till the opposite suggestions of Experience are repudiated by it as trivial'. To illustrate this, let us consider Hume's argument on the subject of miracles. Experience, he tells us, shows that the course of nature is regulated by certain fixed principles admitting of no deviation; that such Experience is our sole ground for calculating on any future event whatever, even the recurrence of the seasons or the rising of the sun to-morrow morning: on the other hand that Experience shows the minds and actions of men to be subject to great variety and caprice, that one man may act on motives which to another are unaccountable, and therefore that, however little the conduct of the Sacred Historians may look like that either of enthusiasts or impostors, still the conclusion that they were not so, and consequently our reliance on them as credible witnesses, must rest on our Experience of so capricious and mutable a thing as the human heart; whereas our reason for not relying on them rests on the immutable laws of Nature.

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[This means, "It does not become a duty to believe, except so far as we have reason to think that, &c. ;" or The duty of belief does but rise out of the conclusion in reason, that the apparent meaning of Scripture is the true one, &c. Hence, moreover, there are two points for consideration: 1st, Whether "the opposite suggestions of Experience" are relevant, or whether Rationalism is not unreasonable, which is treated of in Chapter iii.; and 2nd, On what principles Scripture is to be interpreted, a fragment on which subject is contained in Chapters iv. and v.]

Now it is frankly admitted that this, to a certain extent, is a fair statement of the argument; the question is, whether it is more reasonable to allow that such and such laws of Nature may have been suspended, (taking into consideration the reason assigned for their suspension, and the agents to whom it is attributed,) or to believe the alternative, viz. that certain men, such and so many as are described in the New Testament, were by a simultaneous caprice induced to act the part assigned in history to the Apostles and Disciples of our Lord and their first Christian converts all over the world; and on the decision of this question, the reality of the supposed Christian revelation must depend.

In the same manner, with regard to the Socinian question, the point to be decided is, whether, taking every thing into consideration, we have on the whole so good ground for satisfaction with the completeness of the knowledge derived to us by Experience and the light of Nature concerning the nature of the Supreme Being, the sense in which Personality can be attributed to Him, His intentions towards mankind, and the principles on which He regulates the great scheme of the Universe, as to make it certain that any texts of Scripture, which add to or modify, or interfere with such knowledge, must either be interpolations or modes of speech foreign to the idiom of the Greek language, or figures for the use of which [if they be such] no reason can be given except an intention to perplex. On the answer of this question depends

the whole controversy. If we have such ground, then it is clear that revelation opposes Socinianism only apparently, not really.

These and all similar disputes must be decided by Reason, and Reason only, and the two things which it has to weigh against one another are, on the one hand the grounds we have for trusting to the suggestions of Experience, and on the other for believing that a supposed revelation contrary to them, is real. This is a question, which it is not only safe, but necessary, to entertain in religious questions; for although to oppose any experience to a revelation ascertained to be real, would be infinitely absurd, yet Experience may on some questions afford us a light sufficiently clear to prove that a revelation which contradicts it cannot be real. Indeed it is clear that on some points Experience gives us such certain information, as of itself to render questionable any supposed revelation contradictory to it, or indeed to prove it no revelation, however strong might be the positive evidence on its side. Conscience, which is part of Experience, teaches us certain notions of right and wrong, which we know so well to be the Law of God written in our hearts, that, if miracles were to be done under our own eyes to overset such notions, we might be sure these miracles were from Beelzebub; as indeed we are clearly taught by our Saviour, who appeals to the consciences of His hearers as the proper proof that His own miracles

were not from Beelzebub'. In such a case Experience is sufficient to outweigh any positive proof of a revelation opposed to it, and ought to make us certain that such supposed revelation could not be real.

It is obvious, however, that there are very few cases in which Experience can be so far relied on ; and that in any case, where the slightest doubt hangs over its suggestions, in such case, unless the proofs of an opposed revelation are absolutely none at all, it will be our duty to proceed with the greatest caution; for that in such a case it will be doubtful whether God has given a revelation or not, and it is obvious that to treat what may possibly be a revelation from God as if it certainly was not, is the very height of presumption.

A farther reason for caution is furnished us by the fact, that in all cases where an appeal is made to Experience on the one side, and to Faith on the other, there is a decided bias in all minds to give undue weight to Experience. To assign a reason for this is beside my present purpose; the fact will, I believe, be acknowledged by all thinking persons,

1 [Matt. xii. 25. St. Paul tells us that, though an Angel brought doctrine contrary to the faith once delivered, he would have no claim on our attention. Accordingly it has been observed that such divine communications in Scripture as run counter to our natural feelings of right (e. g. the destruction of the Canaanites) always relate to single actions, not to doctrines. Abraham was told to sacrifice his son; he was not told that the sacrifice of children was ordinarily allowable.]

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